Nicola Bizzi: “Count Dracula, Draghi, national and monetary sovereignty”

That the Italy that emerged from World War II has always been a country with limited sovereignty is an established and absolutely irrefutable fact. What is tragic, however, is that most Italians often and willingly pretend not to remember it, or – and this is even more serious – just ignore it!

Subject from the end of World War II to a real military occupation (we host more than 180 American military bases and installations on our territory), we no longer had autonomy in decision-making in terms of foreign and energy policy. In the cases in which an attempt has been made to re-establish, and successfully, a minimum of decision-making autonomy in these key sectors, the consequences, as the story of Enrico Mattei teaches us, have been dramatic. And that minimum of sovereignty that still remained and that we could exercise, albeit mildly, the monetary one, was progressively undermined first with the divorce between the Treasury and the Bank of Italy in 1981 and then with the provisions of the Amato government in July 1992. finally, it was definitively stolen with the questionable entry of our country into the circuit of the single European currency, with all the economic and social imbalances that it entailed. And the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989, brought to our country another penalization still little understood and faced by historians: the loss of a large part of our geostrategic weight, and therefore of our "position income", transforming us into the after a few years in an earthenware pot among iron pots.

As Giorgio Vitali underlined in a report he gave at a conference in Orte in 2010, «we know well that the destiny of Italy is a geographic one, or rather 'geopolitical' one, and it must be thought precisely at a geopolitical level. Working with conjectures without inserting the elaboration of thought within the Cartesian coordinates of geopolitics is useless. It was a great "Italian", Napoleon, who declared in no uncertain terms that history is made by geography. The interest in Italy of all of Europe, even taken for individual countries, (…) shows us with sufficient clarity that "elsewhere" Italy is valued for its position in the Mediterranean, regardless of the political line of those who are in power. Therefore, the great Metternich was perfectly right when, in a suitable forum, he declared that Italy was a geographical expression. Many Italian patriots have speculated on this sentence for a couple of centuries without realizing that the judgment was independent of the "intrinsic value" of its inhabitants. The history of our country proves it » .

The historical experience of the last decades has clearly shown us that there is absolutely no reciprocity between Italy and the USA (as indeed it does not exist also with regard to France, Great Britain and other nations closely linked with the puppeteers of the theater of international politics). In fact, we can safely challenge any professor of International Law or Constitutional Law to prove otherwise.

Without going around it too much, a nation can be said to be sovereign if the following points are respected:

1) Within its territory, delimited by certain borders, there are laws and regulations equally applicable to all those who exercise their activities there for various reasons, regardless of their nationality. A separate discussion applies to some aspects of Civil Law for which International Law establishes in bilateral treaties between states which – of course – the solution of certain aspects of coexistence are based on the principle of reciprocity.

2) The national territory appears to be perfectly intact and devoid of enclaves where forms of authority other than the national one exist.

3) The government authorities that succeed each other at the helm of the nation over time appear to be perfectly independent, that is, free from external conditioning, in making their own political, economic and diplomatic choices.

4) The regulatory discipline of the means of exchange (money and similar) and monetary policy fall within the full power of the national authorities.

Well, can we then say that the four conditions listed so far are respected in the case of Italy? Absolutely not! And I'll explain why:

a) It is not true that there is uniformity of treatment under Italian law for all those who carry out their activity in the national territory for various reasons. We can cite, for example, the tragedy of Cermis, when a US military plane with personnel on board not engaged in particular activities other than those of a normal routine flight, some years ago severed the cables of a cable car, causing the death of twenty-one people. Of that tragedy, for which it was immediately clear whose responsibility was, under Italian law there was no culprit. The only judicial body was an American court martial, which even sanctioned a promotion of the accused military! Paradoxically, has anyone ever heard or read in our regime press interviews with the families of the victims of Cermis?

b) On all American bases, or those of NATO (which is essentially the same thing) present on our territory, the Italian authorities have no jurisdiction, or if they do, it is because it is delegated to them by the NATO command . They are in fact portions of foreign territory on the national surface, like Guantanamo in Cuba.

c) With regard to this aspect, it would take full pages to list the many cases in which there has been a total subjection by the Italian governments to the wishes of foreign powers or of the so-called "international organizations". Not to mention the undue influence exercised not by the usual overseas master, but by a much smaller and much closer state, even located within the national territory: the Vatican.

