Which ministers and programs for Draghi, between Pd / 5Stelle suffering and Lega / FI centrality?
A name was enough, a name alone to give life to a very large parliamentary majority even before knowing both the program, if not for some title and inspiration, and the Executive itself, the latter remained completely confidential, so as to constitute a greedy morsel for the daily fantasy journalism. There has been a movement that has forgotten that it has grown into a party, so as to renew the rite of consulting its associative referent through the Rousseau platform, just over one hundred thousand members in front of ten million voters, in the name of a dwarf variant of direct democracy. Except that there was uncertainty about the response of the consultation, so as to induce the big names to try to direct it: first suggesting to do it with full knowledge of the program and the ministerial structure, so as to avoid a blind opening of credit, but here with the probable firm opposition of Draghi, forced to beat the pace pending the green light grillino; concluding, then, to carry it out immediately, not without having prepared the yes with a saving intervention by Grillo and with a tamed question. A true small masterpiece, which proceeds from support for a technical-political government, a compromise with respect to the only political government initially required; it continues with the launch of a super-Ministry of Ecological Transition and with the maintenance of the “main results achieved by the 5Stelle movement” (?); to close modestly with reference to the "other forces indicated by the appointed president Mario Draghi".
This last expression hides the true and profound difficulty that not only the 5 Stars, but the historical left itself, Pd and Leu, feel about the co-presence, within an almost plebiscite majority, of Forza Italia and Lega; only that the major incompatibilities are different, if still personalized in the figures of the leaders : for the 5 Stars, Berlusconi; for the PD and Leu, Salvini. It almost seems that there is hope that Draghi will exclude these forces if not explicitly, implicitly, by dictating unacceptable programmatic conditions; but it is a very tenuous hope in the light of Mattarella's clear words, that the perimeter of the pro-Draghi majority must be extended according to the rule of those who are there, without any exclusion motivated by ideological incompatibilities, programmatic contrasts, character frictions, so as to make participation politically and personally neutral.
This, however, has an important impact with regard to the identity of the forces in the field, which they used to characterize themselves, both in a positive sense, for what they are, and in a negative sense, for what they are not vis-à-vis. -vis of others: left / right, conservatives / progressives, democrats / populists, sovereigns / Europeans. Above all, the left suffers from it, which has practiced its own identity in an existential way, through a constant accentuation of its being more than different and completely opposed, with a self-referential characterization raised to the nth degree, the only force fully legitimized in force. of the Italian constitution and in view of European integration.
Here is the catchphrase of Pd and Leu, who, after having put Matteo Renzi in the dock, smearing the human figure even before being political, ended up being wrapped up in a contradiction. If it is true that the senator from Rignano brought Conte down, it is also true that he propitiated Draghi's entry into the field, who certainly holds the comparison with his predecessor perfectly from a European point of view. Good would have been born from evil, but not by chance that would have remedied the coup of a completely unreliable exhibitionist narcissus, as one would have us believe, but for a precise calculation by Renzi: sure that Mattarella would not have dissolved Parliament, he had foreseen the fallout on a government of the president, which might have had Draghi as its most likely name.
The guerrillas cultivated by Italia Viva concerned Conte himself, as Zingaretti had defined him, that is the most advanced point of balance between Pd / Leu and 5 Stars, in view of a structural alliance considered electorally competitive, even if such as to swallow the historical left any programmatic dissonance. Which was exactly what Renzi did not want, from which this structural alliance took away any area of maneuver, forcing him to be part of it in a residual way, with a strengthening of the current secretary of the Democratic Party, compared to the two big matches on the calendar, the destination and management of the Recovery Fund , not that the election of Mattarella's successor.
Now, however, to be framed in the target of the duo Pd / Leu is Matteo Salvini, of whom it was believed that he was called out of the majority, which did not act as a good tactician, certainly to intercept the north wind , but also to regain a central role, freeing himself from the portrait of the black man built around him, since he led the League to consistently be the most awarded party in the polls. Faced with his opening of credit to the former president of the European Central Bank, wider and more unconditional than that made by any other political force, the left, which had deluded itself that the good Salvini was on his own, has spent a growing negative arguments about his sudden conversion to pro-European and Atlantic: a purely tactical conversion, destined to fail in the face of Draghi's position that emerged in the consultations, with regard to fiscal policy (no to flat tax ), emigration (no to ports closed), community (no to the unanimity rule, yes cession to the EU of portions of sovereignty, yes affirmation of the rule of law), foreign (no to Putin's Russia, yes to Biden's USA); and, in any case, a conversion that took place on the theses and priorities of the Pd / Leu.
