Here are the reasons for the discomfort of the mutual banks in Iccrea and Ccb
Because there is unease in some mutual banks that adhere to the Iccrea or Ccb groups. The speech by Marco Bindelli, vice president of Banco Marchigiano and managing director for relations with cooperative credit and the parent companies (Ccb group)
In an article published in Il Sole 24 Ore on 8 September 2020, entitled " The discomfort of the Bcc and the look at via Nazionale ", professors Guido Alpa and Francesco Capriglione, as top experts, respectively, of civil law and banking law , have faced the difficulties to which those cooperative credit banks (Bccs) which intend to escape the diktats of the parent company and allocate their activities to another sector of cooperation will be called, ceasing to exist as banks and changing their corporate purpose .
The transaction examined – in some ways similar to that implemented by the Bcc di Cambiano in compliance with the way out reserved for the large Bccs by law no. 49 of 2016 and for which space was given here on Start Magazine commenting on the Cassation Ordinance which referred to the Constitutional Court – as correctly observed by the two jurists, despite not giving rise to particular problems from a civil point of view, is conditioned by the will of the Bank of Italy.
What we need to underline here are the reasons why more and more Bccs, especially those that have joined the cooperative banking group of Cassa Centrale Banca (Ccb), feel the need to recover their managerial autonomy (which has obviously been lost. ) through the search for solutions capable of preserving in its own territory the patrimonial resources accumulated with difficulty with the banking activity without, however, removing them from the channel of cooperation.
THE GROUP SOLUTION ADOPTED WITH THE REFORM
The appeal to the Bank of Italy launched from the pages of the Confindustria newspaper, so that it does not remain silent in the face of requests from the BCC indicative of a strongly felt unease and intervene both to restore managerial autonomy and to modify a discipline that entails their operations, suggests that the solution adopted in 2016 with the cooperative credit reform was inadequate ( de iure or de facto ?).
Yet, a large part of the doctrine (including Prof. Capriglione) worked incessantly in 2016 to create a second cooperative banking group headed by Ccb. Evidently, excessive trust had been placed in persons or legal instruments that were subsequently not adequate as soon as they were called to the first operational test, to the point that some Bcc exponents continue to sarcastically say that "we fell from the pan into the fire".
Despite the certain governance problems, which to tell the truth would not seem to concern only the parent companies of cooperative banking groups (otherwise the banking crises that have occurred in the major non-cooperative banks in the last ten years would not be explained), the innovative instrument of the cohesion contract , a fundamental element on which the systemic structure underlying the functioning of cooperative banking groups is based, would still seem suitable for solving most of the difficulties encountered in the mutual banks.
First of all, it should be remembered that the cohesion contract, if correctly applied by both parties, unlike the domain contract governed for example in Germany, does not allow a coercive power so strong as to limit the management autonomy of healthy and virtuous mutual banks. Indeed, the contractual scheme approved by the Bank of Italy and signed by the Bcc and the parent company provides, in addition to compliance with the cooperative and mutualistic principles for the entire group, a series of obligations and duties for the latter governed in the interest of the former. and of the same group. Finally, without forgetting the safeguards provided for by our legal system for the exercise of management and coordination with articles 2497 and following of the civil code.
It is therefore evident that, if many mutual banks today find themselves regretting not having accepted the Ips ( Institutional protection schemes ) proposed years ago by Federcasse, or requesting the establishment of regional cooperative banking groups, rather than trying to liquidate the banking activity ( while remaining in the cooperative context) or hypothesizing a sort of transformation into a joint stock company similar to that carried out by the Bcc di Cambiano, the blame cannot be attributed to the legal instrument but to those who have to implement it. Hence the fundamental role of the authorities responsible for supervising the banking sector, which are responsible for supervising the correct observance of the special legislation, preventing excesses and, if necessary, removing bank representatives who appear to be oblivious to the requirements of the law.
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AUTHORITIES
In addition to that attributable to the parent company, the responsibility of the Supervisory Authority, with the acquisition of the governmental one, for allowing the Trentino group to venture into a rescue operation of a bank joint-stock company of large dimensions (Carige SpA) even before trying to solve the problems of the mutual banks belonging to the group itself; and, in fact, using cooperative credit resources to favor lucrative banks. With the risk – as well highlighted by prof. Marco Sepe – to start a process of hybridization and heterogenesis of the banking group that could turn from a cooperative into a lucrative one.
Nor can the inertia of the Mise (Ministry of Economic Development), repeatedly requested directly on these pages since March 2019, which should have issued its decree to regulate the controls aimed at verifying that the exercise of the role and the functions of the two parent companies are consistent with the mutual aims of the mutual banks.
Furthermore, if on the one hand the European Central Bank – which, although its vision must be considered correct, considers the Bcc Significant for the sole fact of belonging to a Significant group and which, unlike the Federal Reserve and empirical evidence, sees in the large dimension the only element of banking stability – it seems to struggle to understand the originality of the cohesion contract and the cooperative banking group imposed by the reform, on the other hand, the Bank of Italy, which actively participated in the process of reform (and therefore knows its rationale and disciplinary scope) maintains a substantially silent line of behavior in the face of evidence of the facts reported to it by some mutual banks.
Finally, it should also be noted that Federcasse, which should be the bearer of the mutualistic and cooperative interests of all the Italian mutual banks, is still grappling with the implementation of some changes to its Statute that could allow it to stand as a super partes , independent of two group leaders.
In this context, in which many seem to have forgotten the history of the BCCs, the legitimate request for intervention by the Bank of Italy to modify the original reform plan is based and explains how the final message of hope expressed by the illustrious authors of Il Sole 24 Ore assumes a particularly significant value for many mutual banks today.
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/economia/ecco-i-motivi-del-disagio-delle-bcc-in-iccrea-e-ccb/ on Wed, 09 Sep 2020 12:30:38 +0000.