This is why Brussels is denying Italy flexibility on the Stability Pact
The European Commission continues to deny Italy the right to activate the safeguard clauses provided for in Article 26 of the Stability Pact to address energy costs, arguing that the conditions for a "severe recession" do not exist. This position, beyond its legal form, is not neutral: it is a deliberate political choice. Brussels is not simply applying rules: it is consciously deciding not to grant Italy any room for maneuver. Flexibility is not ruled out because it is impossible, but because it is deemed inappropriate.
The point is that the energy crisis is neither neutral nor uniform. It is a profoundly asymmetric crisis, affecting member states based on their energy mix. Italy is among the most exposed countries: it depends heavily on gas and therefore on global energy prices. Geopolitical tensions in the Persian Gulf, starting with Iran's role, affect not only oil but the entire global energy balance: both oil flows and a significant portion of liquefied natural gas pass through the Strait of Hormuz. This is why shocks of this type tend to be transmitted simultaneously to both crude oil and gas prices, amplifying the impact on the most exposed countries like Italy.
Faced with a crisis of this kind, economic logic would dictate timely and targeted interventions, including preventive measures. Prevent, not chase, crises. Instead, the Commission takes refuge in a formalistic interpretation of the rules: no widespread recession, therefore no safeguard clauses. But this approach is economically shortsighted. Crises are not addressed when they erupt, but when the initial signs appear. Waiting for the full-blown deterioration to intervene means transforming a manageable shock into a systemic problem.
The crucial point, however, is another: the safeguard clauses provided for in Article 26 leave the Commission enormous discretion. There are no automatic thresholds or stringent objective criteria. Establishing when a situation is "exceptional" and when the impact on public finances is sufficiently serious is, in effect, a political decision. Not a technical one: it's political. And it is used as such.
The proof is in recent events. For military spending, the safeguard clauses were activated quickly and without much resistance: 17 member states obtained flexibility. In that case, the emergency was recognized without hesitation. For energy costs, however, this was not the case. The only difference is what Brussels considers a priority. When the spending is classified as strategic at the European level, flexibility becomes possible; when it concerns internal economic and social needs, it suddenly becomes impractical.
And this is where the most critical point emerges: allowing Italy to activate the safeguard clauses would set a political precedent that is difficult to control. If today we recognize that an asymmetric energy shock justifies a derogation, tomorrow other states could claim the same right due to industrial, social, or financial crises. Brussels fears this domino effect and, to avoid it, prefers to block any opening at the outset, even if it is more than legitimate.
Added to this is a crucial factor: Italy, given its high public debt, is considered by Brussels to be a country requiring discipline rather than support. Allowing the activation of the safeguard clauses would, in this context, undermine the credibility of the new Pact precisely in the case deemed most sensitive. However, this approach risks producing the opposite effect: preventing countercyclical interventions in the face of a significant energy shock curbs growth and, in the medium term, makes it more difficult to sustain the very debt it seeks to protect.
This double standard makes it clear that the Stability Pact is not a system of neutral rules, but a selective mechanism. Flexibility is not a right, but a discretionary concession. And a discretionary concession, by definition, is never neutral. It coincides with the prevailing political interest in the European institutions.
The result is an inconsistent framework. On the one hand, stability and predictability of the rules are invoked; on the other, selective exemptions are applied based on political considerations. On the one hand, states are asked to be responsible; on the other, they are denied the ability to intervene when economic conditions require it. It is a system that demands discipline, but applies discretion.
For Italy, this means finding itself bound by rules that fail to take into account the specific nature of the shock it has experienced. The energy crisis, further amplified by geopolitical tensions simultaneously impacting oil and gas, is hitting the national production system more intensely. Failure to recognize this asymmetry is tantamount to imposing a more severe adjustment on those most exposed.
The reality, therefore, is simpler than what is being portrayed: Brussels is not granting flexibility not because the economic conditions are lacking, but because it doesn't want to assume the political cost of doing so. It's a choice of institutional convenience, not a technical necessity.
The conclusion is inevitable: the problem is not the rigidity of the Pact, but its political use. As long as flexibility remains subject to discretionary assessments rather than clear and symmetrical criteria, the system will continue to produce distorting effects. And Italy will continue to pay the highest price.
Antonio Maria Rinaldi
The article Here's why Brussels denies Italy flexibility on the Stability Pact comes from Scenari Economici .
This is a machine translation of a post published on Scenari Economici at the URL https://scenarieconomici.it/ecco-perche-bruxelles-nega-allitalia-la-flessibilita-sul-patto-di-stabilita/ on Wed, 06 May 2026 06:00:09 +0000.