Because Putin’s moves on Ukraine have damaged Russia. Economist Report
Going beyond the immediate, Putin has lost ground on a long-term and strategic perspective. The Economist in-depth study
The news, for a moment, seemed encouraging. In a televised appearance on stage on February 14, Vladimir Putin grunted a terse "good" at his foreign minister's proposal that, despite warnings from the West of an imminent invasion of Ukraine, diplomacy should continue. . The next day, the Russian defense ministry said some of the approximately 180,000 troops it has deployed on its borders with Ukraine would be withdrawn to barracks after completing their military exercises which, it has always claimed, is the reason for they were there in the first place.
Officials and the markets heaved a small sigh of relief. Alas, open-source intelligence soon showed that while some units were moving, many others were preparing to fight. With the frankness that stunned Putin, many Western security officials accused him of lying, doubling down on their warnings of a looming Russian invasion. Even if the troops withdraw, this crisis is not over yet. And, whatever happens, war or no war, Putin has harmed his country with his plan – writes The Economist .
Many Western observers contest this judgment. Without firing a shot, they point out, Putin has put himself at the center of global attention, proving that Russia matters once again. He destabilized Ukraine and made everyone understand that his future is his business. It could still get concessions from NATO to avoid war. And at home he emphasized his political prowess and distracted from the economic hardships and repression of opposition figures like Alexei Navalny, who was once again dragged before a judge this week.
Yet these gains are tactical. While Putin won them, in a more lasting and strategic sense he lost ground.
For one thing, even though all eyes are on Putin, he has galvanized his opponents. Led by Joe Biden, who once called Putin "a killer" and certainly hates the man who tried to deny him the presidency, the West has agreed on a package of harsher sanctions threats than in 2014, when Russia annexed by the Crimea. NATO, liquidated in 2019 by the French president as suffering from "brain death", has found a new purpose in protecting its flanks facing Russia. Having always preferred to keep their distance, Sweden and Finland could even join the alliance. Germany, after recklessly supporting the new Nord Stream 2 pipeline, has accepted that Russian gas is a responsibility it faces and that an invasion would kill the project. If Putin imagined that his threats would meet the Western mush, he had a disillusionment.
Ukraine has indeed suffered. But the crisis has also affirmed the popular sense among Ukrainians that their fate is with the West. True, Putin has obtained assurances that Ukraine is not going to join NATO – but these were cheap, because membership has always been remote. What matters most is that, after being neglected in recent years, Ukraine is enjoying unprecedented diplomatic and military support from the West. Those bonds, forged in the crisis, will not suddenly dissolve if Russian forces withdraw. Again, it is the opposite of what Mr. Putin wanted.
It is also true that Putin has put Europe's security on the agenda, including discussions on missiles and military exercises. But these talks would be in everyone's interest, because they reduce the danger of a conflict. If win-win negotiations count as victories for Putin, let there be more.
The most important loss for Putin is at his home. Russia attempted to build a fortress economy. It has increased its reserves and reduced its dollar share. It has reduced firms' dependence on foreign capital and worked hard to build its "technology stack" (everything from chips to applications to the network itself). It also approached China in hopes of finding an alternative buyer for the hydrocarbons that are still its main source of foreign exchange.
While these actions have lessened the potential damage of Western sanctions, they have not eliminated it. The EU still takes 27% of all Russian exports; China about half. The Power of Siberia pipeline running to China, when completed in 2025, will bring only a fifth of what now goes to Europe. In the event of a serious conflict, sanctions through the fast banking network or on large Russian banks would cut out the financial system. The Huawei-style import restrictions would cause enormous difficulties for Russian tech firms.
Putin can live with this interdependence or turn further towards China. But this would doom Russia to be the lesser partner of an insensitive regime that sees it as a diplomatic shoulder and a backward source of cheap raw materials. This is a yoke that Putin cannot bear.
This alliance of autocrats would also have a psychological cost within Russia. It would demonstrate Putin's dependence on siloviki, the security chiefs who see Ukrainian democracy and deepening ties with the West as a threat to their ability to control and plunder Russia. It would be a further sign for the liberal capitalists and technocrats who are the other pillar of the Russian state they have lost. Others of the best and brightest would leave; others would give up. Stagnation and resentment would turn into opposition that could be met with greater brutality.
What if Putin, aware of all this, invades? This could still be the terrible result of this crisis as each side tries to overcome the other. Just this week, the Russian State Duma urged Putin to recognize the self-proclaimed "republics" in the Donbas, which claim large chunks of Ukrainian territory that they currently do not control – adding another trigger that Putin can pull whenever he wants.
In addition to devastating Ukraine, war would do much more damage to Russia than the threat of war. The West would be more galvanized and more determined to turn its back on Russian gas; Ukraine would become an open wound, bleeding Russia of money and men; and Putin would be a pariah. Russia itself would be ruined, in the short term by sanctions and later by even deeper self-sufficiency and repression.
Putin has cornered himself. It could attack. But a retreat now, with its ambitions hampered, could only lead to an attack later. By addressing the threat he poses, the West has the best chance of discouraging that fateful choice.
(Extract from the press review of eprcomunicazione)
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/russia-ucraina-sconfitta-strategica-putin/ on Sun, 20 Feb 2022 07:23:03 +0000.