Let me explain Putin’s dilemma over Ukraine
What Putin's next moves will be in Ukraine. Carlo Jean's analysis
Russian forces are painstakingly completing the conquest of the Donbass. They made the "land bridge" with Crimea and occupied the Black Sea coast up to Kherson. They fight bitterly in Mykolaiv, a strategic position to attack Odessa and to build a "bridge" with Transnistria, and towards Zaporizhzhia. Russian forces have huge quantities of weapons and ammunition. They suffered heavy losses. Unlike the Ukrainians, they cannot replace them. This is their greatest vulnerability.
Putin cannot declare general mobilization and transform his "special military operation" into a "people's war", without declaring the failure of the first. An autocrat like him cannot admit a strategic defeat in the face of his own and his public opinion, without losing face (in the world he has already lost it). It loses its power. Maybe the place and the life.
The morale of the Ukrainians is holding up well, despite the bombing of the cities and the heavy losses of their armed forces: since the beginning of the offensive in the Donbass about 100 killed and 400 wounded a day. So far the Western bloc, which supplies arms to Ukraine, remains firm, even if there are signs of weariness in Europe. Long-range artillery is pouring in, capable of countering the firepower on which Russian military superiority rests. Only our own "Napoleon of the Gargano" has the audacity to affirm that the Ukrainians do not need other weapons. Indeed, they would already have too many. For Heaven's sake, let's forget it. In his eagerness to win a few votes, he did not even realize that it feeds Putin's only hopes: that is, that the coalition supporting the Ukrainian resistance will collapse.
The penalties begin to bite. That things do not turn out as Putin expected is demonstrated by the removal of generals and advisers. The Russian president is a prisoner of himself. He is faced with a difficult dilemma. He could declare victory, keep the Donbass and sit down at the negotiating table, perhaps using the conquered territories in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts with the Ukrainians as a "bargaining chip". Or he could hold on and continue, hoping that Ukraine remains isolated. It could remain so, if Donald Trump is re-elected in the US presidential elections at the end of 2024.
In my opinion, Putin will choose the second solution. In any case, I am convinced that the Ukrainians will not be able to choose the former. Apart from the sale of large territories, to accept they would demand a US guarantee of their safety. It is unacceptable to Putin. It would mean Ukraine's entry into NATO, through the window rather than the door. In the event of even partial disengagement of the US, the Ukrainians would have no choice but to continue fighting by implementing the “guerrilla war” strategy, which they have been preparing for for years, even at the cost of destroying Ukraine.
Few in Italy think that Putin has never been interested in annexing some piece of Ukraine and protecting Russian-speaking citizens. He cannot give up having it all. The existence of a small Ukrainian state, amputated from some province and whose security is guaranteed internationally, that is, by the US, is incompatible with its regime. A “little Ukraine” would be increasingly anti-Russian, democratic and westernized. It would develop more economically and socially than the regions conquered by Russia. It would have destabilizing effects on the autocratic regime in Moscow and Minsk. It would weaken the "vertical of power" theorized by Surkov, or "authoritarian democracy" – as Putin says – or "kleptocratic regime", as it would perhaps be more realistic to call it. In fact, the "mystical visions" of "Mother Russia", "Third Rome" destined to save the world from materialism, could only be a "fig leaf" to hide the looting of Russian wealth by oligarchs and siloviks, firmly power in the Kremlin.
A proof of what we have argued above about Putin's probable choices is that the change in his policy towards the West was caused, not so much by the risk of Ukraine joining NATO (he knows that no one is crazy enough to go and attack a state with 5,000 nuclear warheads), but from its Europeanization, evident from the "Orange" and "Euro-Maidan" revolutions. Putin cannot compromise on the goal of "de-Nazifying", that is, "de-Westernizing" and assimilating Ukraine into the "Great Mother Russia". He cannot retreat without putting his power on the line. Perhaps, but I am not so sure, he could accept a temporary truce on the line reached by his troops, pending the conditions for resuming the advance towards his true objectives. They remain the initial ones, as Zakharova endeavored to explain to the willing – but for her naïve – Giletti, who insisted on asking her which transfer of Ukrainian territories would be enough to induce Putin to start negotiations, which it is politically correct to call "peace" , even if in my opinion today – and perhaps also tomorrow – would end in insults and blows.
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/vi-spiego-il-dilemma-di-putin-sullucraina/ on Wed, 08 Jun 2022 10:54:47 +0000.