How Germany will change after the elections
Elections in Germany: party programs, post-Merkel challenges and the effects on Europe. The analysis by Federico Niglia, professor of History of International Relations at LUISS School of Government, for Luiss Open
The German federal elections of September 26 draw near under the sign of uncertainty. The decision of Angela Merkel to pass the baton after fifteen years in which she led Germany and held the helm of the European Union contributed to enliven a German political framework for a long time accustomed to standard formulas. A party dynamic was triggered on this void which saw the CDU-CSU, led by Armin Laschet, grappling with a complex transition both in terms of leadership and political line, while the Social Democrats experimented, especially in this last phase of the campaign, a recovery linked above all to the propulsive role of Olaf Scholz. In parallel, the parable of the Grünen (Greens) was consummated, first considered as the force capable of undermining the traditional bipolarity and then resized by the polls. The performance of the parties was then affected by a series of personal events, gaffes and scandals whose weight will then be quantified by the electoral results.
THE REPOSITIONING OF THE MAIN PARTIES AND THE ROLE OF LEADERSHIP
The electoral moment always has a polarizing effect on the parties and, in general, in the aftermath of the vote we are witnessing a return to more pragmatic positions. This is especially true for a country, like Germany, where the coalition logic is dominant. However, it is undeniable that in this long electoral campaign, which actually began when Angela Merkel announced her intention to leave, the main parties are deeply
changed. The CDU-CSU has certainly changed, which only in January managed, with the election of Laschet as president of the CDU, to end a succession war that had been going on since 2018. In December of that year she was elected president of the party Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, advocate of a line of close continuity with Merkel. However, when AKK jumped on the Thuringiagate mine, a “Tambroni crisis” in German style, the CDU struggled to find the compass again, forcing Merkel to stay on the field for an extra time. Finally, the pandemic, which further slowed the process, made the transition more complex. With Laschet, the idea prevailed for the second time that the CDU should continue on the Merkelian furrow: Friedrich Merz, advocate of a conservative turn, was defeated for the second time, and Markus Söder, the Bavarian leader of whom he was for a moment his rise as a national candidate, he retired, guaranteeing support for Laschet. But the choice of the summit reflects only in part the change of a party, which after the "ecumenical" season of Merkelism, seems to rediscover its conservative identity. It does so because both because the conservative is a strong and rooted identity, and because this allows it to regain space on the right without leaving the field free to the radical right of the AfD, all without necessarily compromising the catch-all party nature of the CDU.
The rise of the SPD is part of this discourse, linked but not completely dependent on the figure of Olaf Scholz . Throughout the Merkel era, the SPD had represented the great sick man of German politics, under whose conditions the logic of the “groKo” (grand coalition) certainly did not help. It was seen in the 2009 elections, when the party registered the first of a series of heavy defeats. Subsequently, the party focused on Martin Schulz, also on the strength of his experience as President of the European Parliament, who however disappointed expectations. Recently, the party seems to have found its own direction by returning to more left-wing positions, as evidenced by the election, in 2019, of Saskia Esken and Norbert Walter-Borjans as Parteivorsitzender. With a party rediscovering its socialist identity, Scholz's choice as Spitzenkandidat (literally "leading candidate"), the opponent of the Esken / Walter-Borjans duo, had a balancing effect: the outgoing Finance Minister, moderate of the party and on cautious (or even conservative positions listening to the latest statements) on public finance and the European budget, may be able to keep the party attractive even towards the moderate electorate.
THE SCENARIOS ON FUTURE GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
It is from the repositioning of the two main parties, CDU-CSU and SPD, that we must start both to imagine the possible coalition scenarios and to think about the impact that the outcome of the German elections could have on Europe (and on Italy). As far as coalitions are concerned, it is certain that the rediscovery of the identity of the two parties makes the hypothesis of yet another grand coalition, if not certainly impossible, at least difficult to achieve. It will also be tiring because it is a somewhat exhausted formula that no longer meets the favor of the voters and is considered as pernicious by the parties themselves. This relaunches the role of the other parties, primarily the Greens, initially considered as the force capable of subverting traditional balances and subsequently resized by the polls. However, this downsizing does not diminish their ability to be an important coalition partner: it seems that the party has now overcome the sectarianism that precluded participation in previous governments. The discourse can also be extended to the liberals of the FDP and to Linke herself, apparently more open to possible agreements (in this case only with the SPD and the Greens).
While waiting to know the response of the polls, what can be imagined from now on is that the formation of the new balances will not take place immediately. This is because Germany has emerged from a fifteen year period in which Merkel has represented the metronome of national and European politics, but also because the panorama of political forces has undoubtedly changed compared to the past. Already in the past, the procedures for creating coalitions have proved complex and laborious. This time, however, time does not favor programmatic Byzantinisms and imposes relevant choices especially in the European context. The parties will have to try to achieve a double balance that reconciles the different visions of the reforms at the national level and at the same time promotes a common position regarding the future of the European Union.
This second negotiating table appears, in some ways, the most complex. In fact, during the electoral campaign there was a renationalization of the positions of the major parties on some key issues, such as those of debt and growth. Up to now, Germany has been the promoter of a moderate but progressive opening towards the consolidation of the Union. Now, in the absence of Merkel and in the hypothesis of a coalition with complex balances, the achievement of this goal can be, if not certainly impossible, certainly more complex to achieve.
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/come-cambiera-la-germania-dopo-le-elezioni/ on Sat, 25 Sep 2021 05:00:04 +0000.