Why the Taliban are aiming for the Tapi pipeline
The in-depth analysis by Francesca Manenti, Cesi analyst, for Rienergia
For just over three weeks now, the Taliban have regained control of Afghanistan and are preparing to write a new page in the history of the country. After the withdrawal of the international contingents, which ended with the departure of the last US plane from the international airport of Kabul on August 31, the group headed by Mullah Hibatullah Akhunzdada controls, in fact, about 90% of the national territory. The reconquest of power by the Taliban is the result of the military campaign organized and implemented by the movement since the beginning of August, which allowed the group to rapidly advance from the countryside to urban centers and provincial capitals throughout the country. and which culminated in the entry without a shot in Kabul last August 15.
After about twenty years of conflict, and close to the symbolic anniversary of 11 September, therefore, the Taliban have thus declared themselves the legitimate winners of the war and have announced that they want to restore the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Despite the success of the initiative, however, the group now finds itself having to manage a series of unknowns that could have a direct impact on the sustainability of the Taliban government and of the country itself in the medium to long term.
First of all, on the home front. Akhunzdada's group must overcome the great challenge of being able to bring back to a coherent synthesis the different souls of the Taliban militancy, formed in these twenty years of internal upheavals. Power struggles, operational differences, conflicts of interest were just some of the reasons that caused a fragmentation of the Taliban front over time, which resulted in the creation of a complex architecture of the movement in which the political leadership (note such as Shura of Quetta), supervises and coordinates a series of cells more or less nourished by militants organized on a local and regional basis. This complexity could now become a thorn in the side of the Taliban leadership. At a time when the group is in a position to distribute prestigious posts and positions in the new Afghanistan, those who fought for two decades and contributed to the success of the insurgency could now press for adequate rewards. The division of roles will be even more crucial to reconcile the differences that have developed within the political leadership itself, among the most extremist fringes that have always expressed an opinion opposed to dialogue with the United States (first of all the influential Sirajuddin Haqqani, right arm of the 'Emir Akhunzdada and leader of the famous Haqqani network, which has always represented a fundamental link between the Taliban and al-Qaeda) and those who instead sponsored the dialogue, to relaunch the political image of the group (for example, Mohammad Yaqoob, son of the founder of the Taliban, Mullah Omar).
If the division of offices represents the most urgent problem, it will be equally important for the Taliban leaders to be able to ensure control and capillary management of the group, both in urban centers and in rural areas. This coordination is essential to ensure the sustainability of the new image with which the Taliban have tried to present themselves after the conquest of Kabul, both to the internal population and to the eyes of the international community. Presenting itself as a legitimate winner of the war, the group is trying to prove that it is a more mature political actor than in the 1990s, which can be a credible interlocutor for foreign countries interested in supporting Afghanistan in this new phase. However, this change has not yet occurred uniformly in the group, especially in rural areas, and risks remaining the prerogative only of the political leaders and administrators of the main urban centers. This could create two speeds in the Taliban movement, thus jeopardizing the creation of the new Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Any irreconcilability of views among the Taliban, in fact, could create two kinds of problems: on the one hand, opening the way to the creation of new secessionist ribs, which, dissatisfied with the change, could create a new front of opposition or seek an alliance with the local branch of Daesh in Afghanistan. On the other hand, the lack of control and a possible new resurgence of internal violence would jeopardize the prospects for relaunching international relations, first and foremost with the actors of the region, which is essential to be able to imagine a reconstruction of the country and start an internal economic recovery. .
This context would also include the resumption of negotiations for the construction of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, in which the Taliban have already expressed their interest. It does not seem causal, in fact, that already last February, the diplomatic representation of the group, headed by the now well-known Mullah Ghani Baradar, visited Ashgabat to frame the possible construction of the pipeline in an economic development and partnership project. broader policy, at a time when the Taliban were still officially the armed opposition to the Kabul government. The TAPI is expected to consist of a pipeline of approximately 1,814 kilometers to carry natural gas from the Turkmen field of Galkynysh to the Indian city of Fazilka, passing through the Afghan provinces of Herat and Kandahar and the Pakistani cities of Quetta and Multan.
Although the problems of implementing the TAPI also go beyond the instability that has characterized Afghanistan in recent decades, the project represents an example of how the Taliban have an interest in accrediting themselves with foreign chancelleries as a guarantor of security and stability in the Country to be able to imagine an economic recovery essential for the sustainability of the country in the near future.
In this context, the choices that Akhunzdada's group will make in this first phase of transition, also regarding the composition of the new executive and the institutional form of the new Emirate, will be important to determine not only the internal balance, but above all the sustainability of the new Taliban government. With international eyes on Kabul, the group's challenge will be to prove that they are able to "win the peace" after winning the war.
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/energia/talebani-gasdotto-tapi/ on Sun, 12 Sep 2021 06:00:30 +0000.