Why is it useless to read these telegrams from Ustica?
What the (fundamental, yet ignored) messages of the SISMI center manager in Beirut Stefano Giovannone say about Ustica. Gregory Alegi's article
Paolo Bolognesi, in 2016: «I have read the papers contained in the folders made available to the Moro Commission and I can affirm that there are no secrets, no revelations, no news on Ustica and Bologna. Decades go by but misdirections seem to resist. Daria Bonfietti, in 2022: «The 'secret' documents that Giovanardi has always kept hovering around, like menacing crows carrying extraordinary truths […] contain absolutely no elements pertaining to Ustica.» This is more or less how the clash has been going on for some years over the messages that the SISMI of Beirut sent to Rome in 1979-1982 and, above all, over the fact that in them we can find useful clues to find those responsible for the destruction of the DC-9 Itavia that in the order-sentence of the judge Rosario Priore they are declared unknown. On one side the presidents of the associations of relatives of the victims of the station and of Ustica, on the other Carlo Giovanardi. Simplifying: the supporters of killing it with a missile and that of destroying it with a bomb.
For those who are not familiar with the matter, it may seem like a condominium dispute, in which the intensity of the dispute makes one forget the seriousness of the underlying argument. The difference lies in the way of validating the different readings. Giovanardi, perhaps with some memory errors, has always broadly indicated the content of the messages from Beirut (which he had consulted in 2016 as a member of the Moro commission). Bolognesi and Bonfietti invoke external authorities, whether they are magistrates or the then general secretary of Palazzo Chigi who on 11 April 2022 defined them as "deeds that concern contemporary facts, immediately preceding and following the Ustica massacre, the evaluation of which is more useful for to rule out leads, than to ascertain a certain truth".
In the declared fear that the acceptance of the bomb on the DC-9 will necessarily lead to a review of the penal sentences condemning the neo-fascists for the Bologna station massacre of August 2, 1980, the approach of Bolognesi and Bonfietti seems to be that of asking the opinion publishes something halfway between a referendum and an act of faith ("believe us, not him"). Like everyone, I know that the hypothesis of the connection of the events has always been put forward by Giuseppe Zamberletti, in his now unobtainable book The threat and revenge (1995) and during the Assise trial for Ustica. However, having never dealt with the massacre at the station, it escapes me why the confirmation of the presence of a bomb on the plane must necessarily reverberate in Bologna.
But let's go back to Ustica. The sequence of messages from the SISMI center manager in Beirut Stefano Giovannone (in the photo), codenamed "Maestro" has been available for consultation at the Central State Archives for less than a year. Rather than arguing about the "unseen" interpretation, rather than cheering between Modena and Bologna, between DC and PCI (and their subsequent transformations), I think it is more appropriate to give an account of what appears in the 32 documents of the "Ustica" file in 2022 and in the 163 added in 2023. After all, an old journalistic proverb states that «if one person says it's raining and another says it's not, the job of a journalist is not to give space to both but to open that damn window and see if it's raining."
It is clear that a complete reconstruction of what emerges from the almost 600 pages of the 195 documents is not possible here. Limiting ourselves therefore to the question of whether or not the Beirut papers contain investigative cues (not absolute answers) for the destruction of the DC-9 on June 27, 1980, we propose the complete transcript of the classified "top secret" message, number 335D27 "urgent for Sirius" sent at 10 in the morning on 27 June 1980 from "connection 113" (Beirut or Giovannone?), with «distribution DD3». The document does not contain the words "Ustica", "airplane" or "bomb", but it is one of those viewed in 2016 and now at the ACS in the "Ustica" digital folder. On August 28, 1984, at the request of Giovannone, the State secret was affixed.
