Russian imperialism and the dilemma of European energy dependence
Democracy, Russian imperialism and energy dependence. Ubaldo Villani-Lubelli's interview with Kai Struve, history professor at the Martin-Luther-Universität of Halle/Wittenberg, taken from the latest issue of the quarterly of Start Magazine
The war in Ukraine has reopened the question of the enemies of democracy and the crisis of democratic institutions. If Vladimir Putin is certainly not the only one of a generation of unscrupulous political leaders to question liberal democracy, the Russian president and the political regime established in Russia are the model to which other presidents have more or less explicitly inspired themselves. In 2019, Vladimir Putin manifested his contempt for democracy in an interview with the Financial Times , stating that “the liberal idea has outlived its purpose […] The liberal idea of democracy has become obsolete. It has come into conflict with the interests of the vast majority of the population”.
On this issue as on other aspects of the war in Ukraine and its consequences for Central and Eastern Europe we interviewed Kai Struve , professor of history at the Martin-Luther-Universität of Halle/Wittenberg in Germany and renowned scholar of the history of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian nationalism and the propaganda use of the memory of the Second World War.
One of the most interesting aspects in analyzing Russia's war against Ukraine is that since the end of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian society and Ukrainian society have had a divergent development. A democratic, liberal and pro-Western sentiment has established itself in Ukraine which has inevitably distanced the Ukrainian people from Russia and its authoritarian and imperialist model. You wrote an interesting article for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (March 28, 2022) in which you clearly explained that the war on Ukraine and the intention to denazify it has its roots in resentment over the collapse of the Soviet Union. The enemy indicated by Putin, that is Ukrainian nationalism, represents a reality distant from current political relations in Ukraine but rather brings out an old and outdated enemy of the Soviet Union. In the light of your analysis, what are the main reasons for the Russian war against Ukraine? Is there also an anti-democratic ideological discourse against liberal democracy?
To me there doesn't seem to be a real coherent political ideology behind the policies of Putin and his circle. The central, driving reason is obviously the desire to regain the former position of the Soviet Union for Russia. This means that states that formerly belonged to the Soviet Union are granted limited sovereignty. Furthermore, Putin is striving to reassert Russia's position internationally comparable to that of the former Soviet Union. From his point of view, the liberal idea, understood as the rule of law and democratic self-determination, is a threat to all this as it calls into question the Putin regime in Russia which is based on the political manipulation of the law, on the manipulation of the public and on corruption.
Democratic self-determination also calls into question Russia's hegemony over former Soviet neighboring states which Russia has tried to maintain with the same methods of corruption, manipulation of public opinion and the use of military force or its threat. Russia's war against Ukraine, which started in 2014 and not in 2022, stems from the fact that the Ukrainian people aspire to the establishment of a rule of law and respect for democratic rules in their country. The Orange Revolution of 2004, the Euromaidan revolution of 2013-14 and the landslide election victory of Volodymyr Zelensky in 2019 had this aim. By disrespecting Ukraine's democratic self-determination and now seeking to eliminate it with all-out war and massive violence, Putin has permanently destroyed the close ties between Russia and Ukraine which continued to guarantee Russian influence in Ukraine, even if it was already in significant decline since 2014. Using the same methods of manipulation and corruption – and in this way the former KGB officer Putin refers to Soviet history – in recent years Russia has tried to influence public opinion more and more of Western countries. It had and continues to have the greatest positive resonance with the anti-liberal forces of the right and left.
With regard to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the post-communist transition of the Russian Federation, do you think that Russia has been left to its own economic and political difficulties? And still with regard to this complicated transition, what are the reasons why the states of the former Soviet bloc wanted and continue to want to detach themselves from the Russian sphere of influence?
The current Russian political system developed according to an authoritarian model only with the ascent to power of Vladimir Putin. Ancient Russian traditions and Soviet history undoubtedly play an important role in this regard. In the 1990s, however, the situation was uncertain. It was not clear in which direction Russia would develop. However, it does not seem to me an inevitable development that since 2000, i.e. since Putin became president, the rule of law and democratic freedoms have been systematically curtailed. Furthermore, the imperial renewal of the Soviet Union at the expense of the freedom and prosperity of the Russian population has become the central project of the Russian leadership. In Russia's neighboring states, however, especially in the Baltics and Poland, Russia's uncertainties and continued imperial ambitions were perceived early and accurately, unlike in Western European states. The experience of Russian interference attempts and the manipulation of internal conflicts have contributed to the aspiration of Eastern European states to join NATO and the EU.
The expansion of NATO, but also of the EU, towards the east was an inevitable process after the fall of the Soviet Union. NATO filled the political vacuum left by the Warsaw Pact, so that former Soviet bloc states turned to it for security reasons. On the other hand, the European Union has been and still is an extraordinary pole of attraction thanks to its economic and political model and the advantages of the single market. In the light of recent events, does he agree with this analysis on NATO and the EU's eastward expansion or does he believe that mistakes have been made (think of the 2008 NATO summit in which the entry of Ukraine and the Georgia in NATO)?
