Will Biden Really Change Arms Control?
Not just arms control. Biden's announcement that he wants to strengthen old alliances has sparked much enthusiasm and unrealistic expectations from the US's European and Asian allies. Everyone has thought of taking advantage of it, without wondering if Biden, weak on the domestic front, will be able to actually implement it. Carlo Jean's analysis
The new US president , Joe Biden, has repeatedly stated that arms control will be a central component of his foreign policy. It would aim to revive liberal and democratic multilateralism and, with it, to legitimize American leadership in the world. Soft power, diplomacy and the strengthening of alliances would be the essential tools.
That is, Biden would like to replace Trump's America First with a Back America, in his role as leader and, if necessary, as a gendarme of democratic internationalism against growing authoritarianisms.
Such a radical change from Trump's policy would not be new. Throughout history, the US has always alternated cycles of isolationism and internationalism.
In my opinion, Biden's emphasis on arms control will actually be scaled back. It will be more a consequence of other security and economic policies than a cause of detente and stability.
A man of the cold war, Biden is well aware of the relevance of Hard Power and the limits of Soft Power. Without a balance of forces or the superiority of those of the status quo, internal and external, objective and subjective difficulties make any agreement impracticable. There are insuperable limitations on the contribution of Arms Control – including disarmament agreed between the parties; not the one imposed by the victor on the vanquished that follows different logics – to relaxation and peace.
Arms control is part of the security strategy. It aims to neutralize the "security dilemma", according to which, in the situation of anarchy that characterizes the international system, all the measures decided by a State to increase its own security, induce others to adopt similar ones, leading to an expensive race to rearmament and unpredictability and tensions that make conflict more likely. This happens especially in periods, such as the present, in which technology favors the offensive over the defensive, increasing the possibility of preventive wars. Arms control aims to neutralize the "security dilemma", to create a mutual and shared security system, to facilitate communication and transparency between potential adversaries, reducing the risk of wars by mistake, reducing costs and limiting damage and conflict losses.
The effectiveness and the very possibility of any agreement depend on the parties' interest in maintaining the status quo and on the existence of a certain degree of mutual trust, reliable verification systems and the ability to "punish" violations, including through withdrawal from the agreement. Arms control does not create peace. It assumes that it already exists and is solid enough. Thus, arms control is possible when it is not needed. Instead, it becomes impossible when it is really needed. Its added value for international peace and stability is entirely relative.
Even the simple restoration of US participation in the agreements from which Trump withdrew presents many difficulties for both internal and external reasons, to which is added the impact of the current accelerated technological evolution in both defensive and above all offensive armaments, and also of geopolitical changes, first of all the disappearance of the bipolar world. Concluding a two-party treaty is much easier than coming to an agreement with three or more parties, as is inevitable in the polycentric world.
Chief among the internal factors is the polarization that exists in the US. Biden will have to favor initiatives that can be approved with simple presidential executive orders (such as the Paris climate agreement or the one-five-year extension of the New START, which expires on February 5) or that require a simple majority in the Senate and Congress. It will not be able to renegotiate new treaties. They would require ratification by an unattainable two-thirds of the Senate. Furthermore, it must take into account that Trump's reasons for withdrawing are often shared by Democrats.
New negotiations would be very complex. Contrary to what many people think, Biden is a tough and savvy negotiator. He demonstrated this in negotiations with the USSR in the 1980s and then as Obama's deputy. But, before making the weight of the US felt abroad, it will have to strengthen itself internally. The announced D-10 or Summit of Democracies (G-7 plus India, South Korea and Australia) and its presumed crusade for human rights will neither hot nor cold in Russia, North Korea, China and Iran. Some US interlocutors – both allies and adversaries – have taken advantage of the power vacuum of the change of president. For example, Russia continued to develop and deploy intermediate-range nuclear cruises, with which Trump justified the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty ; Iran has a quantity of uranium enriched at 20% (not the 3.67% foreseen by the JCPOA, dealt with Iranian nuclear power), that is to say a quantity greater than 12 times that allowed, and has upgraded the underground plant Forlow's enrichment. Tehran will not accept tougher conditions, such as the suspension of its missile upgrade. To resist US sanctions, he thinks he can count on greater support from China and also from the EU. She is convinced that the weakening of the United States, due to Covid-19, will not allow Washington to impose its will, as in the past, with extra-territorial sanctions.
This Iranian conviction was strengthened with the signing of the investment agreement with Beijing by the EU. The Europeans challenged Biden, not even taking into account his request to wait for his inauguration. All European countries would like the restoration of the Euromissile Agreement, but no one is willing to deploy Euromissiles on their territory, as was the case in the 1980s. At that time, the dual track decision was crucial in convincing the USSR to eliminate its Euromissiles from Europe. For their part, Japan, South Korea and Australia have concluded trade agreements that include China, but not the US (Rcep and CPTP).
Biden's announcement that he wants to strengthen old alliances has sparked much enthusiasm and unrealistic expectations from the US's European and Asian allies. Everyone has thought of taking advantage of it, without wondering if Biden, weak on the domestic front, will be able to actually implement it. The allies of the Americans, somewhat "beaten up" by Trump, have not wondered what they should do to strengthen Biden at home and abroad. Only in this way can they realistically think that Biden can proceed as promised, also taking into account their wishes. Instead, they were concerned only with their "shop" interests.
Sooner or later Biden will wonder if Trump was right.
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/biden-cambiera-davvero-il-controllo-degli-armamenti/ on Fri, 22 Jan 2021 08:00:41 +0000.