The Unusual Suspects and the Marquis del Grillo
In another, more qualified and private chat on this non-existent blog, an interesting debate is taking place on the impending debt crisis, a topic we've addressed, for example, here . Meanwhile, the new OECD Global Debt Report was released (in March). In 2025, the " narrative " was this :
in 2026 the emphasis has shifted a bit and the narrative is this :
from which it can be deduced that the total debt securities issued in 2026 are expected to be 4,000 billion more than those issued in 2024, with an increasingly important contribution from the Intelligent Friend, and that 78% of the securities issued by governments in 2026 will go to refinance existing debt (this 78% is in some way the child of the 40% that was talked about last year, that is, the percentage of public and private securities that would have matured by 2027).
Last year, the OECD insisted on the decoupling between the rise of private debt and the dynamics of productive investments:
This year it does not address the issue (or at least not in the executive summary ) but highlights another not reassuring aspect:
that is, the fact that the increase in the cost of long-term financing is leading to a realignment of public debt maturities which, however, increases the risk of short-term refinancing operations (the emphasis is therefore placed on the riskiness of public debt).
In short: for the second time in two years, the OECD is "issuing a warning" (this year slightly more accentuating the risks of public debt). My educated guess , as you know, is that we are on the eve of a private debt crisis, in which a possible "deflation" of the Intelligent Friend bubble could play a role ( I cited Storm's work on this ).
As we recall, the last private financial crisis was disguised as a public debt crisis to allow for regressive measures in income distribution ( those in Draghi's letter ), only to later admit, through the Pirouette, that no, it wasn't a public debt crisis . Ultimately, the purpose of European governance is precisely to support this narrative, and so we have no doubt that in this case too, the blame will be cast on "irresponsible" governments. But what is the situation? What will the markets be looking at?
If they look at the debt levels, the situation is known and it is this:
that is, it sees us as the top dog in countries affected by original sin (i.e., which get into debt in a currency they do not control).
But if they instead looked at the dynamics, then the situation would change radically:
Since the end of 2019 (i.e., the pre-COVID era) to date, the largest increases in debt have occurred in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States: they are the unusual suspects! In this ranking, Italy is second to last, even managing to outperform Germany. This would explain why, according to friends who monitor the markets, we're starting to feel some pressure on gilts and Treasuries (and also on Japanese bonds, but the problem there is their level), while it doesn't explain why pressure isn't yet felt on OATs.
Evidently, the market has its reasons that reason does not know, but equally evidently the moment of procedure is approaching.
The one for infringement?
No: that of the Marquis del Grillo: "I don't throw away the money, and you don't take it."
With all the human miseries that those who have been here from the beginning remember well.
But we continue to indulge in electoral laws, the Maastricht parameters, true sovereignism, and other miscellaneous issues of daily debate.
This is a machine translation of a post (in Italian) written by Alberto Bagnai and published on Goofynomics at the URL https://goofynomics.blogspot.com/2026/05/gli-insoliti-sospetti-e-il-marchese-del.html on Mon, 25 May 2026 08:09:52 +0000. Some rights reserved under CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 license.