All things Turkish of Qatar in Libya
The role of Qatar in Libya in symbiosis with Turkey in the scenario that opens up after the agreement between the Libyan factions. The in-depth analysis by Giuseppe Gagliano
It is certainly difficult to deny that the agreement between the Libyan factions arose within the American administration both for the purpose of limiting or containing Russian power projection in Cyrenaica and in view of the upcoming American elections.
Specifically, this agreement would be the result of both the talks between Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry – under the supervision of General Korea responsible for the Middle East of the American Nation Security Council – and of the talks between Richard Norland, ambassador American in Tripoli, and Aguila Saleh, president of the Tobruk Parliament.
Well, in light of the situation of very high political instability that has clearly manifested itself in the last two years in Libya, this agreement proves to be scarcely credible but above all absolutely fragile.
Beyond the promises that this agreement formulates and regardless of the differences between the two contenders well underlined by Agenzia Nova, the fact remains that the GNA has granted – as we had foreseen – to Turkey both the port infrastructure of Misrata – as a naval base to legitimize de facto the projection of Turkish power in the Eastern Mediterranean – and the infrastructure of the military airport of al-Watya located in Western Tripolitania.
Beyond the fact that this agreement was signed on August 17 in Tripoli, the geopolitical data of great importance is the presence of a third party – alongside Libya and Ankara – namely Qatar.
As regards bilateral relations between Turkey and Qatar, it should be remembered that Turkey has always supported Qatar on a military level, receiving ample financial support in exchange.
Suffice it to recall that, for example, the deputy commander of the Ankara forces, Ahmed bin Muhammad, is also the head of the Qatari Military Academy. This means that the training of military cadres is selected on the basis of pro-Turkish political and religious choices.
Furthermore, the presence of the Turkish security forces in Qatar tangibly represents the importance of the Turkish political-military influence. Think of the Turkish military infrastructure Tariq ibn Ziyad, in which the command of the “Qatar-Turkey combined joint Force” is present.
Qatar's arms exports to Turkey have increased dramatically, allowing Ankara to generate revenues of $ 335 million, while the Turkish military operation Source of Peace, set up in north-eastern Syria, is was openly supported by Doha, also to expand the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood.
As for investments, Qatar has disbursed $ 15 billion since 2018 and bought a 50% stake in BMC, a Turkish armored vehicle manufacturer whose Turkish partners are known friends of Erdoaan to produce the Altay. the main next-generation battle tank.But there is also the case of a state-controlled military software company in Ankara, which has signed a partnership agreement with al-Mesned Holdings in Qatar for a joint venture specializing in security solutions. cyber security.
However, one of the most important agreements to remedy the serious economic situation in Turkey is that of 20 May thanks to which the Turkish Central Bank announced that it had tripled its currency exchange agreement with Qatar.
As regards relations between Libya and Qatar, Doha has been able to take advantage of the political weaknesses of both the European Union and the UN. Furthermore, the relative American disengagement from the Middle Eastern theater – given that the Trump administration's priorities are for China, the Indo-Pacific and Russia – have in fact brought an undoubted strategic advantage to Doha.
Now, taking advantage of this situation of instability, Qatar has tried to exploit this propitious opportunity for a policy of greater weight and significance at the geopolitical level in Libya. Precisely for this reason, Qatar's military presence in the 2011 conflict, alongside NATO, was certainly significant not only thanks to the use of air power but also through the training of Libyan rebels both on Libyan territory and in Doha, without forgetting of course the relevant role that their own special forces played in the final assault against Gaddafi.
After the fall of Gaddafi's regime, Qatar recognized the National Transitional Council as a legitimate political institution and made a decisive contribution, not only economically, to supplying the rebels with the necessary energy resources.
Another instrument of influence, and at the same time of penetration into Libya, were certainly the brothers Alī and Ismā'īl al-Šalabī persecuted by the Gaddafi regime. In particular, Alī al-Šalabī is certainly one of the most important men of religion linked to the Muslim brotherhood.
Another key man for Qatar was certainly Abd al-Ḥakīm Bilḥāğ, considered by both the CIA and the US State Department as a dangerous terrorist as the leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. His political role was very important both because he coordinated the military council of Tripoli and because he was one of the main leaders of the al-Waṯan party political group of extreme weight within the general national congress.
Returning to the agreement signed on August 17, Qatar will invest significantly in the reconstruction of Tripoli's military infrastructure. Indeed, the presence in the Qatari delegation of military advisers and instructors who held meetings with their Libyan and Turkish counterparts was not accidental.
Equally significant, from a political point of view, was the meeting between Haftar and the director of Egyptian military intelligence, that is, General Khaled Megawer at the Rajma base, located in Benghazi. A meeting aimed at planning an eventual Egyptian military intervention is certainly an eventuality to consider.
In this regard, Egypt's support of some Libyan tribes could play a significant role. According to the head of the supreme council of tribes in Libya Saleh al-Fendi, as according to Abdel Salam Bou Harraga Al-Jarari, a member of the Al-Ashraf and Al-Murabitin clans in Tarhuna, south of Tripoli, Egyptian support is indispensable. Al-Jarari himself stressed that Egyptian support is the only way to end a harrowing civil war. Not surprisingly, Major General Ahmed Al-Mesmari, spokesman for the Libyan National Army, said that Turkey is mobilizing. just as the August 17 meeting between Turkish and Qatari officials demonstrates, a meeting that, according to Al-Mesmari, will seal the permanent presence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya.
According to Abdelsalam Bohraqa al-Jarrari, an elderly member of a tribe from Tarhuna, south of Tripoli, Egypt also needs a comprehensive military intervention. As for the presence of Doha in Libya, according to Sheikh Adel Al-Faidi, a member of the Supreme Council of Libyan Tribes, the meeting of 17 August coincides with the Turkish-Qatari control over the port of Al-Khums and its transformation in a military infrastructure for the joint military operations of Ankara and Doha in Libya.
On the other hand, the presence of two Turkish frigates arrived at the port of Khums, 135 km east of Tripoli, legitimizes the suspicion that Ankara wants to take possession of the port infrastructures in the area to transform them into military infrastructures, thus allowing it to strengthen its its projection of economic and military power in both the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa.
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/tutte-le-cose-turche-del-qatar-in-libia/ on Sat, 22 Aug 2020 08:15:05 +0000.