A neutral Ukraine is not enough for Putin: the desertion of German Europe and the weakness of Biden
Are we really on the eve of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, as one would say in the light of the bellicose declarations and the alarm sirens that are ringing in these hours? Are the winds of war blowing, or is the wind of Monaco '38 blowing stronger, evoked yesterday by the British defense minister Wallace? As Enzo Reale explained in Atlantico Quotidiano , we still find it hard to believe that Putin could launch a large-scale invasion, which would still entail enormous risks for Moscow, among which the damage to image would be the last on the list.
By deploying a credible threat of invasion of Ukraine, capable of lasting for months, Putin's goal is to force the United States into a negotiation aimed at realizing the geopolitical dream of a lifetime: to stop NATO's expansion to the east. and to restore a sphere of influence of Russia, albeit on a smaller scale compared to the Soviet era, but based on the same principle of limited sovereignty of the satellite countries, buried by the collapse of the USSR. Basically, forcing the United States into a new Yalta.
Alternatively, should Putin fail to secure a satisfactory agreement from Washington, he could aim for the Donbass. In this eventuality, the Russian troops would prepare not for an occupation of Ukraine, but for a counter-offensive that would be justified by a "provocation" by Kiev, real or not very important, the classic casus belli. In fact, Putin would need a spark, a pretext, to present it as an operation to defend the Russian-speaking populations of the Donbass. It could therefore try to repeat the Crimea operation: provoke a Ukrainian reaction to a declaration of independence or annexation of the Donbass provinces, which would be followed by the "inevitable" Russian counter-offensive.
The moment is particularly propitious, in Putin's eyes, for at least four reasons: first , America is increasingly focused on China and therefore may be more inclined to make some concessions in order not to end up with two enemies to face at the same time. But here perhaps the Russian president made a mistake: the recent agreement with Xi Jinping in Beijing should have warned Washington that giving Ukraine to Russia would very soon mean having to give Taiwan to China.
Second , the weakness of the American leadership, embodied by the very figure of President Biden: the de facto green light for Nord Stream 2 , with the waiver of sanctions by Washington, and the disastrous flight from Afghanistan are two unequivocal signs of the US will. to extricate oneself from the theaters of crisis no longer at the top of strategic priorities, even at the cost of unloading friends and allies. Ukraine is undoubtedly one of these, as Biden himself admitted, recalling that there is no moral and legal obligation for NATO to defend Ukraine and therefore that the option of using US force in defense of Kiev is not on the table.
It is no coincidence that Putin did not dare to carry out his threat when Donald Trump was in the White House, who according to the left wing was supposed to be his puppet . What better time could there be, if it had been, to take back Ukraine? But no, because even with his unusual ways, Trump was able to put America back at the center of the scene, keep Russia at bay both on the military and energy fronts, open for the first time a tough confrontation with Beijing, call back to order the European allies, change the game in the Middle East with the Abrahamic agreements.
Third , Putin realizes that he cannot waste any more time: in Ukraine the process of alignment – political and cultural – with the West is proceeding swiftly. Perhaps this is the last chance to force events and not completely lose his grip on the country. Should he be able to obtain guarantees on the halt to NATO expansion to the east, he would not even need the use of force. The geopolitical inertia would be reversed and Kiev would be pushed to return to the sphere of influence of Moscow, if the prospect of NATO membership and integration into Western Europe would be enough.
As US political scientist Walter Russell Mead observed, "a Ukraine aligned with the West, and in particular with anti-Russian countries such as Poland and the Baltic Republics, is an unbearable humiliation and an unacceptable threat" for Moscow. But the fact that only the military threat remains, sounds like an "admission of Russian failure": Russia has already "lost its battle for the heart of Ukraine". More than for security reasons (the feared accession of Ukraine to NATO is not on the agenda nor will it be in the next few years), it would be a loss in geopolitical and cultural terms.
However, notes WRM, "if the political situation inside Ukraine alarms Putin, the disorder and ineptitude of the West give him hope".
And here we come to the fourth reason why the Russian president believes he can play a winning hand, with or without strength. Already in 2014, the West actually bowed its head when Moscow annexed Crimea and launched the offensive in the Donbass, merely reacting with economic sanctions and the exclusion of Russia from the G8. Today it is even more divided and blackmailable than then.
From how they are moving in these days, the feeling is that for the European capitals – above all of course Berlin and Paris – pressured by the energy crisis, any agreement with Moscow is welcome in order to avert a conflict. But whatever diplomatic it takes with Putin's Russia is called surrender: if you accept the threat, if you are not willing to take the risk of a conflict to defend your "red lines" (which you have not even drawn), you have already lost . As Enzo Reale noted on Twitter , “there are agreements that are a prelude to greater war disasters. It would be giving in to blackmail and preparing the way for further invasions and annexations ”.
