Because Western democracies are indebted to Ukraine
We must be grateful to the resistance of the Ukrainian people for having avoided (at least until now) another indecorous drop of breeches like in Munich in 1938. Giuliano Cazzola's opinion
I very much appreciated that Start Magazine resumed – with the title '' A few questions to the Italian pacifists '' – a large part of the essay that my friend Michele Magno had published, in the previous days, in Il Foglio. I am not a historian, but for some time I have been interested in the political facts and processes that took place in that '' long armistice '' between the two great world wars of the last century, because I am convinced that there are – mutatis mutiando – significant analogies between the tragic events that led inexorably to the outbreak of the Second World War and those we are experiencing in this quarter of the 21st century, which began in the belief of the '' end of history '' and arrived on the threshold of a third conflict that cannot be avoided even by that "balance of terror" of the nuclear holocaust which, in the second half of the twentieth century had ensured a peace in arms, but lasting and '' governed '' by the two superpowers.
Magno recalls a crucial event of that phase: the Munich Pact signed on 30 September 1938 by Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy with which, in the name of peace, Hitler was allowed to annex the German-speaking Sudetenland, then in March of the following year complete the occupation of what remained of Czechoslovakia. Representatives of that government, present in Munich, were not involved in the negotiation; they were only informed when things had been done and openly asked not to oppose their fate for the sake of peace in Europe.
Michele also cites the triumphal welcome that Neville Chamberlain (the main supporter of the policy of appeasement also towards France which was bound by a treaty with Czechoslovakia) received on his return to London, when he showed from the flight ladder and during the return by car to London of the document signed by Hitler in which the Fuhrer had taken on the solemn commitment to work for peace in Europe, through the method of consultation with the government of His British Majesty.
In his '' History of the Second World War '' Winston Churchill punctually and with rich documentation reconstructs the Munich Pact to which he was resolutely opposed not only for ethical reasons ('' to avoid war you have chosen dishonor; you will have dishonor and the war ''), but for objective assessments of the actual benefits of the parties involved. First of all, Churchill documents that the General Staff was opposed to the Czechoslovakia operation, after Germany invaded and annexed Austria in the spring of that year. General Ludwig Beck, chief of SM of the army prepared and even presented a critical memorandum on the results of that operation.
Hitler didn't even answer him. So Beck resigned, forcing Hitler to appoint a replacement in the person of Hadler. It goes without saying that after the signing of the Pact, the military felt humiliated and in difficulty with the Fuhrer. The British statesman also recalls that during the Nuremberg trial Marshal Keitel admitted that, in the autumn of 1938, the Germans were not yet prepared and would not attack Czechoslovakia if France and Germany threatened to intervene in his defense. Churchill wonders who gained more strength in the following year in Munich, Hitler or the Allies. Based on precise data, the statesman comes to the conclusion that the year of '' gained '' breathing space in Munich left Great Britain and France with respect to Germany, in much worse conditions than they had been at the time of the crisis.
And he cites an indisputable fact: England's military expenditures in the year 1938-39 amounted to 340 million pounds; those of Nazi Germany exceeded the figure of 1.5 billion. Having said all this, I believe that there are many connections between Hitler's politics at the time and that of Putin today. Defeated in the Great War, the Central Empires and the Ottoman Empire broke up in various states, whose borders were drawn in the Versailles negotiations of 1919: among these – leaving out the geopolitical structure of the Middle East – also Czechoslovakia, Poland and the 'Hungary. In these new states there were robust German-speaking minorities, stirred up by Nazi Germany which claimed to extend its sovereignty wherever there were German communities.
But in general these new states were a patchwork of ethnic groups, poisoned by growing nationalism. Czechoslovakia was then said to be a Czech-German-Polish-Hungarian-Ruthenian-Romanian-Slovak state. After Munich, Poland and Hungary also came forward to erode neighboring pieces of territory. Towards the end of the 'short century', the Soviet Empire lost the Cold War, but collapsed by itself under the marveling eyes of the West. The former satellite states and the Baltic republics did not hesitate to marry into NATO, after joining – perhaps with little conviction and as a preparatory step – to the EU. For these countries these were irrevocable choices because the decades spent under the dominion of the USSR, in a regime of real socialism, were added to the historical rashes. The aggression of Ukraine was a test of the new imperialism of the Kremlin, with all the consequences we know.
The Russian autocrat did not expect the reaction of the West he had been watching during the occupation of Crimea and Georgia. After all, the previous year Putin had threatened to invade Belarus if his '' snack companion '' in power in that country were deposed. I am convinced that, if the special military operation had been successful, succeeding in deposing Zelenzky and putting '' good people '' in his place, the West would not have been too agitated. This is where the real difference lies with the Munich appeasement. But this difference was determined by the resilience and heroism of the Ukrainian people who forced Western powers and institutions not to turn away. That valiant defense resulted in an escalation of the assistance commitment, including military assistance, to Ukraine. At this point, reading Michael the Great's considerations, I asked myself a question.
But what would have happened if Czechoslovakia, in 1938, after Munich, had sent to France and England and reacted with its armed forces? Czechoslovakia was not a defenseless country: in those tragic situations it had as many as 21 regular divisions already mobilized and another 15 in reserve, in addition to fortifications on the mountains. Its industrial apparatus was first-rate. Germany should have fielded 30 divisions. Would the democratic powers stand by or would they intervene in the conflict in less disadvantaged conditions than those at their disposal the following year at the time of the Nazi invasion of Poland? This is why the debt that the cause of democracy, freedom and peace has incurred with the Ukrainian people is great. We must be grateful to him, for having avoided (at least until now) another indecent descent of breeches like in Munich in 1938.
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/perche-le-democrazie-occidentali-sono-in-debito-con-lucraina/ on Sun, 13 Nov 2022 07:59:22 +0000.