The Belarusian unknown: Moscow reacts and Brussels flounders: but does Putin really have anything to do with the hijacking?
There is great excitement on the Moscow-Minsk axis: Prime Minister Mishustin runs to the Belarusian capital for a two-day visit and today Lukashenko returns to sit with Putin in Sochi, in an urgent summit convened after last Sunday's plane hijacking . A sign that, contrary to what has been insinuated by many parties, Russia must not have digested too well the action of aerial piracy of the riotous and unpredictable neighbor.
Of course, the presence of three Russian passengers (secret agents?) On the Ryanair flight bound for Vilnius and forced to a forced landing in Belarusian territory does not help to clarify the position of Moscow, on which basically three theses circulate: that the Kremlin knew everything or she even participated in the hijacking, that she was not aware of it but that she covered Lukashenko a posteriori trying to take advantage of the situation, that she was taken by surprise but does not want to show it. The coverage of the Russian media was immediate and almost unanimous in justifying the case as a " security issue " (the famous bomb scare), in silencing any reference to the arrested dissident (Roman Protasevich) and in accusing – oh, surprise – the 'West of " double standard ", in reference to a similar episode a few years ago linked to the story of Edward Snowden.
Historian Timothy Snyder went so far as to argue that Moscow would coordinate the action with the dual objective of creating a precedent to be replicated in the future and increasing the isolation of Belarus from Europe, so as to make the de facto annexation of the country inevitable. Country. Journalist Anne Applebaum, on the other hand, underlined how Protasevich's detention confirms a tendency of authoritarian regimes to apply their coercive measures even beyond national borders, in a sort of transnational extension of internal repression capable of changing the fate of hundreds of dissidents, who would no longer be safe even in the host countries.
Added to the damage is the insult of a Lukashenko who, instead of giving explanations to the international community, publicly demanded " compensation from the West " for the " accident " in the Belarusian skies. Which, if nothing else, proves two things: that the sanctions announced by the European Council have no deterrent effect on autocrats of this nature and that, sooner or later, authoritarian regimes always end up discharging domestic tensions outside, creating real international crises that automatically turn into threats to collective security. But there is also another relevant aspect: whether he had informed Moscow or not, Lukashenko has shown that he fully confides in Putin's support, so much so that he stands in the way of the entire European Union. A bet that, at the moment, seems to have won.
Yesterday afternoon the sensational decision of the Russian authorities to ban their airspace to European companies that, in retaliation, do not transit over Belarus. Brussels flounders, as always. In the immediacy of the kidnapping, Ursula Von der Leyen curiously called it " an attack on European sovereignty ", as if such a thing existed. In the summit of 27 convened by Michel to respond to the attack, it was decided to extend the sanctions (already in force against Minsk) to the officials directly involved in the hijacking, in addition to the exclusion of Belarusian skies from the routes of European aircraft and the ban on overflight of EU ones by Lukashenko's national airline. Although sterile, sanctions remain the only policy that the Union seems capable of expressing in the absence of hard power . However, these are emotional responses, more typical of a private association that tries to defend its members, than of a public institution that claims to absorb the competences of individual states. In order for sanctions to have any practical effect, it is first of all necessary to know what objective they are proposing, except to simply become a repetitive and self-referential mechanism. In this case it is not very clear what we want to achieve, whether the safety of flights, the weakening of the Minsk regime, the increase in pressure on Moscow or a little bit of everything. On the other hand, any initiatives by national governments on the margins of the European Union – probably the only effective ones – would certify the substantial powerlessness of the Community project and its overt geopolitical inconsistency.
But let's go back to Putin for a moment. The Russian president had just come out of a week that was nothing short of propitious: the Blinken-Lavrov meeting in Iceland, the United States' renunciation of hindering the completion of North Stream 2 , the latest survey by the Levada Institute with a new surge in consent (65 percent approval). Unlikely that he felt the need to raise the level of the battle by planning or facilitating an act of air piracy in league with Lukashenko. It is true that the Kremlin and its secret services have not recently shown particular clarity and shrewdness in the realization of their missions, but one thing is to stake your reputation to hunt down a sworn enemy like Navalny, another is to dig a grave. diplomatic to allow the arrest of a Belarusian journalist, however inconvenient it may be in Minsk.
The first not to believe in Russian involvement is Joe Biden who, the day after the crime, sent his counterpart an official invitation to the Geneva summit on June 16. A nice life preserver, no doubt about it, while suspicions were mounting in Europe. Beyond the possible retaliation, from the political point of view it is not indifferent that Lukashenko has carried out alone or accompanied by the FSB: in the first case we would be faced with a reckless but personal act, dictated by desperation; in the second hypothesis to coordinated action to confront the West with the fait accompli and test its determination in the response. Those who argue that Lukashenko would never act without consulting his patron should be reminded that, until the outbreak of demonstrations in Belarus last August, the line of the Minsk government in the international arena had been rather ambivalent: it dates back to a few months before the visit. of the then secretary of state Mike Pompeo, a meeting that the regime had not failed to emphasize to confirm its independence and autonomy from Moscow. Then the electoral farce and protests changed everything and the batka was left with no choice but to accept Vladimir Putin's suffocating embrace.
While everyone rolls their eyes, however, the Belarusian land continues to be stained with blood. The victims of the last days of ordinary repression are not only Roman Protasevich and his girlfriend Sofya Sapega. On Wednesday, relatives and friends buried Witold Ashurok, a dead political prisoner (killed, say his loved ones) in one of the many prisons in the country. A video is also circulating online where he suddenly falls to the ground after receiving assistance from his captors. Dima Stakhovsky, seventeen, took his own life after the authorities threatened him with a 15-year prison sentence for the events in August. The same authorities who sentenced Iryna Shchastnaya, administrator of Telegram channels, to 4 years for her role as a political activist. We look to the sky but in the middle of Europe there is a black hole of right and dignity that no one seems able to fill.
The post The Belarusian unknown: Moscow reacts and Brussels flounders: but does Putin really have to do with the hijacking? appeared first on Atlantico Quotidiano .
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Atlantico Quotidiano at the URL http://www.atlanticoquotidiano.it/quotidiano/lincognita-bielorussa-mosca-reagisce-e-bruxelles-annaspa-ma-putin-centra-davvero-con-il-dirottamento/ on Fri, 28 May 2021 03:57:00 +0000.