Iran at a crossroads: who would take power if the Islamic Republic were to fall? Scenarios include coups, opposition, and economic uncertainties.

10 January 20261 week babelfish

Before delving into the intricacies of political succession and speculation, it's necessary to make a cold but necessary realpolitik premise. It's by no means a given that the Ayatollah regime is about to fall. Those who bet on the imminent end of the Islamic Republic often forget the very nature of a theocracy: it believes itself legitimized not by popular consensus, but by a divine mandate. This belief makes the ruling elite impervious to criticism and, above all, willing to resort to any level of violence to preserve the status quo . Furthermore, history teaches us that the streets, however heated, suffer the ravages of time: after days or weeks of clashes, physical and economic exhaustion can set in, leaving the regime, bruised but alive, still in power.

However, in economics as in geopolitics, we must also analyze the tail risks . If the protests were to pass the point of no return, if the dam of repression were to burst, who would fill the power vacuum in Tehran? And what would the seismic consequences be for the global economy and the balance of power in the Middle East?

Iran 3

The succession dilemma: not "Who," but "How"

As Iranian streets simmer and the health—both political and physical—of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is the subject of speculation, the central question is not only who will succeed him, but how his transition will unfold. According to regional experts and opposition voices, the answer is far from clear and depends less on ideology and much more on the resilience of the security forces.

Behnam Ben Taleblu , senior analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies , offers us an interesting technical insight : the critical variable is the mode of collapse.

“Despite the title of Supreme Leader, one must question how much Khamenei is actually governing the country’s affairs,” notes Ben Taleblu.

The greatest risk, from a Western perspective, is falling into the trap of "Leopard-esque change." The analyst warns against supporting a cosmetic transition, a reshuffle of elites that leaves the deep power structure intact. The fear is of a "Maduro Model" or an Egyptian scenario: a situation in which the security forces, despite sacrificing a few crowned heads (or turbans), maintain control of the economic and military levers. It would be a classic game of musical chairs: the music changes, but those in charge remain at the table.

The Role of the Security Apparatus: The Real Tipping Point

There's no point in beating around the bush: Iran's future is not being decided in the salons of Paris or Washington, but in the barracks of Tehran. The consensus among analysts is that everything depends on the cohesion of the coercive apparatus: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ( IRGC ), the Basij militia, and the regular army (Artesh).

For the regime to collapse, popular anger alone isn't enough; a fracture in the monopoly of force is needed. Ben Taleblu emphasizes that segments of the security forces must desert or refuse orders. Without this internal schism, fueled by economic strikes that cut the regime's funding, real power will remain in the hands of the armed institutions. There have been rumors of units that have not obeyed, but so far there have been no mass mutinies.

Is a military coup possible? Benny Sabti, an expert at the Israel Institute for National Security Studies, doesn't rule it out, but with reservations. The IRGC is an ideological and asymmetrical force, not a traditional professional army. A Pasdaran general could attempt a coup, but Iran has a structural problem: a lack of charisma. Sabti notes that, despite some internal criticism, there is a lack of military figures capable of catalyzing national consensus, as happened in Egypt with al-Sisi. There are no figures with the authority to seize power, especially since the Israeli attack has leveled many commands.

The Opposition: Between Nostalgia, Exile, and Controversy

If the inside is blocked, the outside is fragmented. Here are the main players in play:

Political Prisoners: Despite the media attention, it's unlikely that leadership will emerge from prison. Decades of repression have prevented the formation of an alternative internal political class. The released prisoners will be part of the system, but they're unlikely to be its architects.
Reza Pahlavi (The "Prince"): Son of the last Shah, Pahlavi is emerging as a focal point for mobilization. He presents himself not as a restorationist monarch, but as a guide to a democratic constituent assembly. His supporters see him as the sole unifying figure; critics, however, fear a return to the past and are wary of outside influence. Furthermore, his real influence on the population, beyond his slogans, is unclear.

Prince Reza Pahlavi

Maryam Rajavi and the MEK: The People's Mujahideen (MEK) are the most organized and militarized opposition, with strong political connections in the US (from Pence to Pompeo). However, they enjoy very little popular support within Iran due to their violent past and their support for Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war. They are well regarded by certain Western "hawks," but viewed with suspicion by the younger Iranian population.

