Iran and Qatar sponsors and principals of Hamas: from a Palestinian group to a regional “proxy”
From Jerusalem – Hamas is no longer a group confined to Gaza, but has now become a regional movement. In fact, Hamas' political and military strategy no longer takes into consideration only local aspects, but also those of its allies in the Middle East: Iran and Qatar. The proof is given by Hamas' non-reaction to the "flag march", organized by Israeli settlers and far-right movements, last June 15 in Jerusalem. Israel had already declared the alert and deployed the Iron Dome , to prepare for a possible missile attack from Gaza, as had happened last May. Although the site near Hamas, Gaza Alan , announced during the march that a car bomb was ready to go off and that the missiles would arrive in the evening, none of this has happened.
Not only that, but after Israel bombed Gaza, already twice since June 15, in response to the incendiary balloons launched by the Barq unit (close to the Islamic Jihad group), Hamas has again decided not to react, saying that it will not be Israel to dictate the timing of the war or change the "equation" on the ground. This makes it clear that Hamas is no longer the movement that reacts from the gut and that only thinks of satisfying the demands of the Palestinians, who shout from social media : "Abu Obeida [spokesman for the armed wing of Hamas, now a star, ed ] think about it you!" "Abu Obeida let the enemy hear the flames of the missiles from Gaza." Hamas is now a regional movement, following the logic and needs of its financiers / supporters.
To understand better, let's take a step back and go back to last May, when the "11 days" war (or as Hamas calls it, the battle of the sword of Al-Quds) began. In early May, the situation in Jerusalem is increasingly tense, due to the evictions in Sheikh Jarrah and some barricades set up by the police (and then removed) in front of Bab Al-Amoud (the gate leading to the Muslim quarter in the old city ) during the month of Ramadan. Then on May 10, the "march of flags" takes place as usual to commemorate the Israeli unification of the two sectors (east and west) of the city of Jerusalem during the Six Day War . Hamas therefore takes advantage of the opportunity, and – while the Israelis (mostly settlers and far-right) wave the blue and white flags in the heart of the sacred city – launches the first missiles on Jerusalem, starting a war that would have lasted almost two weeks. But why did Hamas launch missiles, after 7 years of truce since the last war in 2014?
As the Gulf analysts themselves suggest, therefore, Hamas did not start a war to "defend" four houses in Sheikh Jarrah , but rather to respond to Tehran's need to put pressure on the United States. A few months ago, Hamas financier Iran (Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, in every speech, always thanks Tehran for the economic and military support) has begun to negotiate the renewal of the nuclear agreement (Jcpoa). This agreement was reached during the Obama administration in 2015 between Iran, the P5 + 1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States – plus Germany) and the European Union. In 2018, under the Trump administration, the United States withdrew from the agreement (considered inadequate to prevent the Iranian takeover of the nuclear bomb), accusing Iran of violating the JCPOA and thus relaunching economic sanctions against Tehran. But now the Biden administration wants to rejoin the agreement, but with new conditions, which the Iranian regime is unwilling to accept. At the same time, however, if Tehran wants to see sanctions lifted, it must agree to negotiate the JCPO with Washington. Here the role of Hamas takes over.
Iran, in fact, which does not want to accept all the conditions imposed by the United States, knows that it can count on Hamas to carry out a proxy war (note: Tehran can no longer rely on Hezbollah, now politically weakened and with its leader leader Nasrallah who is not in good health). Iran therefore used Hamas' escalation against Israel for two reasons: first, to improve its negotiating influence on the nuclear deal with the United States; second, to test the new Biden administration and its willingness to support Israel.
So what has Iran achieved since the 11 day war? Iran got what it wanted. In fact, although Israel won militarily, at the same time it came out of the war politically weakened, unlike Hamas. The political weakening of Israel has also caused a weakening of its influence over the United States regarding the nuclear deal with Iran. Israel is in fact the major opponent of the JCPO and politically weakening Israel is tantamount to weakening the voices in the United States against the agreement. This weakening is therefore a great success for Iran.
