I’ll explain the grandeur of the British National Cyber Force

21 November 20204 years ago babelfish

The analysis of the analyst Arcangelo Milito on the establishment of the brand new National Cyber Force (Ncf)

On Thursday 19 November in Great Britain, the London Ministry of Defense announced the establishment of the brand new National Cyber Force (Ncf). The NCF will be made up of personnel from various backgrounds: Gchq agency (Government Communications Headquarters), Ministry of Defense, Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) and Defense Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl). For the first time, all of these personnel will be under a unified command.

Jeremy Fleming, the director of the GCHQ in Cheltenham (to understand: the extremely effective British NSA), is a private person, usually never speaks and it is very rare that he expresses himself publicly. That's why when he illustrated the characteristics of the NCF, everyone understood that 'it is serious'. Here are Fleming's words: “Today the National Cyber Force builds out from that position of defensive strength. It brings together intelligence and defense capabilities to transform the UK's ability to contest adversaries in cyber space, to protect the country, its people and our way of life ".

In other words, the NCF will strengthen Britain's defensive capabilities in cyberspace, protecting its people and the industrial system. It is not possible to hastily dismiss Ncf as yet another secret unit with the aim of intruding on other people's digital systems and causing damage or hacking (as stated in the Wired article in English ). This has never been the case even with regard to highly efficient and specialized Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) cyber-defense and espionage forces such asUnit 8200 or the other much less known Talpiot Unit , expressly formed by graduates in Physics, Mathematics, ICT and it is also intent on combining intelligence, operations, defense and more.

General Sir Patrick Sanders of Strategic Command, head of all the special cyber, intelligence and information forces of the Defense of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, emphasized the extreme interactivity and operability of Ncf: "What distinguishes the Ncf, and I believe passionately is its greatest strength, lies in the partnership between Strategic Command, Gchq and SIS, blending our strengths and cultures to create this operationally distinct force ".

The Defense Minister himself clarifies that examples of operations could include diplomatic, economic, political and military activities, as well as cyber operations:

interfere in cellular communications in order to prevent terrorist communications;
prevent the use of the internet as a global global platform for criminal activities, including pedophilia crimes and commercial fraud;
to preserve British defense and air strike capability in the presence of hostile military systems and weapons.

The announcement of the newborn Ncf is almost contextual to that made by Prime Minister Boris Johnson on the investment in British defense the day before . Britain will invest £ 16.5 billion (€ 18.45 billion) over the next 4 years. The sector relating to cybersecurity operations will have a specific budget quantified at £ 1.5 (€ 1.68) billion, again four years. It should be remembered that the 2019 budget of the Gchq alone consisted of £ 1.74 billion (equal to € 1.95 billion).

If we think of the now disappeared Italian Institute of Cybersecurity, at best it makes you laugh (if not cry). In the original draft of the 2021 Budget Law, the IIC Foundation was established and therefore € 210 million had been budgeted, then reduced to 10 and finally canceled, completely volatilized. It ended as it ended: all of art. 104 relating to Iic has disappeared and nothing more is done about it. From many quarters – especially the Democratic Party (with the Ministers Franceschini and Guerini in particular) and Italia Viva and some opposition forces – have found solid objections against this IIC. There was no lack of objections from further political parties such as Copasir and service environments, because the functions of Aisi and Aise cannot be carried out by other bodies. At this point it is more understandable the objection of the Minister of Defense Guerini who calls for an organic bill that addresses the issue, including operational competencies. In any case, we can form a clear idea of the proportions between British commitment and Italian uncertainties and hesitations.

If we compare the fledgling British NFC to the Italian bailamme, once again we must point out the prevailing confusion between “particular” skills and gross uncertainties about spending commitments. This uncertainty about spending for the military and intelligence sector is a sore point recorded by all experts in the sector and military leaders, as can be seen from the hearing in Parliament of Gen. Enzo Vecciarelli , Chief of Defense Staff held on 11 November and with the subject of the multiannual programmatic document for defense for the three-year period 2020-2022 . If we add to this uncertainty a solid and unified political direction, net of clearly lacking party propensities, then things get considerably worse.
At the same time, the push given by Great Britain with Ncf and four-year investments help to better understand why Leonardo UK and Mbda are heavily involved in defense projects, starting with the search for funds for the Tempest multi-role fighter. These funds were clearly framed in the Typhoon Eurofighter program by Min. Guerini, who was also recently audited in the Joint Chamber and Senate Comm. Defense . To this we must add the multi-billion dollar program developed for future funds relating to the Next Generation Eu program for European defense in general.

This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/vi-spiego-limponenza-della-national-cyber-force-britannica/ on Fri, 20 Nov 2020 16:04:12 +0000.