Burma more Chinese after the coup: this is why Beijing prefers the military in power
Mya Thwe Thee Khaing is the first victim of the Burmese protests. After days of agony, her family decided to unplug the car that was keeping her alive. She was hit by a bullet in the head on February 9th. He was twenty.
Each revolution has its symbols and the young woman risks becoming the icon of this protest, which revolution is not yet. Despite the curfew decreed by the military and the ban on meetings, demonstrations against the military coup of two weeks ago continue in the streets of the main towns of the country. The police for the moment have shown relative tolerance, limiting themselves to disperse them without indiscriminate use of force, but the fear of a generalized repression such as in 1988 or 2007 constantly hangs over Burma. Last Saturday the executive order which, based on article 420 of the constitution, effectively decrees the suspension of the civil rights of citizens, allowing searches, arrests and detentions for indefinite periods without a judicial mandate. The junta, which recently appointed the new ministers, has also targeted the Internet, reducing access to social platforms that are now practically only accessible through the use of proxy servers .
This is where the calls for the mobilization of an adolescent generation that has known the semi-democracy of the last decade and does not want to go back to the past of isolation and prisons that preceded it pass: a factor that this time could make the difference. The military are aware that their position is not as solid as in previous coup experiences and perhaps the relative prudence in the management of the square that they have shown up to now depends on this consideration. Probably requests to this effect have also come from Beijing which, while it guarantees the Tatmadaw the protection necessary to consolidate the authoritarian plan, does not like an overexposure on the Burmese question.
The relationship with China has been one of the most discussed topics in the specialized press in recent days: some see the inspirer of the coup d'etat in the powerful neighbor, others tend to downsize its role. The most probable hypothesis is that the Chinese Communist Party did not explicitly promote regime change but made it known to the military that it would gladly accept the new political order: in short, an implicit green light, dictated by the needs of realpolitik and by the prediction that the foreseeable Western reaction would pave the way for an increase in Chinese influence in the economic and geopolitical sphere of the country. Biden's announcement of " targeted sanctions " and the threat of a further punitive squeeze seem to point precisely in the direction of a progressive cooling of relations.
History repeats itself, in the Burmese case always as a tragedy. When the previous military junta decided in 2008 to promote a new constitution and to initiate a process of controlled transition to a " disciplined democracy ", they gasped in Beijing. Economically, Burma, a very poor nation but rich in raw materials and a fundamental territory from a strategic point of view, already then depended on Chinese investments, guaranteed by the kleptocracy in power and international sanctions. With the start of the political liberalization process, which culminated in Aung San Suu Kyi's first NLD ( National League for Democracy ) election victory in 2015, diplomatic isolation ended and the United States and its partners returned to doing business with the new government. But the repression of the Muslim Rohingya minority, led by the current strongman Min Aung Hlaing and supported by Aung San Suu Kyi herself, froze again relations with Western democracies. China regained control, making the best of a bad situation and pragmatically agreeing to deal with the new civil administration, effectively led by the former dissident and Nobel laureate, albeit under the protection of the army.
While the NLD's approach has proved more cautious than that of the generals, Burma remains a key piece in the Asian section of the Beijing Belt and Road Initiative , as it provides China with access to the Indian Ocean via the economic zone. special of Kyaukphyu (Rakhine State) and connects it directly to the other territories of Southeast Asia. Rail projects and works for canalization and transport of hydrocarbons have been underway on these routes for years but, above all, they are essential transit routes for fuel flows from the Middle East to arrive in China without passing through the Strait of Malacca.
If you think that Chinese investments currently represent more than a quarter of the total and are constantly increasing thanks to the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (a trade integration agreement between ASEAN members and other Asian nations, minus the India), it is difficult not to see in Beijing's classic appeal to " non-interference " in Burmese internal affairs the ambition to be the only power authorized to interfere.
Far from signaling an ideological affinity between regimes, Xi Jinping's approval of the coup stems from the awareness that a military dictatorship will inevitably lead to a reduction in the Western presence and an increase in Chinese control. In short, a pure strategic calculation based on mutual convenience. The junta is aware of the anti-Chinese sentiment spread among the Burmese and Min Aung Hlaing himself, the commander in chief, has always looked with some concern at Beijing's growing hegemony in the region. His long experience of military campaigns against insurgent groups in the northeastern states (Shan and Kachin) led him to oppose the local armed militias that received arms and funding from China. The peace process currently underway is taking place under the pressure of centrifugal forces that look to Beijing as a political referent and that have been accentuated in the last phase of the legislature led by the NLD. Competence over national borders is constitutionally assigned to the military, who do not like the influence of the powerful neighbor on the peripheral regions. Min Aung Hlaing has long enjoyed excellent relations with Moscow and the sale of Russian military technology to Burma has intensified in recent years. However, anyone who claims to rule Naypyidaw today cannot do without Chinese support. It is no coincidence that the first official post-coup gesture was the appointment of Wunna Maung Lwin as foreign minister. The diplomat is known for his anti-Western and pro-Chinese positioning and is the staunchest supporter of Beijing's economic corridor to the Indian Ocean. A guarantee for Xi Jinping and an unequivocal signal of the times to come.
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This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Atlantico Quotidiano at the URL http://www.atlanticoquotidiano.it/quotidiano/birmania-piu-cinese-dopo-il-golpe-ecco-perche-pechino-preferisce-i-militari-al-potere/ on Tue, 16 Feb 2021 04:51:00 +0000.