I’ll explain China’s 3 options on Taiwan
Apart from the aggressive tones – for the use and consumption of Chinese public opinion – Beijing will not go beyond provocations and verbal threats for Taiwan. Carlo Jean's analysis
The choreography of the centenary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was perfect. Xi Jinping took advantage of this to celebrate China's successes and to illustrate its ambitions. It has exploited, to further consolidate its already undisputed power, the always very strong nationalism of public opinion, even in the CCP. It has always been nationalist, more Leninist than Marxist, centered on canceling the "Unequal Treaties" and the effects of the "Century of Humiliations". He reiterated that in 2049, the centenary of Mao Zedong's victory, China will be the strongest world power, underlining that Beijing's first goal remains the unification of Taiwan with the motherland and that all options, both peaceful and military, for this goal , remain open. With an all-Chinese style, however, he did not specify the timing of the reunification. Recent polls have shown that 57% of Chinese would not oppose military action and that 37% would like it to happen within 3-5 years.
The mass of Chinese believe that the response of the US and its allies – Japan first among them – would consist in protests and sanctions, but not in an intervention by force. He is in fact convinced that the US is in decline and that China must take advantage of the situation before the alliance between Washington and New Delhi is consolidated, while that between Beijing and Moscow would remain firm.
American policy towards Taiwan's security has been and is characterized by a certain degree of ambiguity. It has been so since 1972 when, in order to allow Nixon and Kissinger to travel to Beijing, the United States – until then allies of Taiwan on whose territory they deployed 30,000 soldiers – were forced to accept the policy of "One China", therefore of belonging to the island to the Celestial Empire. Of course, the US has reiterated, and not only declaratively, its commitment to the security of the island. In 1996, faced with threats of Chinese attack, Clinton had sent two powerful aircraft carrier groups into the Taiwan Strait. Last month, the US and Japan carried out important naval exercises in the area, clearly anti-Chinese. But this is not a specific obligation, so the credibility of the US deterrence is questioned. The likelihood of their military response in defense of Taiwan is questioned by a more self-confident and more aggressive China, aware that it cannot be internationally isolated, given its integration into the globalized economy. This can be seen from the difficulties that the US and the EU face today in disengaging from the Chinese supply chains.
For some time, also due to the greater awareness of the risks associated with the ambiguity of their commitment to Taiwan, the US has been adopting the so-called “porcupine strategy”. It consists in transforming the mountainous island (in its 35,000 sq km about fifteen mountains exceed 3,000 m) into a fortress. Hundreds of thousands of bunkers have been excavated, billions of dollars worth of weapons – anti-ship, anti-aircraft, anti-missiles, drones and cyber means – have been transferred very sophisticated. The 14 small beaches that lend themselves to an amphibious assault have been mined and fortified. The Armed Forces are numerous: 400,000 u. including the ready reserve; a thousand tanks and 3,000 rocket launchers and artillery pieces; over 500 fighter aircraft; submarines and anti-ship drones, etc. An amphibious attack involves greater difficulties than the Normandy Landings. The operations for the conquest of the island could be protracted and require months of flow of reinforcements and supplies that would be subject to attacks in the Taiwan Strait. It would be an extremely risky operation. According to the US Indo-Pacific commander, China would not be able to carry it out until at least 2035.
It turns out that Chinese strategists are considering three other options. First, the naval blockade of the island, to induce it to yield to the will of Beijing. It seems risky to me. It would give rise to a counter-block, disastrous for the Chinese economy, dependent on maritime transport for the import of raw materials and the export of manufacturing products. Such transports can be blocked to the west in the Strait of Malacca, and to the east, towards the Pacific routes, by the "double chain of islands", dominated by the US Navy and their allies.
Second, a prolonged air and missile offensive, which induces Taipei to surrender to Beijing. The "hedgehog strategy" would reduce its effectiveness. It would give the US and its allies time to attack Chinese bases. It would lead to an escalation and an all-out war that China knows it cannot win.
Third, to induce the US to abandon Taiwan to its fate, inflicting severe damage on the American Pacific forces with a surprise attack, preventing them from effectively intervening in support of Taipei for at least 6-9 months, deemed necessary for the occupation of the island. With China's enhancement of ICBMs, the US would be dissuaded from employing its strategic nuclear forces. This third option is also risky, bordering on pure madness. The loss of Taiwan would be for Washington what Suez was for London in 1956: the end of the status of a great power (only that for Suez the UK was behind the US, while for Taiwan, behind the US they have no one behind).
In conclusion, apart from the aggressive tones – for the use and consumption of Chinese public opinion – it seems likely to me that Beijing does not go beyond provocations and verbal threats for Taiwan. The situation could become more risky only in the event of a collapse of the Chinese economy or a power crisis of the CCP, party-state now firmly hegemonized by Xi Jinping. But such eventualities seem completely unlikely to me. The "new cold war" will not be characterized by a Sino-American conflict over Taiwan. It will take place unlike the first, centered on strategic competition, in the economic, financial and above all technological fields, as well as in space and cyber issues. Crucial to its outcome will be the US's ability to persuade its European and Asian allies not to subordinate common security requirements to the "selfish" conveniences of doing business with China.
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/vi-spiego-le-3-opzioni-della-cina-su-taiwan/ on Tue, 06 Jul 2021 07:29:08 +0000.