Here are the successes and defeats of Russian intelligence in Ukraine. Russian reports
What the report by Rusi (Royal United Services Institute, a think tank for defense and security based in London) says on Russia's strategy for Ukraine through FSB intelligence. The article by Giuseppe Gagliano
What does the RUSI report briefly say about the strategic aspects of the war between Russia and Ukraine and, in particular, about the unconventional strategy applied by the Russian security services both before and during the intervention?
THE FSB MOLE
The war in Ukraine is the result of long preparation by Russia. Before entering the war, Vladimir Putin and Russia's intelligence service, the FSB, made efforts to steer Ukrainian policies towards Russian interests, as early as 2000. From Ukrainian intelligence services to nuclear management companies, the FSB led between 2000 and 2022 a massive recruitment strategy in Ukraine at all levels.
For example Andriy Derkach, the son of a KBG officer, went to Ukraine in 1993 after his studies and became a people's deputy in the Kyiv parliament in 1998. At the same time, he will manage Energoatom, which is responsible for nuclear power in Ukraine and signs numerous contracts favorable to Rosatom, the Russian equivalent of Energoatom. Since the end of the 2000s, the SBU – the intelligence agency of Ukraine – warns the President of Ukraine about the activities of the individual. We have to wait until June 2022 when the Americans accuse him of being a Russian spy. One of the evidence provided consists of documents revealing that he would be charged with establishing a network of private security companies, intended to monitor several cities in Ukraine with the aim of preparing for the Russian invasion.
The other FSB mole would be General Oleg Kulinich, one of the regional heads of the SBU, who is also associated with Derkarch at Energoatom. Until then, he was responsible for undermining the services of the SBU. He also allegedly received orders to influence the Ukrainian executive to make Ukraine opt out of joining NATO. He is fired and detained by the SBU in July 2022. The FSB has thus demonstrated high competence to spy on and influence the Ukrainian state, avoiding being directly involved in operations due to its effective recruitment of agents.
THE WEAKNESSES OF THE FSB
The FSB's recruitment system obviously has weaknesses, demonstrated since the February 2022 invasion. At the beginning of the conflict, the FSB thought it had a network loyal to its orders and had been very optimistic about its ability to influence Ukrainian institutions . However, the continued existence of Ukrainian institutions in the aftermath of the Russian invasion proved this scenario wrong. Furthermore, many informants have left the services since the beginning of the conflict, demonstrating another limitation: the absence of ideology among the Ukrainian agents. Motivated above all by the retributions proposed by the FSB, the desire to protect their lives and those of their loved ones certainly got the better of the promises of retribution. Once the situation became too risky, the mission became too risky.
CALCULATION ERRORS
Little informed of the true situation in Ukraine, weakened by the desertions of some of its informants, the Russian army was taken by surprise upon its arrival. Lieutenant General Reshetnikov of the SVR (Russian external intelligence services), sums up the situation well: “The miscalculations were essentially political and military: underestimation of the enemy, misunderstanding of the mood and functioning of this country. There were certainly unjustified hopes – we would go to Kiev and Kharkov, bring reasonable Ukrainian representatives to power. But that's not what happened." However, in the territories where the Russian army has managed to enter, an effective occupation regime is put in place, again thanks to the use of agents recruited by the FSB.
TERRITORY CONTROL
As the Russians demonstrated in Crimea in 2014, their ability to effectively establish and control territory is remarkable. As soon as they arrived in the conquered cities, they made sure they had men loyal to Moscow to administer them. A procedure conducted for example in the Kharkiv oblast: interrogations, construction of houses, replacement of mayors or even interruption of communications with Kiev, everything is done to allow a "Russification" of the populations of the oblast. In addition to this, the FSB creates a good network of informants among the population. 800 Russian agents have been identified in Kharkiv oblast. The primary goal of the FSB is not so much to enlist the support of the population, but to ensure its control, as it did during the 1994 Chechen war, when on average 8% of the population collaborated with the Kremlin's intelligence services .
UNCONVENTIONAL PRACTICES
The use of unconventional practices also extends to the military. The heavy losses in the Russian regular army and the settlement of many of its members in conquered cities or oblasts in Ukraine to ensure their administration have caused a shortage of men in recent months. To overcome this phenomenon, the Russians increased the use of mercenaries, including the Wagner group and the Chechen regiment of Colonel General Ramzan Kadyrov.
The Wagner group, founded in 2014 by the influential Yevgeny Prigozhin, officially depends on the General Directorate of Russian Intelligence, the GRU, but would receive its orders directly from Putin. Initially absent from Ukraine, due to his presence in Syria and Mali, he has seen his role increase in recent months. His action was added to that of Kadyrov's men, charged with assisting the FSB in controlling the conquered territories. Supplied in armaments and men by the GRU, without being part of the Russian army's organization chart, Wagner's participation in the conflict is expected to increase in the coming months, as should the development of other private armies. The use of the private army PWC Redut, founded by GRU elders, is an example of this.
WEAK POINTS OF RUSSIA
The failure of the Russians during the first months of the war in Ukraine underlined the existence of considerable problems within the FSB, inherited from the Soviet period, in particular the poor communication between the authorities and agents on the ground. The Russian special services had been instructed to facilitate a timed occupation and not to assess its feasibility. The Russian military suffered the consequences…
Obedience to orders rather than providing honest advice to the Russian special services to the executive and fear of displeasing the boss and Vladimir Putin prevent the system from functioning effectively, despite the indisputable dynamism of the services. The other problem is the inability of the Russian services to renew their methods, which have remained the same since the Soviet period, regardless of the field of action. The Ukrainian example is clear: faced with an unforeseen situation, the intelligence services' ability to adapt was lacking.
The FSB still has many strengths, including its ability to gather intelligence, thanks to its network of agents, which allowed it to locate and destroy several strategic sites in Ukraine, especially energy and military. The technical competence of the Russian services therefore remains, despite the defects which however have serious consequences in this type of conflict.
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/russia-ucraina-strategia-fsb-rusi/ on Thu, 20 Apr 2023 05:40:11 +0000.