The problem, as we wrote last November, is that the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline is not yet in operation but Europe is already under Putin's blackmail. Now, with Germany and the EU increasingly dependent on Russian gas (60 per cent of imports), as the last few weeks of energy squeeze and skyrocketing prices show, to convince Berlin to take back Nord Stream 2 , or to turn it into a weapon of pressure on Moscow, it seems very difficult. The paradox that a certain US president had already highlighted in 2018:
“Germany is Russia's prisoner of energy and should we protect it from Russia? Explain it to us ". “Very sad that Germany concludes a massive oil and gas deal with Russia, paying them billions upon billions of dollars a year, when we are supposed to protect it from Russia. It does not make sense".
But it made sense for Putin, given that today there is no one who does not see how the interests of European countries diverge from those of the Americans in the Ukrainian crisis: the former willing to do anything to avoid a conflict with their first supplier of gas, the latter worried about keeping the European security architecture in place.
By inserting the wedge of energy dependence, Putin has pushed continental Europe away from the United States: it is therefore not surprising that a non-secondary effect of the Russian military threat on Ukraine is the worldwide staging of the disruption of the Atlantic Alliance.
The pro-European press hunts down the Russian trolls on social media and the sweatshirts worn by Salvini on Red Square, but does not see that the main Russian trolls in Europe are in government in Berlin: they are called Merkel, they are called Schroeder, they are called SPD. With France which, as usual, tries to play on its own, indulging its desires to be an anti-NATO protagonist, and therefore committed to ensuring an agreement with Berlin at whatever cost to the Alliance.
So here it is the elephant in the room: the Franco-German EU is already equidistant between Washington and Moscow (and Beijing), thanks mainly to Germany which has made itself, and the Continent, even more dependent on Russian gas as a result of the transition green and Nord Stream gas pipelines.
Furthermore, as Daniele Capezzone observed, even on the level of principles the West seems to have lost its compass. “He doesn't even remember how he won the Cold War: deterrence, defense of principles (freedom and democracy), aid to minorities and dissidents. And the Covid two-year period has made things worse: not being able to defend freedom in their own homes, many governments are neither believed nor credible in the eyes of their citizens, who despise current Western leaders, insincere and inconsistent ".
A possible way out? An agreement between the United States and Russia for the neutrality of Ukraine, in practice its finlandisation, under which Kiev would not enter either NATO or the European Union. Our impression is that the Biden administration would not in principle be opposed to this hypothesis, but would prefer to suffer it de facto, rather than grant it de jure, through a treaty, a legal framework, which would risk undermining the role of containment of the Born, its very raison d'etre, by granting Moscow a veto right on Alliance membership. Certainly, it is not a proposal that Washington could make with the gun pointed at Kiev's temple, with Russian troops on the border ready to invade and without being sure that Russia will be enough.
But are we sure that Putin is satisfied with a neutral Ukraine? The Russian president asks for legal guarantees on the end of the NATO expansion to the east, in practice that Ukraine, but also Georgia and Belarus, will never join NATO. But on closer inspection it is not exactly the same: the guarantee, written or informal, that Ukraine will never join NATO does not in itself mean that it remains neutral. This would also imply a specific commitment from Moscow to respect its neutrality. On the contrary, Putin appears to be turning back Ukraine, the political and cultural influence that Russia had over it. He does not want it to be “neutral”, he wants it as a satellite country with limited sovereignty. He doesn't want it to be Finnish , he wants it to be Russified .
From the latest news, it seems that Kiev is ready to give up its request to join NATO. Putin is unlikely to be satisfied, he wants the legal guarantee from the US, which he cannot have, however. Instead, it should seize openness, de-escalate and negotiate neutrality, also committing itself to guaranteeing it.
On the other hand, there is no West race to defend Ukraine. The empty embassies, the invitations to their citizens to leave the country, the international missions that are withdrawn, the suspended air links, the differences over military aid, rather signal the intention of the West to abandon it to its fate – and remember in fact, Afghanistan in the weeks and days before the Taliban's capture of Kabul. It almost seems that Kiev is under sanctions right now.
Ukrainian President Zelenski is right when he warns that "this panic is playing the game of the Kremlin". Also because it must be remembered that Moscow can keep its forces deployed on the border indefinitely, making the invasion "imminent" for months. If in the meantime, in fear of a possible invasion, the West empties Kiev of its diplomatic, civil and military personnel, and weakens its connections with the outside world, it becomes easier for Putin's men to intimidate the Ukrainian government and restore taken over the country even without a military offensive.
The Biden administration must make up its mind, it cannot stay halfway: either it convinces Putin that he is serious, pledging to defend Ukraine – and its prospect of integration into the Western system – from Russian aggression, or it seeks an honorable retreat, aware, however, that he will strengthen his enemies and weaken his credibility in the eyes of his friends.
The post A neutral Ukraine is not enough for Putin: the desertion of German Europe and the weakness of Biden appeared first on Atlantico Quotidiano .
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Atlantico Quotidiano at the URL https://www.atlanticoquotidiano.it/quotidiano/a-putin-non-basta-unucraina-neutrale-la-diserzione-delleuropa-e-la-debolezza-di-biden/ on Mon, 14 Feb 2022 03:51:00 +0000.