US-Russia thaw? From Biden a hand extended to Berlin that becomes an undeserved gift to Putin
The past week has left us with two important news on the front of Russian-US relations. On the one hand, the meeting in Iceland between their respective foreign agents, Blinken and Lavrov, which ended with a generic but significant declaration of intent towards a " more stable and predictable relationship "; on the other hand, Washington's renunciation of renewing the sanctions inflicted on the construction company of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and its top manager, Matthias Warnig, former Stasi agent and great friend of Vladimir Putin. Just two months ago, during a television interview, President Biden had called his Russian counterpart a " killer ", words which were followed by the escalation of the war on the border with Ukraine and the dispatch of two ships from war in the direction of the Black Sea, then return to base before reaching the conflict zone. The events of recent days would therefore seem to indicate a reversal of the trend compared to the tensions of recent months and a possible rapprochement between the American superpower and Moscow, which should materialize in the tête à tête meeting between the two leaders , announced for the coming months but not confirmed yet. But what is behind this sudden change of perspective and, above all, can it really be considered such?
The essential premise from which we must always start is that the United States, while considering China as a strategic rival that poses an existential threat, sees Russia mainly as a tactical opponent, as such expendable for internal and international policy purposes on the various scenarios of the geopolitical chessboard. This does not mean that they underestimate its potential destabilizer but are confident that they can neutralize and manage it more easily. Washington does not believe, perhaps wrongly, in Sino-Russian convergence: it does not conceive that Moscow can surrender itself to a hegemonic power on its doorstep and, after all, it is convinced that it can bring Russia back in due time to a Western front in anti-Chinese function. It is a risky but not senseless bet. The Russians are in difficulty, the economy is struggling, domestic tensions are growing, Putin is now on the way to the last phase of his mandate and the image of his country abroad is severely compromised. Russia is worrying but not scary and, as also demonstrated by the Blinken-Lavrov meeting, it is receptive to any sign of openness that may come from the White House.
The Kremlin, beyond the rhetoric, seems to constantly seek American recognition and even the war skirmishes with Ukraine can be read as an attempt to build a political capital to be asserted on the diplomatic level. Washington's calculation is that in moments of difficulty for the adversary, we can allow ourselves to ease the pressure, to go down the path of normalization of relations, to mend the tears, to be able to concentrate on scenarios considered more urgent: it is the same movement that over the years, and of the administrations, it has characterized relations with Iran, more tense when the ayatollahs' regime has shown greater assertiveness, more “ diplomatic ” when internal problems have highlighted its weaknesses.
As already analyzed in a previous article , the fundamental need of the United States is the maintenance of stability in Europe which, translated, means preventing Germany from establishing itself as an autonomous reference pole as opposed to Washington and the consolidation of a hypothetical axis Russian-German in the heart of the continent. Until a few days ago, the American reaction to this double threat consisted of a firm opposition both to the completion of Nord Stream 2 and to the trade agreements with China promoted by Berlin. It is likely that Biden found himself with too many fronts open at the same time and decided to close some dossiers in order not to lose control of a game in which he is both the referee and the player.
Hence the substantial renunciation (even if formally Blinken reiterated the American opposition) to hinder the completion of the gas pipeline that will connect Russia and Germany through the Baltic, in exchange for an unspecified " compensation " promised by Berlin to Ukraine, whose economic and geopolitical interests are heavily compromised. But above all in return – and I do not think I have seen this connection stressed elsewhere – of the freezing by the European Parliament of the investment agreement with China (CAI), approved by a very large majority in plenary session, and which Merkel had to cash tight-lipped. The gift from Brussels arrived just as Biden's triple European appointment is being prepared in mid-June (G7, EU and NATO summit), that the respective diplomacies cannot fail if they want to accredit the much touted thesis of the " rapprochement " between the two sides of the Atlantic.
In this context, a hand extended to Germany to ease the recent tensions awaiting the elections in September is welcome – they reason in Washington (but even if the Greens win it will perhaps be late to reverse the course), yielding on a Nord Stream 2 now in phase too advanced to be stopped and taking home the victory of the European no at the CAI. It matters little if détente risks objectively favoring the interests of Moscow, which is focusing almost everything on energy penetration in Europe. Hence the criticism of some Republican representatives in Congress, according to which the decision to suspend the sanctions would send a signal of weakness to Putin and of lack of reliability to the American allies in the region, the Baltic countries and Poland in the first place . Just last Saturday, during a meeting with journalists, the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Kaczyński declared that Poland must " develop its military capabilities as soon as possible ".
Since the policies of states in the international arena are judged not by intentions but by results, what seems at first sight a realistic attitude, dictated by practical and not ideological considerations, could in reality cause a boomerang effect for the Biden administration. First of all because it is quite curious that under the pro-Russian Trump the United States has imposed sanctions and under the anti-Russian Biden they renounce them citing no less than reasons of " national interest ": until yesterday the American priority was not precisely to block the doubling the pipeline? Secondly, because the tactic of concessions to obtain concessions, if it can work with riotous allies against whom Washington still maintains a high bargaining power, normally fails if applied to antagonistic powers actively engaged in counteracting actions, as in the Russian case.
Finally, because, as Federico Punzi pointed out about the Middle Eastern crisis, the apparent inconsistency between statements of principle and concrete actions, combined with a still embryonic but already visible tendency to appeasement and overturning (yes, of an ideological nature) of policies Trumpian, risks awakening the never dormant ambitions of governments and non-state organizations hostile to the United States and its allies. Détente with Moscow makes sense in a long-term perspective and is probably a necessary path in the context of the China-West opposition: but in the immediate future – with Putin still firmly in the saddle, in full authoritarian drift and with expansive ambitions in the near abroad – it is an instrument to be handled with care, on pain of the deterioration of that regional stability which it is intended to strengthen.
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This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Atlantico Quotidiano at the URL http://www.atlanticoquotidiano.it/quotidiano/disgelo-usa-russia-da-biden-una-mano-tesa-a-berlino-che-diventa-un-regalo-immeritato-a-putin/ on Mon, 24 May 2021 04:01:00 +0000.