Because I am not convinced by the constitutional reform outlined by Casellati. Cazzola’s opinion
The draft constitutional reform developed by Minister Casellati commented by Giuliano Cazzola.
Play your Alessandro Zan too! We will play our Casellati. I understand: the comparison is bold for many reasons, not only political, but also personal attitudes. But between the bill exhibited, in the last legislature, as a banner of civil rights first signed by the garrulous senator of the Democratic Party and the one, of a constitutional nature that the owner of Institutional Reforms will bring to the Council of Ministers, there are similar approaches in dealing with issues, of different nature, but delicate and important.
Dd Zan claimed not to take into account, in determining gender, the sex that mother nature had reserved for a person. The Casellati bill, according to what emerges from the drafts circulating, claims to change the nature of a state system without passing through the vote of a Constituent Assembly.
It is also true that article 138 of the Charter provides for a particular procedure for constitutional revision laws: a fairly rigid and complex procedure, with the obligation of two readings spread over time and with mechanisms for verification by the electorate through the use of a referendum.
It is also true that only the republican form (article 139) is precluded from any possibility of modification. But here lies the point of conjunction with the Zan bill: just as one changes gender with self-certification (and without having to subject one's repudiated body to painful mutilations), so the will of the Founding Fathers placed at the foundation of the Republic is called into question.
Is it possible for a Parliament to redefine the hierarchy and balance of powers typical of a liberal democracy, without feeling the political need to have a mandate to this effect from the people?
All this having been stated and admitted and not granted that the reform of the institutions is a priority problem, the revision plan contained in the Casellati bill resembles a game of three cards, each of which is marked by a State office, but by the name of who currently covers: namely Sergio Mattarella, Giorgia Meloni and Matteo Salvini.
The first two – some signatures appointing the prime minister and ministers were stolen from Mattarella – share the powers that determine the formation of the government. And here the bill makes a very serious technical error: it does not include in the Constitution – a rigid one at that – the criteria and mechanisms of an electoral law (including the majority bonus) which always has a one-to-one relationship with the party system, so much so that determine their practical behaviors, compositions and decompositions.
The Second Republic has taught us that as far as stability is concerned, bipolarism has not been able to provide the guarantees of bipartisanship, so much so that more often than not, center-right or center-left governments have been crippled, at home, to work of their majorities.
The latest elections have highlighted that electoral laws can turn into a nexus shirt for parties that are forced to weave alliances undermined in the programs and objectives that are pursued by each of the parties in the coalition.
Then, in the Casellati bill, there is a wink towards Salvini: if Giorgia fails, the Head of State will try again with you. As if the fall of the prime minister whose name was printed on the ballots did not depend on an internal crisis within a majority that governs with an electoral bonus that brings it to 55%.
Even the history of the appointment and dismissal of ministers, with greater autonomy, by the prime minister will always be a decision conditioned by the relations between the parties of the majority coalition.
Finally, the anti-tipping rule is of dubious constitutionality. Not only do parliamentarians represent the nation without mandate constraints but the parties compete with a democratic method to determine national politics. The rules must also be considered in their possible pathology.
The anti-reversal rule could keep a coalition going only with the threat of early elections or it could lead to frequent recourse to the dissolution of Parliament: in the face, in both cases, of the desired stability.
Beyond extravagant rules made by Casellati, the only revision in line with what happens in Europe in all the countries where a dynastic monarchy is not envisaged – without questioning the primacy of Parliament and without disturbing presidentialism – would be direct election of the Head of State.
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/perche-non-mi-convince-la-riforma-costituzionale-abbozzata-da-casellati-lopinione-di-cazzola/ on Wed, 01 Nov 2023 13:55:23 +0000.