There is no doubt that considerable mistakes have been made. I do not have a definitive opinion on the decisions of the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit, but the glaring errors have been the lack of sufficiently strong international responses to the numerous violations of international law and war crimes committed by Russia over the past two decades. This starts with the wars in Chechnya, continues with the war against Georgia in 2008, with the occupation of Crimea and with the Russia-initiated war in eastern Ukraine since 2014. And let's not forget Russia's war in Syria as well. I would say that one of the main mistakes made, especially in Germany, is that the dependence on Russian gas and oil was hardly considered a problem and that it has increased significantly again in the last fifteen years. Unlike many Eastern European states, it has completely ignored the fact that dependence on natural gas supplies, in particular, gives Russia political influence. At the same time, it can be assumed that the weak reactions of Western countries created an expectation in Russia that even a large-scale military attack against Ukraine would be accepted, thus encouraging Russia effectively to start the invasion.
Addiction can be inserted into a much more complex process involving some political choices, particularly in Germany in the 1990s and 2000s, which must be interpreted in the historical context in which they were made. Don't you think that behind the trade agreements with Russia there was the conviction of being able to initiate processes of democratic political transformation in Russia or, more simply, an evident commercial convenience?
It is now clear that it was a mistake to become so dependent on Russian energy supplies, especially natural gas. One should ask why Germany and also some other countries increased this dependency considerably in the last fifteen years and didn't start reducing it even after 2014, when the Baltic countries and Poland were already working to reduce it. Now, it is certainly true that there are several reasons why the problem of this dependency has not been sufficiently considered in Germany, as well as in other countries.
The central reason for this political difference, however, seems to me to be historical, as economic motivations were also similarly or even more strongly important for the Eastern European states that could have continued to source their energy from Russia. It is the experiences of Soviet hegemony in the 20th century and a clear awareness that Russia, with Putin's political regime, has not broken with Soviet imperial traditions but, on the contrary, wants to refer to them, which have led to an energy policy different. This also relates to the prevailing images of 20th century history in the respective societies. While in Eastern European societies the image of the Soviet Union under Stalin as the second major criminal regime of the 20th century alongside Nazi Germany is deeply rooted, the image of the Soviet Union in Western Europe is much more ambivalent. In this case, it continues to be shaped to a much greater extent by the fact that the USSR made the essential contribution to the victory over Hitler's Germany in World War II. In Germany, this is compounded by the fact that the Soviet Union, as a victim of the German attack and criminal occupation regime in WWII, was identified above all with Russia, and therefore was seen above all as a continuing moral obligation towards Russia. Ukraine, on the other hand, which in many ways suffered more than Russia during the German occupation, is often identified above all with collaboration and support for fascism. Russian propaganda also connects to this aspect when it claims that Ukraine is ruled by "Nazis" and Putin declares that "denazification" is one of the goals of the war.
We now come to the European Union. What does the war in Ukraine mean for the EU? Should Brussels be able to find strategic autonomy in international politics?
I believe that three points in particular should be emphasised. First, the European Union reacted surprisingly unanimously and decisively to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, quickly imposing far-reaching sanctions against Russia and clearly siding with Ukraine. Of course, there are good reasons to criticize the fact that some decisions have been taken too slowly or that the sanctions have not been comprehensive enough. However, it seems to me that the Russian war of aggression and, above all, the heroic resistance of the Ukrainians, willing to sacrifice their lives for the values and principles on which the European Union is based, have led to a return to the idea that even the EU must actively defend its cause, also accepting the costs.
Secondly, it seems to me that there are many elements which suggest that, as one of the consequences of the war, the Eastern European states will assume a more important role within the European Union in the future. The Baltic states and Poland in particular have taken a leading role in supporting and defending Ukraine, while Germany in particular has lost a lot of prestige due to a very hesitant and indecisive stance and little military support. Should Ukraine also join the European Union in the future, this would undoubtedly mean a significant shift of the balance eastwards.
Thirdly, this war has clearly demonstrated to the European Union, and here above all to Germany, that economic interdependence does not necessarily lead authoritarian regimes to moderate their policies to avoid economic damage, but that there is considerable potential for blackmail prevent EU states from resolutely opposing massive violations of international law. As a result of Russia's war of aggression, economic dependence on China is also now more clearly seen as a problem, especially against the backdrop of Chinese threats against Taiwan.
In Italy there has been a heated debate on the delivery of arms to Ukraine. Until when can Ukraine be supported militarily? When do you think a peace deal will be possible?
If you continue to support Ukraine with weapons, money and sanctions against Russia, Russia has already lost the war. If the European Union and its members were to give up on this, they would betray the values on which the European peace order is based and thus also undermine the foundations of the EU. It is obvious that currently, with continued Western support for Ukraine, Russia can no longer achieve any significant military successes. The negative economic effects of the war and the sanctions will increasingly be felt by Russia. The objective must be the withdrawal of Russian troops to where they were before 24 February. Otherwise, the population of the occupied territories would remain at the mercy of the Russian terror regime. Whether and in what period of time this can be achieved or not come to a kind of frozen conflict, however, does not seem to me at the time of this interview foreseeable.
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This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/imperialismo-russo-dilemma-dipendenza-energetica-europea/ on Sat, 07 Jan 2023 07:04:29 +0000.