But why doesn't Hamas attack again? There are various answers to this question:
Elections in Iran – Iran now, with the elections held on June 18, does not need any problems or distractions from its proxies . Until the new government takes office, it does not need a new war with Israel.
Rapprochment Egypt-Qatar – In the post-war period, new scenarios opened up. Egypt has established itself as the great mediator of the conflict between Hamas and Israel, returning to be a prestigious actor in the Middle East context. This time, however, Egypt does not seem to have adopted a super partes approach. In fact, on June 14, the Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry went with great fanfare on an official visit to Qatar, the biggest supporter of Hamas, thus formalizing the resumption of diplomatic relations.
In fact, the visit can be considered historic given that an Egyptian minister had not been to Doha for 8 years. Relations between Egypt and Qatar, an ally of Turkey and enemy of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, therefore seem to have normalized, so much so that Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi invited the Qatari emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani to visit the Cairo at the earliest opportunity.
Qatar is happy with this rapprochement with Egypt, which was previously sided with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. In exchange for the normalization of relations, Cairo wants Qatar to moderate the anti-government activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. At the same time, however, Sisi must recognize Hamas as a representative of the Palestinian people, to the detriment of the Palestinian Authority. Now that Egypt has regained its prestigious role as a mediator between Hamas and Israel (exalted by the Biden administration itself), it cannot afford to lose it with the start of a new conflict. Qatar, which does not want to lose Egypt as an ally, is therefore holding back Hamas' reaction against Israel.
Qatari funding in Gaza – Hamas has long requested Israel to channel Qatari funding directly into Gaza. The terrorist movement in fact urgently needs this money to be able to rebuild the military posts hit during the war. In recent weeks, the movement's leaders have repeatedly threatened to resume the escalation to put pressure on Israel on the funding issue. But Hamas realizes that if a war were to start again, Israel would not allow any economic aid from Qatar to enter Gaza. It is important to underline that Hamas wants these funds to go directly to Gaza, without going through intermediaries such as the Palestinian Authority or Egypt, fearing to see a large part of the economic aid stolen from them.
Hamas Prisoners in Israel – Finally, there is the issue of prisoners. Hamas leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar said he wanted 1,111 prisoners in exchange for the four Israeli hostages, two alive and two dead, which the movement is holding hostage (some Gaza media suggest that the request would even be for 4,444 prisoners, or of 1,111 prisoners for each hostage). An exchange that Israel is unwilling to accept especially in the event of a new war breaking out. Meanwhile, the issue of prisoner exchange is on the negotiating table with Israel through Egyptian mediation. On the Gaza Alan Twitter page, a user asked why Hamas did not respond to the latest Israeli bombing of Gaza. Gaza Alan's response was: "This is a phase of calm … the issue of prisoner exchange must first be resolved."
Hamas prisoners in Saudi Arabia – Hamas has been trying to free its prisoners in Saudi Arabia for years. In early June, Mouath Abu Shemala, a member of Hamas in Yemen, met with Mohammed Ali Al-Houthi, a prominent figure in the Shia armed group of the Houthis, longa manus of Iran in Yemen and enemies of Saudi Arabia. During the meeting, criticized online by the Sunni world, it seems that the possibility of an exchange of prisoners with Saudi Arabia was discussed. The Houthis would give Saudi prisoners to Riyadh in exchange for the release of Hamas prisoners in Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, however, the Arab media reported last Saturday, June 19, that Saudi Arabia has arrested 160 Palestinians affiliated with Hamas. In fact, Saudi Arabia fears the Hamas-Houthi link, given that the latter is accused of having even launched a missile against Mecca in 2019. Hamas will therefore only begin to attack Israel again when it sees the right moment for the group and its allies in the Middle East. Hamas is now a regional movement, which follows a logic linked to the interests of Iran and Qatar, and cannot afford to make strategic mistakes and make decisions alone or based only on the impulsiveness of the moment.
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This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Atlantico Quotidiano at the URL http://www.atlanticoquotidiano.it/quotidiano/iran-e-qatar-sponsor-e-mandanti-di-hamas-da-gruppo-palestinese-a-proxy-regionale/ on Mon, 21 Jun 2021 04:00:00 +0000.