Maryam Rajavi

The Economic Scenario: From Dirigisme to Market?

Here the analysis must become technical. The current Iranian economy is a dysfunctional hybrid: a mix of statism, unsustainable energy subsidies, and the domination of the Bonyads , the religious foundations that control entire productive sectors (from cement to pharmaceuticals) under a regime of tax exemption and total opacity. A country extremely rich in oil and gas, with an ancient entrepreneurial and mercantile tradition, compressed and impoverished by uneconomic management.

If the regime were to fall, we would be faced with an economic shock of biblical proportions, but potentially positive in the medium term:

Ending sanctions: Iran's return to international financial markets would free up billions of frozen dollars and allow massive exports of crude oil and gas, with a deflationary impact on global energy prices (unless OPEC intervenes drastically).
Keynesian Reconstruction: A new government should launch a massive public investment plan to modernize the currently crumbling oil and water infrastructure. This would attract foreign capital, but it would require a legal stability that currently doesn't exist.
The Bonyad issue: Dismantling the economic power of the clerics would be the most daunting challenge. It would mean expropriating billions of dollars in assets from an elite still in control. Without this reform, the economy would remain hostage to the old system. However, anything can be done, even nationalizing and then listing on domestic financial markets.

Geopolitical implications: The collapse of the “Axis of Resistance”

Regime change in Tehran wouldn't stop at the Persian border. Iran finances and arms a network of proxies throughout the Middle East: Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria, and Hamas in Gaza.

Without the steady flow of money and weapons from Tehran (often channeled by the Quds Force), these organizations would find themselves financially and strategically orphaned.

For Israel: It would be the most significant strategic shift since 1979, dramatically reducing the threat on its northern and southern borders.
For Saudi Arabia: The end of the Middle Eastern Cold War would allow Riyadh to focus on its "Vision 2030" without the constant fear of missile or drone attacks. But beware: the new Persia would be a formidable power, as it would also have the demographic boost that Saudi Arabia lacks.
For oil prices: Paradoxically, greater stability could lead to a drop in prices due to increased Iranian supply, but the instability of the transition phase could create short-term speculative spikes.

A marathon, not a sprint

As Ben Taleblu points out, we're facing a marathon. There's no clear successor waiting in the wings. Khamenei is still alive, the Basij are still armed, and the opposition is divided. However, the tectonic plates of Iranian society are shifting. The country's fate will depend not on who shouts loudest on Twitter, but on who can unite the street with a section of the military, offering a credible way out of the theocratic impasse. Until then, Iran remains the biggest unknown on the global stage.

Demonstrations taking place tonight

Questions and Answers

Why has the Iranian regime not yet fallen despite years of cyclical protests?

The Islamic Republic's survival rests on three pillars: a repressive apparatus willing to shoot at the crowds (IRGC and Basij), total control of the economy through religious foundations ( Bonyad ) that guarantees the loyalty of the elites, and the lack of a unified and charismatic alternative leadership within the country. Furthermore, the regime has learned to manage internet blackouts to prevent coordination on the streets.

What would be the immediate impact on oil prices if the regime fell?

In the very short term, instability and the risk of sabotage at facilities could cause a speculative surge. However, in the medium term, the lifting of sanctions and the return to full exports from Iran (which has the world's fourth-largest crude oil reserves) would lead to excess supply on the market, pushing prices down, to the detriment of competitors like Russia and Saudi Arabia.

What would happen to Hezbollah and Hamas without Iran?

Without Tehran's financial and logistical support, these organizations would suffer a devastating blow. Hezbollah would lose the ability to maintain its welfare state in Lebanon and its advanced arsenal. Hamas would find itself politically and economically isolated. This would force these groups to drastically downsize or seek new patrons, which would be difficult to find with the same ideological and economic resources as Iran currently has.

The article "Iran at a Crossroads: Who Will Take Power if the Islamic Republic Falls?" Scenarios Amid Coups, Opposition, and Economic Uncertainties comes from Economic Scenarios .

This is a machine translation of a post published on Scenari Economici at the URL https://scenarieconomici.it/iran-al-bivio-a-chi-il-potere-se-cadesse-la-repubblica-islamica-scenari-tra-golpe-opposizione-e-incognite-economiche/ on Sat, 10 Jan 2026 19:58:39 +0000.