At this point, I believe it is necessary to say a few words on the concept of monetary sovereignty, another fundamental, if not essential, element for the solidity of a state and for the development of a real well-being of citizens and the democratic nature of institutions.

The money issue income is synonymous with the ancient term "seigniorage". In ancient and medieval societies it was the "lords", the kings, to confiscate it, in a measure comparable to the type of coin (gold, silver, minor metals) on which they engraved their effigy. In this way – when they did not resort to slavery – with the "seigniorage" the sovereigns met the war expenses, those for public infrastructures (defensive walls, canals, aqueducts, etc.), or, perhaps, those for their whims: it depended on the King.

In Italy, the monarchical state used part of the income from monetary issuance to build "at no cost" the Umbertine neighborhoods of Rome and other cities. But in general, as the "Nation" was replacing the Sovereign as the source of the Powers of the State and parliamentary democracy for monarchical absolutism, the "seigniorage" was redeclined in the new state structure: in Italy, for example, the Bank of Italy, which already held the monopoly on the issue of banknotes, was transformed in 1936 into an institution under public law. Contrary to what one might think, a bit like AGIP, created in 1926 and saved in 1945-46 by Enrico Mattei, the Republic inherited and strengthened the state control over the currency legislated during Fascism. As Marco Della Luna and Antonio Miclavez remind us in the Euroschiavi essay, "Between 1945 and 1948 the strategic role of the Bank of Italy in the sector of currency control and maneuvering, already largely recognized in the legislation that intervened on the matter between the second half of the 1920s and the second half of the 1930s is further consolidated and strengthened and the discipline of the organization and functions of the Bank of Italy in force at the time of the entry into force of the Republican Constitution is destined to remain almost intact for about forty years " .

The Minister of the Treasury decided on the discount rate; in 1956 a Ministry of State Participations was born under the direction of which both the jewels of the state industry and some banks with a majority state participation would be created or supported. State control of the monetary issuance rent became an essential link in the development of people's well-being, even within a system calibrated by social injustices: it was the financial basis, albeit indirect, of the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s and allowed, between the other, the birth and development, for almost half a century, of the welfare state.

All this ended on the night of July 31, 1992. On June 2 of that year, in fact, the famous meeting of European financiers and bankers was held on the Panfilo Britannia, owned by Queen Elizabeth, in which, mentor George Soros and present even Mario Draghi, the Lira would have been devalued. In the event of privatization of the Italian state industry, therefore – already in the air thanks to the frenzied campaign of the Republic against the so-called "boyars", that is the state leaders to be demonized en masse to bury and rob the state industry – this it would end up with the sharks of international finance at bargain prices.

As I stated in my recent interview, I was twenty at the time and had been involved in politics for some time. I was an eyewitness to a report on TG5: Emma Bonino disembarks from Britannia, moored in Civitavecchia, smiles and explains that, on board, "interesting and constructive" things have been discussed. Then Beppe Grillo lands, but refuses to make statements to the reporter, Enrico Mentana. I saw that service, I remember it very well. It was June 2, 1992. Today this service has disappeared: it has even disappeared from the archives of Tg5. And Mentana himself publicly went so far as to say that he never existed.

But let's go back a few hours, to the night of July 31st: the Council of Ministers is semi-deserted and Giuliano Amato makes a real coup, transforming state bodies into joint stock companies: not only ENI and IRI came like this privatized, but also the Bank of Italy itself. It was the first blow, however already decisive, to the state sovereignty over the monetary issue and its rent. The other came with the adoption by Italy of the Euro which not only halved salaries and wages, thanks to the unfair exchange rate shared by Prodi (1 to 2, instead of 1 to 1), but, moreover, gave way, in the following years, with the Lisbon Treaty (2007-2009) and with the European Stability Mechanism (MES, 2011) to the "perfecting" of the usurpation to the People, of the income from monetary issuance and of the verification-planning of public accounts.

Today sovereignty and monetary rent belong to the European Central Bank, an organism that escapes the control of the member states, in the name of a misunderstood "autonomy": and, as far as Italy is concerned, the issuance rent goes to the bankers Italian private individuals (Unicredit, Intesa San Paolo, etc.) owners of the Bank of Italy, who receive from the ECB the share of Euro assigned to our country, approximately 6-8% of the total.

