The Navalny enigma: exile hypothesis for the only one capable of representing Putin’s nemesis
Navalny was finally able to see his personal doctor. This is no small concession in Russia's rigid prison system. He is ill but is not dying, as was filtered at first by opposition circles. In any case, he had to stop the hunger strike to avoid the worst. Since February 28, he spends his days in the IK-2 penal colony in the city of Pokrov, about 100 kilometers from Moscow. According to lawyers, the environmental conditions are unhealthy and his captors systematically deprive him of sleep. On Wednesday, thousands of people marched again in the main Russian cities to demand their release: the usual script of willing activists, ordinary people who make anti-Putin demands their own and scattered arrests for intimidation purposes.
Navalny's political career began in the liberal Yabloko party, where he served for seven years, before being expelled for joining a march of extremist groups. He then founded a nationalist movement ( Narod ) based on an anti-immigration platform. Despite this controversial affiliation, Navalny has been fighting from the outset for a reform of the judicial system and state institutions and hence the initiative that will deliver him to fame: the anti-corruption foundation which, especially for its online activities, for years it has been a thorn in the side not only of Putin but also of the technocrats who depend on the Putinian system of power. Other essential milestones of his career: the street demonstrations on the occasion of the Duma elections in 2011, the first arrests, the candidacy for mayor of Moscow, where he ends up behind the current mayor Sobyanin with a 27 percent of votes, denying the legend of its limited following among ordinary people and demonstrating that, at least in large urban centers, its message is breaking through. The Kremlin also knows this, which begins to hunt him down and since 2018 precludes him from any possibility of a political career by decreeing his ban from public office. The rest is recent history, the physical attacks repeated, up to the Novichok poisoning last August with everything that followed. Finally, the conviction for embezzlement that led him to prison, a sentence that his supporters denounce as politically motivated.
Leaving aside the pro-Putinian front, aligned a priori with the Kremlin, Navalny's bona fide detractors insist a lot on his nationalist past (but also on the present), bordering on xenophobia. They point out that his are not liberal democratic credentials, that he would be a radical after all, and that he could even represent an exacerbated version of the worst vices of present-day Russia. Based on this, they argue, it is better not to risk and keep the known evil than to open the doors to an alternative that – if it takes shape – for many would be a leap in the dark. This vision, which certainly contains a part of the truth about Navalny's ideological profile, however, presents three major weaknesses: 1) it is the classic excuse that all authoritarian regimes use to justify their actions and perpetuate themselves in power: a contemporary version of " After me the flood "; 2) it is a theory that prevents any demonstration of its validity: if we do not give space to alternatives we will never know if our fears and our hopes will be confirmed or denied, and therefore we make the change objectively impossible; 3) even in the times of the Soviet Union, not all but certainly a part of the dissidence of the 70s and 80s had strong nationalist connotations and this does not mean that the meaning of their action was historically diminished, indeed in many cases nationalism it was a decisive factor in undermining the foundations of the dictatorships of real socialism in Eastern Europe.
When we deal with the Navalny case we are actually talking about very different perspectives, depending on the point of observation. There is the perspective of the political activist Navalny, an almost tragic figure, in the classic sense of the term, a man who seems to have decided to sacrifice himself for the cause: he fights, is arrested, risks dying of poisoning, returns home knowing that he is waiting for him. the prison but does it anyway. The persecution magnifies his figure making him a martyr of the police state. Then there is the perspective of his fellow adventurers, the members of his foundation, the activists who support him: here we are faced with a group that blindly believes in its leader and whose main problem is to keep the attention focused on legal events involving him and create a growing impact on public opinion in an extremely difficult context. They are people who pay for their activism on their own skin, risking being swallowed up by the system and its repressive apparatus at any time, as evidenced by the recent proposal to declare the anti-corruption foundation as an " extremist organization ", like a criminal gang , with all the consequences of the case in criminal terms.
Thirdly, there are ordinary people, those who do not deal with politics directly, who generally tend to support the established power as long as they meet the minimum expectations of economic well-being, to which the struggles for civil rights are of great interest. marginal and for which Navalny is not a point of reference and in many cases it is even a disturbing element. It is the silent majority, the one that in the polls gives Putin 55 percent popularity and his opponent 19 percent. However, and here the game is played, if faced with a real choice, that is, a competitive election with transparent rules, it could at some point produce a surprise in terms of electoral consensus (think of the tactic of intelligent voting in last regional elections, vote for anyone other than Putin's candidate, successfully promoted by Navalny himself).
Finally, there is the perspective of the Kremlin and its security apparatuses. After pretending to ignore him for years (he didn't even say his name), Putin finally had to resort to hard ways to get rid of him, and it seems that for the time being he succeeded. On the other hand, the fury shows that the system fears figures like Navalny, capable of highlighting the abuses and corruption that accompanies it at all levels. What is most frightening is that Navalny could untap and channel a discontent brewing within Russian society but which has not found a way to manifest itself publicly. Navalny alone can do little, but if a movement similar to that of dissidents develops in the Soviet era, then things could change.
Then there is another factor to take into consideration, namely the geopolitical projection of the Navalny affair. It is useful to remember that for Russia and for all the pro-Putin pundits that also abound in our latitudes, Navalny is a weapon of the American secret services to destabilize the country. That certainly a case like yours lends itself to being exploited in terms of international politics is evident and almost obvious, but we must be clear in distinguishing the inevitable implications on a diplomatic level from the ravings of a regime that increasingly takes refuge in conspiracy theories. to armor inside. Also because – beyond the official positions of the European Union who expressed " concern " (the magic word of Brussels) for his health conditions and Biden who defined the situation as " unfair and inappropriate " – it does not appear that the persecution of Navalny has significantly affected economic and diplomatic relations: North Stream 2 is one step away from being completed and when the United States applied sanctions against Moscow it did so in response to alleged interference / cyberattacks and not the violation of human rights in the country.
Finally, it is worth mentioning the fallout of the Navalny case on the open conflicts involving Russia, in particular the Ukrainian case with the resumption of hostilities in the Donbass. It is well known that authoritarian systems, when they feel internal pressure, try to discharge it outside. The political and economic problems of today's Russia may not be the main reason for the current crisis but they are certainly elements that no minimally coherent analysis can afford to underestimate.
Despite all the contradictions of the character, at this moment Navalny is probably the only political subject able to represent Putin's nemesis, capable of aggregating in Russian society a real opposition to the policies of the Kremlin (the formal opposition, in Parliament, as we know it is only facade). From prison everything is more difficult, obviously, and the unknown about his health conditions weighs heavily on the future of democratic activism in Russia. But what interest would Putin have in making Navalny die live and in slow motion? Personally, I don't think that's his goal. Already in August, the Kremlin did not oppose any resistance to his transfer to Germany for post-poisoning treatment, nor did it ever officially claim his return to face the criminal proceedings opened on his behalf. The trickle of persecution may prompt some Western governments to demand that Navalny be exiled for humanitarian reasons. Putin would get rid of an uncomfortable opponent in one fell swoop and demonstrate (from his point of view) that he is a man closely linked to the West. His activism would continue in European capitals but far from the heart of Russian politics. Machiavellian? Maybe. Stay tuned.
The post The Navalny enigma: exile hypothesis for the only one able to represent Putin's nemesis appeared first on Atlantico Quotidiano .
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Atlantico Quotidiano at the URL http://www.atlanticoquotidiano.it/quotidiano/lenigma-navalny-ipotesi-esilio-per-lunico-in-grado-di-rappresentare-la-nemesi-di-putin/ on Mon, 26 Apr 2021 03:53:00 +0000.