The 5 Stars share this opinion on Salvini, but in the end they made us a government with the League, with the achievement of some objectives that they continue to defend even today; nor, on the other hand, have they completely digested the infamous accusations made against them by the left itself, for being anti-parliamentarians, populists, sovereignists, more or less the same formula adopted against the man of Papeete . But their big target is Berlusconi, the one rehabilitated by the Democratic Party / Leu as a potential roommate of the "majority Ursula", a man in their opinion indelibly stained by a long list of criminal investigations, still not exhausted, so as to be impossible in the light of a justicialism that has remained unassailable even in the light of the Palamara scandal. From this scandal emerged the true criterion for selecting appointments to the most important judicial offices, especially those relating to the major powers of attorney, that is a continuous downward market among the leaders of the currents seated in the CSM; but, above all, the clear ad personam fury, yesterday Berlusconi, today Salvini, for a political prejudice, so as to integrate real judicial coups.
Behind this returning justicialism, however, a precise calculation appears quite evident, namely that of seeing in Forza Italia a central, pro-European and moderate force, capable of both aggregating the current fragmentation of the so-called "center", coming to constitute something appealing to the left itself, a convinced supporter of the Ursula majority, and to legitimize the right.
He manages to participate in the game of predictions, once the consultation on the Rousseau platform has given the go-ahead to the government, albeit just before Draghi publicly reveals the mystery. As for the composition of the government team, the rule shared by the media is that it will be much less political, i.e. party-based, the larger the majority is, so as to make it probable that it will be called by authoritative personalities from civil society, who are not enough to have a specific competence, but it requires the skills and experience necessary to put it into practice; and of representatives of the parties, not the leaders, but in any case identifying personalities, if possible already tested in previous government experiences (the heads of delegation of the Conte bis, plus the new entries ?). The latter are necessary to maintain a link with Parliament, where the reforms planned by Draghi will have to pass, with their complex itinerary through the competent committees and the classrooms, which need not be remembered and require compliant behavior of the Chamber and Senate. It may well be that Draghi no longer has recourse to Prime Ministerial decrees that are not based on sufficiently detailed legislative measures to legitimize the limits placed on the exercise of fundamental freedoms; and that it uses decree-laws for emergencies and delegated laws for the most demanding reforms, correct constitutional instruments, to claim an area of legislative maneuver for the executive power.
Regarding the programs, it is necessary to keep in mind both the threefold emergency situation – health, economic, social – and the prospect of duration of the Draghi government, between one and two years. This requires first of all specific measures of prompt execution: the development of a vaccination and containment plan for the virus, which discounts the mea culpa recited by the legendary Ursula about the delay in the supply of doses; the preparation of the set of projects relating to the Recovery Fund , complete with all the administrative and judicial reforms necessary to ensure their implementation; the revision of the social safety nets system that accompanies the selective overcoming of the redundancy block.
The major reforms, from the tax authorities to civil justice, will be darker and more tiring and slower, probably handed over to as many proxy laws, whose decree could characterize 2022. While I really don't think Draghi will take charge of the electoral law or some constitutional revision, such as those relating to constructive trust and regional autonomy, due to their ontologically divisive nature and the length of the procedure required; but not even some incandescent reforms such as those relating to the election of the CSM and criminal justice. This does not at all exclude Parliament from taking the initiative, thus making the existing conflicts on these matters emerge strongly, without in itself putting the existence of the government at risk, but certainly making navigation more difficult and slow.
There is a lot of fighting from the left on the Europeanism and Atlanticism of our Draghi. There is no doubt about Europeanism, as evidenced by its past, such as to give it greater credit and negotiating power in that of Brussels, but not to make it in itself a decisive protagonist of an integration process – which is expected in terms of institutional innovations , which can be summarized in terms of federal integration through the transfer of portions of sovereignty – which would entail the questioning of the current European equilibrium, where so-called “sovereignty” is largely at home. Not even any doubts about Atlanticism, back in fashion after the advent of a character mythologized by us like Draghi, Biden, but this does not correct the shift of the game from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with a substantial confirmation of Trump's policy against that China that our Europe courts . It's the economy, stupid .
The post Which ministers and programs for Draghi, between Pd / 5Stelle suffering and Lega / FI centrality? appeared first on Atlantico Quotidiano .
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Atlantico Quotidiano at the URL http://www.atlanticoquotidiano.it/quotidiano/quali-ministri-e-programmi-per-draghi-tra-sofferenza-pd-5stelle-e-centralita-lega-fi/ on Fri, 12 Feb 2021 04:56:00 +0000.