Weapons, here’s how and how much Italy, France, Germany and Poland helped Ukraine
European defense short, the challenges of military aid to Ukraine. Michelangelo Freyrie's article for Affarinternazionali
The countries of the Euro-Atlantic community have provided an unprecedented volume of weapons systems, ammunition and means in the framework of military aid to Ukraine. They range from armored vehicles to missile launchers and tanks, including both old Soviet-designed weapon systems and advanced assets such as drones and artillery systems. This is posing a new challenge for the European defense industry, which is currently struggling to achieve the high production rates required by the conflict and the new needs of European countries.
THE AMOUNT OF MILITARY AID FOR UKRAINE IN FRANCE, GERMANY, ITALY, POLAND
The heterogeneity of military aid and the secrecy that permeates the shipments does not allow a cross-sectional analysis of the aid cost of donations, nor of how much they have affected national stocks. However, it is possible to give some specific qualitative examples in the main EU countries.
For example, France supplied 18 self-propelled howitzers of the CAESAr type to Kyiv. The Armée de Terre itself held only 77, and thus deprived itself of 23% of the immediately available CAESArs. In response, President of the Republic Macron asked the Nexter supplier industry for an additional effort, encouraging it to go into "war mode" and fully exploit the capacity of its previously 30% active plants. This is a situation similar to that of another howitzer, the Polish AHS Krabs: the Warsaw army (WojskaLądowe) currently owns 80, sending 18 to Ukraine and therefore sold about 22% of its systems .
A different discourse applies instead to the Stingers capable anti-aircraft systems, donated in substantial numbers by the United States, Italy and Germany. The American-made missile was already starting towards the end of active service, to the point that large-scale production in the US had already been stopped. This decision has had important ramifications: although Raytheon has announced a return to mass production of the Stinger, it will not be possible until 2023 due to a lack of components . In addition, initial supplies are likely to go to the US military. This will likely make a massive supply to European countries that donated this system before 2027 unlikely.
Poland, like other former Warsaw Pact countries, also sent 200 Soviet-type T-72 tanks, familiar and therefore immediately usable for the Ukrainian armed forces. They should have been replaced at least partially by an unspecified number of Leopard 2, as part of a Ringatusch agreement (circular exchange) with Germany. However, Berlin offered far fewer numbers than originally promised, sparking anti-German controversy in Warsaw . It is reasonable to think that the shortage of Leopard 2 and the relative slowness with which Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) can produce new panzers plays a decisive role in the German ability and willingness to supply its eastern neighbors.
The Bundeswehr itself has only 298 units, and in recent years KMW has mainly devoted itself to updating older models of the Leopard 2, at a rate of around six per month . According to German media, starting a new assembly line would take 1-2 years and mobilize an entire galaxy of suppliers.
THE LIMITS OF THE EUROPEAN INDUSTRY
In short, it is clear that current production levels are far below the rate of Ukrainian losses, and in most cases will not allow for a quick replacement of what was sold by the Europeans to Kyiv. Not only that: in the case of the Leopard 2 and the Stinger, the sudden saturation of the assembly lines risks or has already caused political conflicts between manufacturers and users.
There are a number of market factors that have led companies in the sector to divest the capacities necessary to achieve high production volumes. First of all, there is the higher cost of the weapon systems employed, symptomatic of an increase in complexity in terms of components, avionics, electronics, software, etc. In light of a threat assessment that until 2021 did not require high procurement volumes in many cases, the growing complexity could not enjoy the advantages of economies of scale to contain unit costs.
Furthermore, a greater number of suppliers and value chains involved makes it very difficult to coordinate a sudden increase in production volumes: just think of the profound diversity of problems affecting the steel or semiconductor markets, both of which are vital for the defense sector. French analysts, for example, have pointed out that the missile supply chain depends on supply chains that are so diverse that they can even lead to delays of 36 months on an order .
The need for qualified personnel also limits the ability to suddenly produce a greater number of weapon systems, as companies in the sector will have to provide significant new hires – and the related training of new human resources – with the respective technical times. Just look at Rheinmetall's example: the company will have to hire between 1,500 and 3,000 people (an increase of 19-28%) to cope with the expected surge in orders. This would be an ambitious goal even without the current shortage of qualified personnel on the labor market.
To all this is added an industrial approach criticality. The strategy of consolidation between industries, including through acquisitions or mergers, is often conceived as a measure aimed at optimizing European companies and cutting waste. However, the criteria for this rationalization have often been considered from the point of view of the value chains currently functioning and of a "just in time" industrial model devoted to efficiency but not resilience, with the aim of reducing capacity to the minimum necessary. and eliminate, for example, underutilized industrial sites.
EU INITIATIVES
European human and infrastructural capital is still highly fragmented, and in the absence of true economies of scale it is very easy to create bottlenecks and frictions even in cooperative projects that have already started successfully. It is inevitable that in the face of a sudden increase in demand from all Member States, manufacturing companies find themselves having to give priority to some customers over others.
Furthermore, as seen in the Polish case, it is highly possible that, without coordination, Member States will end up opting for quick and "turnkey" purchasing solutions from non-European suppliers, primarily US but also Israeli or Korean, which would further fragment the European defense market and therefore the stock of weapon models in use and the related logistic support chains. All this to the detriment of both the efficiency and sustainability of the military instrument, and the production capacity and competitiveness of the European aerospace, security and defense industry.
In this regard, the European Commission has announced various instruments, including a program to mitigate this type of risk, also encouraging the creation of so-called European Defense Capability Consortia (Edcc) with economic incentives to ensure that groups of states interested in a specific supply coordinate their purchases and preferably turn to suppliers based in the EU. If a cooperative and long-term logic were followed, the fact that American manufacturers also foresee long waiting times for the mass production of assets such as the Stinger could create new market opportunities in Europe for those European projects currently under development but that could go into production in a few years.
In conclusion, it is very likely that the war in Ukraine will accelerate a rethinking also on the economic and industrial level. The gaps revealed by the massive aid to Ukraine show the limits of current European production capacities, and additional efforts will be needed for political and economic factors to converge on a model that also allows the type of conflict fought in the east of the European continent to be addressed.
Article published on affarinternazionali.it
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/armi-ecco-come-e-quanto-italia-francia-germania-e-polonia-hanno-aiutato-ucraina/ on Sun, 25 Sep 2022 05:16:40 +0000.