Because I agree with Leonardo’s maneuver on Drs. Camporini’s analysis
Drs is a solid industrial reality with state-of-the-art technologies. It is reasonable that Leonardo, given the impossibility of technological synergies, wants to extract the maximum financial potential, while guaranteeing the flow of dividends. The decision also shows the difficulties of real transatlantic cooperation. General Vincenzo Camporini's analysis
In the spring of 2003, I had an interview with the CEO of Thales, as Thomson CSF had been renamed three years earlier. One of the topics addressed was transatlantic cooperation, with particular reference to joint industrial initiatives in the defense sector. In 2001, Thales created a joint venture with Raytheon for military communications and command and control systems. To my question on how the cooperation was going, the answer was that from the financial point of view the results were excellent, with significant capital gains, while those in terms of technological and industrial cooperation were very disappointing: the case of a system produced by Thales was mentioned. in Europe and adapted for the US market; the American administration denied the authorization to re-export the updated system to Europe, with reasons related to national security: cooperation yes, but one-way.
This episode can help understand what is happening in the Leonardo / Drs issue.
The US firm Drs was acquired through a takeover bid on the New York Stock Exchange in 2008 at a cost (direct plus debt) of approximately 3.6 billion euros. The aim was to acquire an important bridgehead in the USA, in order to be present on the American market as an American company (thus taking advantage of the advantages of the 'Buy American Act') and to open a channel of technological osmosis from which they could benefit. all members of the Group.
Both objectives were missed: Drs continued to be a supplier to the US administration, but without opening any opening for penetration by other Finmeccanica companies, a penetration that has sometimes occurred, as in the helicopter case, for other channels and by virtue of the indisputable excellence of the product.
For the exchange of technologies, then, the Thales scenario was repeated, in an even more radical form, with the substantial ban on non-US personnel from having access to the operating activities of Drs, of which Finmeccanica remained the owner, but kept out of the door. , while enjoying, or suffering, depending on the circumstances, its financial performance, often in the past below expectations.
The history of transatlantic cooperation in the defense industry is certainly not a success story: in the 70s and 80s the watchword was the "two way street", but the reality gave too much evidence to the fact that the flows were far from symmetrical, with Europeans too often reduced to the level of second or third tier suppliers.
The odyssey of the AGS (Alliance Ground Survellillance) NATO system is emblematic, initially conceived in 1992 to jointly develop an airborne surveillance and intelligence capability, which had to integrate manned and unmanned systems on board designed and produced jointly by industries on both sides. of the Atlantic.
The program dragged on wearily for years, tormented by insoluble questions on the transferability of technologies, with the most varied proposals in architectural terms, to then lead to the acquisition by the Alliance of the Global Hawk system, produced by Grumman and a role less than marginal by European industries.
In this climate, which does not seem susceptible to substantial changes, Leonardo's decision appears to be well justified: Drs is a solid industrial company, owner of cutting-edge technologies and represents an excellent investment opportunity.
It is therefore reasonable that the owner, having ascertained the impossibility of any technological synergy, wants to extract the maximum financial potential, while maintaining a solid majority that guarantees an adequate flow of dividends; a decision of absolute convenience, but which gives further evidence of the difficulties of real transatlantic cooperation and therefore of the need to focus on intra-European cooperation.
We must insist on this path, removing the obstacles created by narrow nationalisms which, if they may appear attractive in the very short term, constitute an unforgivable strategic error.
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/innovazione/leonardo-drs-camporini/ on Tue, 02 Mar 2021 06:12:30 +0000.