Here are Russian missiles and drones against Ukraine
All about the air missile campaign in Ukraine after 3 weeks of war. The point of Andrea Mottola for Rid (Italian defense magazine)
The slight increase in sorties that in the first week of March suggested a gradual, but progressive, increase in Russian air operations in Ukraine, parallel to the elimination of Ukrainian anti-aircraft systems – in particular the medium-long range ones S-300PS / PT / V1 – and of the air capacities of Kiev, in fact it was not confirmed in the following 2 weeks. The only real variation on the Russian side was the much wider use of missile raids carried out with KALIBR long-range cruise carriers launched by surface units and submarines of the Black Sea Fleet, and by ISKANDER-M theater ballistic missiles. (about 800 launches since the beginning of the operation) from batteries in Belarus (integrated in the last week by old TOCHKA / SCARAB), accompanied by decidedly more sporadic uses of Kh-55SM / 101/555 cruise missiles launched on a couple of occasions by the Tu-95MS BEAR and Tu-160 BLACKJACK strategic bombers.
The aforementioned raids – accompanied by large volumes of artillery fire, as per established Soviet doctrine, in the case of targeting targets located within large population centers (Kiev, Kharkiv, Kherson, Mariupol, Odessa) – should have further reduced the Ukrainian ground based air defense capabilities, as well as the operation of the vast majority of the air bases – main (including Gavrishkova / Vinnytsia, Ivano Frankivsk and Vasilkyv) and, above all, the auxiliary ones – which host the FLANKER and FULCRUM of Kiev and located in the central western areas of the country. However, both the Su-24 FENCER fighter-bombers and the ever-fearsome Su-25 interdictors responsible for effective attacks against Russian armored and mechanized columns should still remain active. Their more or less continuous and constant activity is probably due to the dispersion in a maximum of 3/4 aircraft on the aforementioned auxiliary runways still operational, probably located in the southwestern quadrant.
The existence of such leads represented – and represents – one of the best examples of the reduced Russian ISR capabilities shown in the conflict so far. An (in) capacity responsible for the unpreparedness of the Russian military device to face the Ukrainian air threat to its ground troops (with losses that amount to over 1/3 of the units deployed) and which explains, together with other factors, that will be highlighted in the special on the Ukrainian conflict present on RID 4/22, the consequent inability to establish a Russian air superiority over the entire territory of Ukraine which, after 24 days, is still limited to less than 2/3 of the Ukrainian airspace. Specifically: Donbass and part of the southern and north-eastern sectors, basically on the airspace located on the lines of the various fronts. In confirmation of this, it should be noted that the raids carried out against targets located in the central and western / southwestern quadrants, are carried out with ballistic or long-range cruise missiles, including the hypersonic Kh-47M2 KINZHAL, 2 of which would have hit an underground ammunition depot in western Ukraine, probably launched by MiG-31.
It should be noted, however, that with the continuation of the conflict, the Russians are refining their ISR capabilities with a more widespread use of reconnaissance mini-UAVs by the few "embedded" FACs with ground units and with the simultaneous use of Su- 24MR and strategic air platforms Il-20/22 and Tu-214R for the COMINT / ELINT / SIGINT collection and subsequent sharing of such information with at least 2 AWACS A-50 aircraft – constantly flying over Belarus and Rostov oblast, close to of the Ukrainian border but at a safe distance from the Ukrainian S-300s – which, thanks to this information, coordinate air operations, prioritizing and assigning primary targets – especially S-300 batteries and BUK systems – to the few Su -34/35 armed with Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles, while attack helicopters and Su-25s are reserved for those located inside or close to the lines of the various fronts.
