How the Russia-Ukraine war will change the world
What the war in Ukraine means for Russia and its alliance with China. The analysis of George Friedman, founder and president of Geopolitical Futures
The war in Ukraine is certainly a humanitarian tragedy, but it has not attracted the attention of the world for that. Moreover, there are humanitarian crises in Yemen, Syria and other countries as I write this. From a geopolitical point of view, war is potentially a watershed moment, that is, if the European political-military unity lasts, creating a new model of Europe and redefining the functioning of the global system. A secondary question is whether China's worldview will change as well, as it seeks a new understanding with the United States or moves away from it.
The Russians have so far fought a surprisingly poor war in Ukraine, especially when you consider their goals: to secure Ukraine as a buffer from the West and to demonstrate Russian power as a force to be reckoned with. So far the war has done the opposite. In some cases this is surmountable: in Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam, for example, the United States failed to impose its will and was seen by some as a declining power. The difference is that those countries weren't essential to American security. Ukraine is vital for Russia.
So now Russia is looking for reinforcements from Syria, Belarus, the Wagner Group, and so on. Even if Moscow finds willing participants, it takes time to transport the troops, familiarize them with the battlefield and put them into the combat structure. And even if Moscow manages to do all these things, a long and prolonged conflict is still expected. For many observers, the need to recruit foreign troops indicates a failure of Russian commanders, a weakness in troop training and motivation, and logistical problems.
If Russia wanted to create a sense in Europe that it could invade at will – something it probably would not do, but something that would potentially cause Europe to find a settlement with Moscow or reconsider its relationship with the United States, just in case – he failed. For now at least, it has brought the United States and Europe closer than before. The continuous fighting and brutality that Russia now seems to think is obliged to defeat Ukraine galvanize it more. It is difficult to think of an outcome for Russia, other than the use of weapons of mass destruction, which leaves the West concerned about Russia as a major threat.
And not just because of Russia's poor performance on the battlefield. The great power status is partly military and partly economic. Russia's gross domestic product in 2001 was $ 1.6 trillion, ranking 11th in the world just behind South Korea. Since then, Russia has hobbled from volatile energy prices, the 2008 financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and now paralyzing sanctions in response to its invasion. In other words, it can no longer even be considered an economic power. And this changes our understanding of the world where Russia was considered a great power, due to its military strength, which accepted a weak economy.
Weeks before the war began, China sought an alliance with Russia because it needed friends in the face of the massive US alliance structure that ran from Japan to India. As I said, China has no significant allies except Pakistan. China knew it could not provide economic support to Russia – it has its own problems to manage – but at least, China needed some relief, which it hoped to obtain by harnessing Russian military power to force the US and Europe to recalculate. the threat that sanctions against it posed.
Aside from the military aspect, Russia benefited from the possibility of financial support from China, or at least from the impression to creditors that China was supporting the Russian economy. It was obvious that Russia's ability to contribute significantly to a Chinese battlefield was limited, as was China's willingness to adopt a weak Russian economy. The covenant had the power to instill fear in those who wanted to be afraid.
The alliance is still there rhetorically, but the possibility of effective support is not. Russia has already been hurt by the economic actions of the United States and its allies, and China, in this economic moment, cannot afford to be caught in the trap that Russia finds itself in. Any military support would be in danger of sanctions. Put simply, Russia is a burden on China.
Beijing's decision to announce its alliance with Russia, I suspect, was based on knowledge of the invasion of Russia. This made an alliance attractive to China when it believed Russia was capable of a quick and easy victory, one that would, in theory, force the West to reconsider its position on a China that could, perhaps, replicate the Russian strategy.
Russia's incompetence has forced China to do everything it can to recover, and therefore it must reconsider its relationship with the United States. It is in severe economic recession. His alliance with Russia has not borne fruit, nor is it likely that it will. The United States and Europe have developed a model of economic warfare which, if applied to China, would appear extremely damaging. China's short-term strategy, therefore, is to appear confident, maintaining its rhetorical support for Russia and criticizing the United States as it considers its next move.
Of note, Taiwan is not the next move. China has seen firsthand that wars can go wrong and therefore that an invasion of Taiwan is something to be avoided for now.
If we think of the great powers of the world, we usually list the United States, Europe and Russia. Russia will have trouble making such a thing unless it does something surprisingly effective. Europe is a great power if it remains united militarily and economically. It is doing this now, but as the fear of Russia subsides, old tensions will emerge. China is still a great power, albeit with an untested army and troubled economy. For now, the United States alone remains large economically and militarily.
(Translation of Friedman's analysis taken from Germano Dottori's Facebook profile; the English version is here )
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/guerra-ucraina-russia-cina/ on Sun, 27 Mar 2022 06:15:36 +0000.