Iran-Israel war? Cesi Report
The Gordian knot is to understand how far Israel wants or can go without incurring a globalization of the conflict which scares everyone and which, at least apparently, no one wants. The analysis by Giuseppe Dentice, Tiziano Marino and Emmanuele Panero of Cesi (Centre for International Studies)
The day after the retaliation announced by Iran against Israel, a series of broader considerations and assessments remain open which in some way could suggest a certain evolution of the regional military and political scenario, at least in the short term.
Tehran's retaliation against Israeli territory was decided in response to the air strike carried out on 1 April by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) against the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, which killed 11 people including Mohammed Reza Zahedi, a high Pasdaran officer in Syria and liaison man between the Iranian militias operating there and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
THE ATTACK SEEN FROM IRAN
From the Iranian perspective, Israel's attack against the diplomatic headquarters violates the "red line" posed by Iran's political and military leaders according to which direct involvement in the regional conflict is justifiable only in response to direct aggression against the national territory , of which the Embassy is de facto part. Consequently, after the action of the IDF, the Supreme Leader and the IRGC had to face the pressure of the ultra-conservative sectors that emerged strengthened by the recent parliamentary elections, which asked for an immediate and muscular response, like that of last April 14th.
The Iranian attack had been widely anticipated, including by a specific US warning last Friday, which announced a concrete risk of action by the Islamic Republic towards Israeli soil within 48 hours of the information itself. In particular, the Iranians claimed to have communicated their willingness to respond on April 2 to the Swiss chargé d'affaires in Tehran and, subsequently, to have also exchanged information with emissaries from Oman, Turkey and Cyprus. Regional players were also notified in the hours before the operations began, according to Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian.
THE NUMBERS OF OPERATION TRUE PROMISE
The operation, called “True Promise”, involved the use of approximately 170 attack drones (OWA UAV – One Way Attack Unmanned Aerial Vehicle), 30 land attack cruise missiles (LACM – Land Attack Cruise Missile) and 120 ballistic missiles (BM – Ballistic Missile), launched at defined time intervals by Iran to converge in a synchronized manner on Israeli military targets especially on the Golan Heights and in the Negev desert, with the aim of saturating their air defenses and increasing the possibility to generate effects on targets. The entirety of the OWA UAVs and LACMs, as well as 98% of the BMs were engaged and neutralized by a large and composite air defense device including not only the dedicated Israeli multi-level architecture, composed of the David's Sling, Iron Dome, Arrow 2 systems, Arrow 3 and the Israeli Air Force (IAF) aircraft, but also by a large set of air, naval and land assets, mainly US, but also British, French and regional countries previously deployed in the area. The significant airspace surveillance and defense apparatus deployed also made it possible to shoot down the majority of attack vectors before they reached Israeli territory. Some BMs nevertheless hit the Nevatim air base in the Negev, causing overall limited damage, while debris from an intercepted missile injured at least one civilian.
THE RESULTS
Starting from these elements, we could say that the desired effect on the Iranian side was not achieved if there was a clear desire to offend and cause significant damage. Indeed, one could say that Iranian action was limited to a fact that was more striking in form but less incisive in substance. From Tehran's point of view, however, the issue is definitively closed, so much so that the Iranian authorities have once again warned Israel to avoid new initiatives in the future, recalling that in that case the resulting response will be proportionate and even more devastating. Furthermore, Iran, precisely by virtue of the swarm attack on Israel at the weekend, has shown credibility in the threat and a certain dissuasive military capacity, which has strengthened the country's deterrent potential towards Israel and the region as a whole. In other words, Tehran saved face and gave a real show of strength by strengthening its credibility towards domestic and regional public opinion. A prestige that inevitably spills over both into its future projection in the Middle East and towards its proxies-partners (Hezbollah, Houthis, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Iraqi Islamic Resistance, etc..), which as a whole strengthen the image and deterrence capabilities of the so-called "axis of resistance" led by Tehran.
IS EVERYONE SATISFIED?
In fact, it could be said that this attack actually satisfies all parties involved: Iran for maintaining and restoring its prestige, Israel for showing military superiority in destroying the enemy's drones, the USA and the West for having coordinated an action in defense of Tel Aviv. Beyond, however, the perspectives and cross-propaganda compared, the sensationality of the attack showed some deeper elements of reflection. Firstly, it was an unprecedented action that creates an unexplored and risky scenario for the entire area. At the same time, however, the very type of Iranian response to the Israeli strike on April 1st would suggest Tehran's unwillingness to open a military front against Tel Aviv that could lead to a war. To support this, there are elements of various kinds that find a rationale in the Iranian domestic context: an economic crisis that is still strong and weakened by international sanctions; an internal social situation that is still hot after the months of demonstrations and protests in 2022 due to the Mahsa Amini case; finally, an uncertain and potentially divisive political context due to both the transformations of society and the health conditions of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
So, from this perspective, for Tehran the issue is definitively closed here and, in a certain sense, also for the United States, which has shown solidarity and protection to its Israeli ally in recent hours, but has also firmly expressed any opposition to “embark” on any Tel Aviv military adventure against Iran. If, as is presumably to be expected, for Israel, however, the question remains open and a whole series of assessments are being examined by the war cabinet on how the country will respond to the launch of Iranian missiles and drones against its territory in the ways and times most appropriate, President Joe Biden has clearly stated that the United States will not participate in any offensive action against Iran.
WHAT WILL ISRAEL DO?
Therefore, now the ball is in Israel's court to understand what it will do and how it will react to these developments. In fact, what has happened in the last few hours could be a politically tempting opportunity for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (rather than for the entire country) to distract the internal and international plan from Gaza, strike Tehran directly and regroup the Western front at his side in a hypothetical military escalation against the Islamic Republic.
Also in this case, the country's strategic logic must confront the instrumental rationality of the Israeli political leadership, with Netanyahu (and a substantial part of his executive) interested in unleashing an all-out conflict between Iran and Israel, as it would represent an excellent opportunity to unite the front (internal and international) against the historical enemy and boast in a future hypothesis some success that can be spent on Israeli public opinion given that none of this will be able to come from Gaza, given the image and reputational repercussions that Tel Aviv is today serving for the military operation launched the day after October 7, 2023 in the Palestinian enclave. An opportunity which would also allow the Israeli leader to hold on to his seat of power with his nails and ward off the hypothesis of early elections put forward by Benny Gantz and the opposition, precisely because a regional conflict of this type would make a scenario impossible and inappropriate election of this kind.
A second Israeli retaliation, therefore, would open up scenarios that are still unpredictable. It is plausible to imagine a missile action by Tel Aviv in response to Iran, always with a view to not opening the conflict recklessly, but these are speculations that can change very quickly and open up a new range of options. In any case, a similar situation would actually allow the USA and Europe to take the field in favor of Israel; at the same time, it would be plausible to imagine the same reaction on the part of Iran's international partners, with Russia and China, willing to assist the country, at least diplomatically and counting on the strong gap that has now emerged with the large and heterogeneous group of countries in the Global South, who continue to consider the West inconsistent due to its multiple standards in dealing with crises and wars in the world. Already in these hours, after having underlined the seriousness of the Israeli attack against the Iranian diplomatic headquarters, Moscow and Beijing have reiterated, also at the UN, the invitation to regional actors to refrain from actions that could trigger a large-scale conflict.
Therefore the Gordian knot is to understand how far Israel wants or can go without incurring a globalization of the conflict which scares everyone and which, at least apparently, no one wants.
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/attacco-iran-israele-conseguenze/ on Wed, 17 Apr 2024 08:33:48 +0000.