Going back to missile raids, the decrease in the number of documented killings of Russian aircraft in the last 2 weeks would demonstrate the success of such attacks. However, it cannot be excluded that the aforementioned decrease may be linked to a lower general activity of the VKS aircraft and the Navy Aviation. Also because, if there had been a real suppression or, at least, degradation of Ukrainian missile capabilities, it would be logical to hypothesize, as mentioned, an increase in Russian sorties which, on the contrary, do not exceed 10/12 sorties per day. Excluding the activities of close air support to the armored / mechanized units carried out by the Su-25 attackers on the northern (Kiev, Zhitomyr and Chernihiv), eastern (west of Donetsk) and southern (Bashtanka, Mikolayev and Mariupol) fronts and by helicopters of attack Mi-24/35, Mi-28N and Ka-52 which, on the contrary, have always maintained a high rate of use since the first hours of the invasion, the documented use of FLANKER fighters and Su-34 tactical bombers remains very limited. The only exceptions are represented by 12/15 sorties carried out on Kharkiv, Popasna, Voznesensk and Zhitomyr during which, moreover, at least 4 Su-34 and a pair of Su-30SM were shot down by medium-short range missile systems and by those shoulder pads MANPADS. The widespread presence of the latter, in particular, represents a further factor that explains the continued "thrift" in the use of fixed-wing aircraft by the Russian side with their respective crews who, in light of this threat, have changed the flight profiles , passing from medium-low to medium-high altitudes (over 10,000 feet) in ground attack missions carried out with OFAB-250 and OFAB-500 unguided bombs.
What appears to be a sharp increase is the rate of use – or, at least, the dissemination of documents certifying their use – of remotely piloted aircraft by the Russian side in the last 10 days, a trend that can also be seen on the Ukrainian side. The Russians seem to prefer the use of reconnaissance UAVs – ORLAN-10, ELERON-3 and FORPOST, the Russian derivative of the Israeli SEARCHER II – used for the discovery of targets and the guidance of the laser artillery shells of the KRASNOPOL systems against them. . But there is no shortage of examples of use of ORION armed UAVs or KUB-BLA circulating / persistent ammunition.
From Ukraine's point of view, missile operations carried out in the last 2 weeks have been extremely limited and reduced to a handful of TOCHKA-U tactical ballistic missile launches, only 2 of which have reached their respective targets located in the Donetsk area. , while the remainder crashed either due to breakdowns, or due to killing by the Russian S-300V / S-400. As already highlighted, air defense capabilities should have been reduced, especially in the more fearsome S-300 systems, with at least 6 launchers eliminated. In this regard, it should be noted the possible arrival of a pair of S-300 batteries from Slovakia and Egypt to supplement the lost systems. The medium-short range anti-aircraft missile systems, on the other hand, are still very active even on the "hottest" fronts, such as that of the Donbass. In particular, the OSA-AKs and TOR-Ms responsible for several killings of 5 Su-25s, KALIBR missiles and a dozen helicopters.
As far as air operations are concerned, according to official sources, those relating to UAVs appear to have significantly increased, both of the usual TB2 BAYRAKTAR armed aircraft – 2 of which were shot down, but always very active especially in the southern quadrant – and of the ISR LELEKA-100 aircraft and old Tu-141s, and, again, by commercial quadcopters which, on at least 2 occasions, were used, such as the BAYRAKTAR , for the elimination of convoys, BUK tactical air defense systems and command and control centers by releasing grenades RKG-1600.
Finally, moving on to conventional aircraft, as mentioned in the last 2 weeks there have been very few documented sorties of the Ukrainian Su-27 and Mig-29, while the Su-24 and Su-25 are still active – at least 4 of which are shot down on the southern front and in the Peski (Donetsk) area – carrying out a minimum of 3 sorties a day, with peaks up to 7, as in the operations of the last 48 hours carried out on the Mariupol front. However, the difficult maintenance operations that can be carried out on the aforementioned auxiliary runways where they are stationed, as well as the lack of fuel and the scarcity of information necessary for an adequate "picture" radar, risk making their rate of use progressively lower or transforming them into easy prey for anti-aircraft systems or Russian FLANKERS. Elements that probably caused the almost total inoperability of the Ukrainian Mig-29 and Su-27, limited to very few interception flights.
Article published on rid.it
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/innovazione/ecco-missili-e-droni-della-russia-contro-ucraina/ on Mon, 21 Mar 2022 14:10:21 +0000.