With Erdogan a Türkiye further away from Europe and closer to the Gulf countries. Mariano Giustino speaks
Erdogan still firmly in power in Türkiye. Conversation with Mariano Giustino, Radio Radicale correspondent from Turkey, on President Erdogan's next moves in domestic and foreign policy
Erdogan had given up after 20 years in power, before the electoral round in mid-May, and emerged victorious from the run-off at the end of May. In just over 15 days , Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been able to shape his own image, reversing it: from a worn leader to an expert, worn but vital man of power. Erdogan prevailed with 52% of the preferences over the opposition which had managed to bring together six parties in the name of Kemal Kilicdaroglu , economist and leader of the Republican People's Party, who failed to go beyond the ballot.
We talked about Turkey and the future of its international relations with Mariano Giustino , Radio Radicale correspondent from Turkey.
Erdogan won but how can we evaluate the result of the opposition? How did Kemal Kilicdaroglu force Erdogan into the ballot?
For more than a year, the opposition has been trying to sign an agreement to form as large a front as possible to defeat the Turkish president in the presidential elections. But it is a story that comes from afar. In the 2019 municipal elections, Erdogan was defeated in the country's major urban centers by the coalition formed by Kemal Kilicdaroglu's Republican People's Party and the nationalist right-conservative MHP Party. These two parties united, with the desistance of the Peoples' Democratic Party, a pro-Kurdish party, which did not present candidates where the candidates of the People's Republican Party were candidates, in the large urban centres.
This strategy has worked very well because this coalition of two parties has been joined by the Kurdish vote, which in urban centers, for example that of Istanbul, represents just over two million people. And this coalition managed to defeat Erdogan who lost for various reasons. For economic reasons, the economy has not been doing well, for several years now, due to the " Erdoganian " doctrine of low interest rates, an expansive and not austere policy, a path that Turkey should prefer, to try to curb the inflation, give more confidence to investors, to the markets and attract money into state coffers which have been increasingly impoverished in recent years. The success of 2019 has led the opposition to try to broaden the lineup of those who oppose Erdogan.
For the first time since the phase of multipartyism began, i.e. since 1950, the opposition presented itself all united, but truly all united, with the six parties plus the external support of the pro-Kurdish radical left party, to defeat Erdogan and on very specific, substantial objectives.
What are these goals?
The return to a strengthened parliamentary system and thus overcoming the presidential system of man alone in command, restoring the rule of law, respect for international conventions, the European Convention on Human Rights and therefore the application of the ECHR sentences to create a return to dialogue with the European Union and also with Washington, as regards international dossiers. And then the economic factor and immigration. In Turkey, everyone agrees that immigrants should return to their countries of origin. I have not seen anything new, if anything a propaganda accentuation of the slogans on immigration in the second round. It served to not give all the anti-immigrant and nationalist votes to Erdogan.
To all this Kilicdaroglu has added a new rhetoric, the new communication strategy of radical love . An inclusive rhetoric that goes beyond the polarizing one adopted by the Turkish president because Turkey is a particularly polarized society, divided along ethnic, religious and ideological lines. Those who followed the election campaign saw Kilicdaroglu and the other opposition leaders make the heart symbol with their hand. It was not a heart turned to its supporters but to the country. As if to say "Now love must win", in contrast to the divisive criminalizing rhetoric used by the Turkish president, not only against Kilicdaroglu but against all the opposition, associating it with terrorist organizations. The other important fact is that in the first round there was an electoral campaign in which civil rights also had space alongside the economic arguments. So much so that the slogan most used during the rallies by the population was "Law, Law, Justice".
In 2023 we celebrate the centenary of the Turkish Republic and what do you think are the most important dossiers awaiting Turkey?
The most important issue is the economic one. The Turkish economy is dramatically ruined. It needs inflows of capital and liquidity and this can only happen if an economic policy is adopted which calms the markets, which is not expansionary, which does not place the central bank under the control of the President of the Republic. To this I also add the improvement of the rule of law and human rights because this too reassures the markets and gives confidence to investors. Without this, Erdogan is increasingly forced to resort to cash arriving from Russia, the Gulf countries and other countries. We recall that the Central Bank was saved before the elections by the opening of swap lines with Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, South Korea, by Saudi Arabian deposits from Azerbaijan, Libya, amounting to 36 billion dollars.
What are the risks associated with Turkey drawing closer to the Gulf countries in terms of economic dependence?
It carries significant risks. First, a closer interdependence with Middle Eastern countries and with Russia which is not exactly the best for Turkey and a departure from the Western bloc. Closer relations with Moscow, which is under Western sanctions, also carries a greater risk for Turkey of itself being subjected to sanctions from Washington, for example, but also from the European Union. This is not only a domestic but an international risk. Erdogan does not sleep peaceful dreams. I say above all for the economy. The Turkish economy was artificially kept on its feet precisely for the election campaign with so-called election spending. The Turkish leader has increased state salaries by 75%, increased the minimum wage by 55%, increased subsidies on fuel, electricity and gas, lowered the retirement age for over two and a half million people .
How will he meet all these expenses?
He will probably proceed with a further devaluation of the lira and this will only create further distrust in the markets. Everything makes us think that he thinks he has cash from the United Arab Emirates, from Qatar. And then the situation becomes very complicated.
Do you think this will be Erdogan's last mandate?
If the Constitution isn't changed, and I don't think it will because he doesn't have an absolute majority, it will most likely be his last presidential term, he won't be able to run again. This means that even within his party the feud for the succession will resume. So while Erdogan has secured another five years, he will still have problems.
Will the opposition, now that it has also lost this battle, remain united or will it fall apart?
If Kemal Kilicdaroglu leaves I see it difficult. This man is an extraordinary person for the opposition, because he has carried out a revolutionary path for a party which until recently was on very anachronistic, closed, reactionary, nationalist positions. So either he will resist or an internal feud will also break out within the People's Republican Party. This is the unknown about the opposition.
What can we expect in terms of Turkey's relations with the European Union and with Italy?
But nothing will change with Italy, in the sense that there is excellent economic and commercial cooperation with Italy, that's all that interests Italy. We will continue to develop this friendship, it is also strategically important. With the European Union there is the risk that we will increasingly reach a transactional relationship, that is, a relationship based on mutual interests to be defended. The European Union is interested in the issue of migration and security, it will cultivate this with Erdogan and nothing more. And so basically it won't change much either. I fear that some issues that have not been resolved and are still very critical will be exacerbated.
What does it refer to?
I am referring to the relationship with Cyprus, the relationship with Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean issue as far as Europe is concerned. And then there's the Ukraine issue. If Turkey continues to represent the open door to Russian markets, favoring Russia in updating the sanctions, this will entail a greater risk of estrangement from the Western bloc, therefore from the European Union and the United States. I don't see any positive changes, on the other hand I fear that Erdogan, after this umpteenth victory, will become even more arrogant, even more certain that he is the only man in charge and will continue to violate national or international regulations and laws.
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/con-erdogan-una-turchia-piu-lontana-dalleuropa-e-piu-vicina-ai-paesi-del-golfo-parla-mariano-giustino/ on Sun, 04 Jun 2023 06:18:00 +0000.