The entry into the Eurosystem and the usurpation of monetary sovereignty by private Italian (Bank of Italy) and foreign (ECB) bankers are a fundamental element of the crisis gripping Europe and Italy. As we all have now realized on the basis of the events of recent years, this crisis, which under the leadership of governments subordinate to the large private banking powers is destroying our production base (ILVA, Finmeccanica, closure of small businesses), has a name : crisis of "public debt".

But the public debt is a big scam against the people: Japan notoriously has a public debt well above that of Italy – 200% of GDP, against our 120% – yet its economy is pulling, it is alive, it produces wealth material, precisely because the liberal government of Tokyo controls and benefits from sovereignty and monetary rent. Japan's public debt is almost entirely internal, made up of a mass of small and medium-sized savers who invest in the country's future. It is a sovereign debt. On the other hand, Italy's debt (internal to only 40% and the remaining 60% foreign debt) is a slave debt.

Here is a typical example of the great public debt scam: the ECB, a private body that escapes the control of the states whose economies are in full crisis, instead of granting credit to the latter (and this would already be a fraudulent operation, because the ECB money is invented out of thin air) grants them to private banks and at a rate of 1%, with the prospect of them buying Italian government bonds (at what rate? certainly not 1%!).

Herein lies the key to deception. Other than waste and cheerful management of the governments of the eighties as the primary and only cause of the Italian debt! There was waste, corruption existed, but as early as the 1980s it was pointed out that the public debt – which stood at 20% of GDP at the beginning of the 1970s – had grown mainly due to the divorce between the Bank of Italy and Treasury of 1981 and the related increase in interest rates.

With the definitive privatization of the Bank of Italy, commissioned by Giuliano Amato in 1992, the usurpation of the monetary sovereignty of the Italian people was completed and a notable boost was given to that terrible vicious circle that, even today, is dragging on day after day Italy in the midst of a recessionary policy, towards the abyss of an endless debt: deprived of the income from monetary issuance, the Italian State prints government bonds to purchase the "nest egg" from the Bank of Italy (and the ECB indirectly) ”Of banknotes that should be his by right, as an expression-fruit of the work of its citizens. In this way, instead of proceeding towards the elimination of public debt, it undergoes an increase from year to year.

Another leading factor that has led to a progressive erosion of the national and monetary sovereignty of the states (obviously including Italy), already from the end of the 1970s onwards, throwing a heavy mortgage on the already problematic internal crisis of their democracies, is was the financialization of the economy.

The reason for the financialization of the economy is very simple: extracting wealth from society in exchange for symbols (and manipulating the market for symbols) is much easier and faster than earning it in exchange for real goods, work and services. To do this, however, it is necessary to impose dependence on those symbols on society, and to build a legal monopoly of their production, thus also financing the politics and regulatory order of the states.

Since the beginning of the 1980s, the primary cause of the socio-economic crises of Western democracies (and Italy is fully part of this configuration) have been mainly the erroneous accounting principles applied to money and credit; correcting them would have been the most effective way of resolving and preventing crises without tears and blood and without violence from governments and the population.

The most serious and profound cause of financial and banking instability, as well as many market crises and economic recessions, is the fact that the most important economic reality of all, involved in the so-called creation of monetary means, is not recognized by current accounting principles, and therefore remains, in the financial universe, a sort of "dark matter", which exists, is present, exerts a "gravitational" force, but it is not visualized, it is not taken into account, it is not even named.

This economic reality are the flows of purchasing power from society to the bank as creator of monetary means, that is, the value that is combined with the symbols, pieces of paper and electronic bits – without their own value – in which the aforementioned means consist monetary and expendable financial values. It joins, enters (so to speak) into the monetary means, as society, the market, accept them, give them ipso facto the value that they then have and that the banking system, collecting it from society without producing it, lends back to society itself and if he charges it as principal and interest.

A value constituting a positive economic quid that the banks collect by creating symbols, and which therefore, if the accounts were drawn up according to reality, would be recorded in the profit and loss account as I receive, and would go to capitalize the banks, making them stronger. But it would also offset the huge global debt; and, last but not least, constituting income, would give a strong tax revenue, suitable for extinguishing the public debts of the states.