«2013 Habet informed me late evening two six [note: June 26] that PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine] would have decided to resume total freedom of action without initiating further contacts virg followed by non-acceptance solicited new shift date of proceedings appeal virg as a result of psychosis and negative reactions determined in Italy following Pecci [sic – actually Patrizio Peci] revelations about alleged arms supplies from Palestinians at Bravo Charlie [note: BC in the international phonetic alphabet] alt I tried in vain to immediately contact my usual interlocutor and alternatively Taysir Qubaa who telephone operator after a few minutes of waiting he said he was abroad alt I represent that the head of the cabinet Minister of Justice Dr Zarabuda [sic – in reality Salvatore Zhara Buda] had not ruled out the possibility of bringing the date of the appeal back to September, raising awareness of the arguments raised by me alt I consider it urgent and important to ascertain the availability of the Court of Appeal accept any request for postponement which I think could be presented by the defense team alt If the trial were to take place and end in an unfavorable sense virg I expect extremely serious reactions as FPLP believes he has been deceived alt In this case I consider no longer valid guarantees concerning Beirut embassy personnel alt For the above, I would prefer to postpone my coming on Saturday to arrange some elements on a possible Court orientation regarding the possibility of postponing the virg process, which I would try to communicate to some PFLP manager alt End»
From the complete text it is noted that Giovannone presents the return of the PFLP to «total freedom of action» as a decision already taken and the insistence on the negotiation for the postponement of the trial as his own hope (“I believe”), especially since the his usual contact Taysir Qubaa was denied on the phone. To date, the recipients of the "DD3 distribution" and the identity of "2013" are not known. Although a telegram "Per Maestro da Sirio" dated November 14, 1979 is signed "Ricci", we know that "Sirio" was Colonel Armando Sportelli. It is not clear why the Italian terrorist formation that received weapons from the Palestinians is referred to as BC when Peci had spoken of BR. Since June 27, 1980 was a Friday, the departure for Rome that Giovannone was suddenly canceling was scheduled for the following day. It is a suggestive urgency, now that we know that the DC-9 Itavia crashed that same evening.
But philology aside, here are the questions. What did “Sirius” do on June 27 when it read message 335D27? Is it credible that on the morning of the 28th, after the fall of the DC-9, he did not (re)contact Maestro/Giovannone? Is it conceivable that in the face of 81 victims, the unknown recipients of the SISMI "DD3 distribution" did not question themselves on the meaning of that "total freedom of action without initiating further contacts"?
Let's go back to 27. Two hours after the first message, Giovannone sent an urgent «personal note for Sirio», still classified as «top secret», still in the ACS, but in another payment. For completeness, here it is.
«Following my three-five of two-seven alt I specify that the interview with the head of the Cabinet Minister of Justice in which I represented the name head of the opportunity service to access the request for a new shift in the date of the appeal process for known contingent reasons took place on the morning of May 5th, the date of my departure for Bermuda [name in Beirut code] for an interview the next day with a well-known interlocutor alt chief of staff est appeared to me available and not pessimistic in this regard virg reserving the right to inform the head of service on the outcome of the intervention with the president of the appeal court alt I represent that the above requirement was represented by me with urgent message no. 258 dated May 9 alt Please avoid branching this message also from the Director's office, verbally informing Ulysses [Admiral Fulvio Martini] as soon as possible alt end Maestro»
Why shouldn't “Sirio” share this clarification with the office of director Santovito? Why did Giovannone ask him to talk to Martini about it, given that the admiral had returned to the Navy in 1978? What did “Sirio” and Martini say to each other? Was the answer referred to Giovannone? Why in 1999 Martini omits all this from his autobiography, instead recounting that until 1984 he remained out of the "events that disturbed the life of the Italian services for years", including "the Bologna massacre, the DC- 9 of Ustica»?
But above all: how is it possible to dismiss these messages as insignificant, knowing that 81 Italians were killed a few hours later? How is it possible that they are not even a starting point worthy of further study? Why accuse those who wonder how these and other documents fit into the overall panorama of the reconstruction of those years of obscure designs?
We believe these are natural questions not only for unbiased scholars, but for ordinary readers as well. What is missing are the answers.
– Read also: Purgatori, Ustica and the subculture of suspicion
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/perche-e-inutile-leggere-questi-telegrammi-di-ustica/ on Sat, 05 Aug 2023 05:48:45 +0000.