Marco Della Luna, in his essay I Lords of Catastrophe , clearly denounces how the application to our society is perpetrated what he calls the Cayman Model : "The recent discovery of 32,000 billion Dollars stashed in tax havens, primarily the Cayman Islands , with the help of leading and authoritative banks, including Deutsche Bank – scandal known as the Offshore Leaks – is just the tip of the iceberg in a world with around 1.4 trillion of debt and roughly as many junk bonds, however, it helps to concretely understand how the global economic-financial system in force in the world works, especially for Europe, and how it generates the economic depression in which we live. It is not difficult! Here I would just like to add a memory: when I went, in 2006 and 2007, on television, to Canale Italia, together with Eng. Argo Fedrigo, who produced a statement from a bank in the Cayman Islands, which showed current accounts of the Bank of Italy and other leading banks. Fedrigo invited the judiciary to investigate, making himself available. Nobody called him, as far as I know . '

What we have now broadly stated is the current economic model. It produces "crises" and recessions, from which it has not emerged as long as it remains in operation. The problem is that this model is strenuously defended by the European Union, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other power groups – real supranational and transnational strong powers – which act exclusively in the interest of their beneficiaries, to despite the evils that this model causes to the population of the States that are involved.

From the 1970s onwards, a targeted series of international treaties and regulatory reforms have contributed to the elaboration, construction and implementation of this model, consciously or unknowingly, freely or forcibly, for utilitarian calculation or for a superior vision, men like Beniamino Andreatta, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, Romano Prodi, Giuliano Amato, Pierluigi Bersani, Mario Monti, Giorgio Napolitano.

If, at the international level, this line was adopted and undertaken in the United Kingdom by Margaret Thatcher, in Europe by all Community institutions, and in the United States by the administrations of Ronald Reagan, George Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush and Barak Obama, we must find that in our country it has had as its main standard-bearers the men and center-left governments that have succeeded in the key roles of power in the so-called Second Republic of the post-Tangentopoli. So much so that the responsibilities of the Italian left in this game have been denounced and well highlighted by international scholars and observers such as the Russian historian Boris Yousef, who has openly spoken of a "pact with the devil" made between the leaders of the PCI-PDS on the eve of Tangentopoli. According to Yousef's analysis, the generation of new cadres of the old Communist Party, in a crisis of political and ideological identity in the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall, in order to secure a political future and the much-needed control of the government of the country, in fact, they would have hesitated to come to terms with what, seen from a Marxist perspective, should in fact have represented in their eyes their most deadly enemy: big international finance. And the most sensational aspect of this operation was not so much the fact that they designed and implemented it, but the fact that they managed to get their electorate to accept and metabolize it!

However, we can give no justification to the center-right governments which, if they have not directly favored this model with their work, have not shown that they have had the necessary tools and sufficient determination to counter it or, at least, to try to contain it.

In my opinion, there can be no solution to the crisis of Italian democracy (as, moreover, to that of many other European and non-European democracies), if we limit ourselves to discussing "corrective" and structural and institutional reforms which, in order to how much they can actually be implemented and applied, they will never even scratch what I believe to be the main problem, the monetary one, reversing the unfortunate course that has led to an ever greater financialization of the economy and the consequent downward spiral and fiscal screwing that grips us.

To cope with this situation, top-level statesmen would be needed, but the Italian political landscape, populated by sad figures and by many puppets without skills and of medium-low caliber, is dramatically lacking. During the much reviled First Republic, however, we had states worthy of this appellation. And the fact that a certain political class of the time – for heaven's sake, not perfect, but which at least also worked for the good of the nation – was deliberately destroyed to make way for the current one, must make us reflect.

Today there is a lot of talk of an imminent "scrapping" of the Conte government and of the eventuality – given by many for certainty – of the advent of an executive led by Mario Draghi, who would be entrusted with the task of quickly ferrying the country out of the "pandemic" schizophrenia desired and fueled by the current government and to relaunch a deliberately destroyed economy. And there is a lot of talk, especially in Masonic circles, of an alleged "conversion" of Mario Draghi to Keynesianism and to the doctrine of an expansive economy. Personally, I'll only believe it when I see it. The character in question has too many skeletons in the closet, far too many.

Nicola Bizzi: “Count Dracula, Draghi, national and monetary sovereignty” comes from Database Italia .

This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on DataBase Italia at the URL on Fri, 11 Sep 2020 15:05:00 +0000.