EU army, favorite catchphrase of those who want to move Europe away from the US
Margaret Thatcher understood this decades ago. From a military point of view, European defense is a chimera. From a political point of view, if anything, it serves to separate Europe from allies overseas (and now also overseas) rather than to strengthen the European contribution to the common defense of the West.
Punctual as a Swiss watch, after the withdrawal from Afghanistan the debate on the European common defense returns. It is by no means a new debate, it recurs with every international crisis. Before the proposal these days, we had heard it with some insistence in the years of the Trump administration. When the tenant of the White House showed some intolerance towards the European allies, who did not contribute enough to the common expenses.
Before Trump there was talk of it as early as 2007, when a rapid reaction force was created, the size of a battalion, never used since. And even earlier in 2004, in the aftermath of the intervention in Iraq which marked, more than other crises, the distance of views on foreign policy between the US and the European Union. Then the European Defense Agency was created. The previous year, the EU launched its first independent mission, with the support of the UN, in Congo. European defense still remains on paper, rather than on the battlefield. But above all, it enters the public debate only when the US demonstrates that it wants to privilege its own interests or, simply, intolerance in keeping the defense costs of its rich allies at a premium.
Few notice the paradoxes of this debate. It is above all the countries that contribute less to defense spending that are the spokespersons of a common European army. In fact, the EU governments that allocate more than 2 percent of their GDP (the minimum required by NATO) to the military budget are only those of Greece, Croatia, Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania and France. Apart from France, the other governments do not actively participate in the debate on the common European army or are openly against it. A common European defense, without the contribution of the United States, would cost the EU member states much more. Is it to be believed that once a "common European army" or in any case a community military structure has been established, EU governments are more willing to spend on defense? It's hard to even believe it.
It can be deduced from the facts and from the rhetoric. From the facts, first of all: the European NATO countries in Afghanistan contributed with troops proportionally much lower than those of the American and British contingent. While the latter conducted most of the combat missions against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the allies of continental Europe mainly carried out training and nation building tasks. This is also reflected in the losses: the United States suffered 2,443 casualties (plus the 13 killed in the attack on 26 August, with the retreat almost complete), the United Kingdom 456, all other European allies 541 killed (including the 53 Italians). The air-only war against Gaddafi in Libya in 2011 was formally led by NATO, on the initiative of France. But the costs of the war show that the US and the UK still played the lion's share: their expenses amount to more than a billion dollars each. The expenses of the EU's largest taxpayer, that is, the reluctant Italy (which was the basis of almost all the attacks) amounted to 700 million dollars, France (which had also taken the initiative) to 450 million dollars.
In the internal political debate, increasing defense spending is a losing card in all EU member states. It is in Italy, where left-wing opposition parties (but also the League, until not suspicious times) have always voted against intervention in Afghanistan and for the withdrawal of our contingent. We are the country where one of the most pro-European leaders, Matteo Renzi, in 2015, in the midst of ISIS terror campaign, declared that terrorism should be fought with culture. The largest party in Italy, the 5 Star Movement (in government continuously since 2018, in three different executives), has also made its electoral fortune with a campaign against military spending and in particular against the purchase of F- 35 (and without proposing alternatives).
In the internal policy debate of EU countries that spend less than 2 per cent of GDP on defense, the scenario is not very different. In Germany, the pacifist party par excellence, that of the Greens, is becoming the majority force in all western regions. It can be ruled out that the economic engine of Europe will once again play the role of a great military power. There is an increased focus on national defense spending in just two northern European Member States, Sweden and Finland, mainly out of fear of Russia. But here too we are talking about expenses of less than 2 percent. For the rest, the EU continues to have anti-militarist public opinions. And to vote for anti-militarist parties.
Last but not least: does anyone have any idea what defense policy a possible common army should follow? Where would it intervene? If we complain that the northern states are insensitive to the security of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, our fellow citizens of northern and eastern Europe complain that southern and western Europe flirts with Russia. The Poles gladly accept to be defended by American and British troops from the Russian threat. But they would not accept with as much enthusiasm to be defended by Germany: the memory of the invasion still weighs today. As for France, it is questionable whether the protection of Poland, and of the eastern flank in general, still interests them. Are we, however, willing to intervene in Africa to protect the interests of France? Given the reluctance with which we participated in the conflict in Libya (in which Germany has declared itself completely neutral), it is really doubtful.
In short, European defense has so far worked within NATO, until the common line is dictated by a power foreign to the European continent, the USA, with a strong historical influence (winner and liberator of Western Europe from Nazism) and therefore capable of recomposing the disagreements between the ancient rivalries of the old continent. But in the case of a common European defense, independent of NATO, it is safe to bet that the old rusts will re-emerge.
Margaret Thatcher was right when, on several occasions, she opposed the idea of a common European army. Already in unsuspected times, on 20 September 1988 (one year before the fall of the Wall and four years before the birth of the EU), in his well-known speech in Bruges he had summarized his project: "We must develop the Western European Union, not as an alternative to NATO, but as a way to strengthen the European contribution to the common defense of the West. Above all, at a time of change and uncertainty in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, we must maintain Europe's unity and resolve, so that, whatever may happen, our defense is solid. "
In 1999, in the aftermath of the Kosovo war, when British Prime Minister Tony Blair himself said he was in favor of a common European defense, Thatcher in a speech given in New York warned the American public: "Apparently it is a splendid idea that Europeans now want to worry more about continental defense. But no: the real reason that pushes an independent European defense is the same that pushes towards a single European currency: the utopian adventure of creating a single European super-state that is a rival of the United States on the world stage ”.
Still in 2002, when the debate had resurfaced after 11 September, the Iron Lady had again expressed all her perplexities about the project, declaring that it was "more political than military" and that in the end it would "damage the cohesion of the alliance with the United States ". And he had put his finger in the sore: “If Europeans really want to increase their contributions to NATO, they can already prove it now. They can increase military spending. They can quickly transform their armies into professional corps, like that of the UK. And they can acquire more advanced technology ”. But: “I don't think the aim is to share the same field with the US, but to contend with them for primacy. And this is the real objective of the European defense plans and the United Kingdom should never be part of it ”.
Thatcher said it two decades ago. But today the scenario has not changed. From a practical point of view, as we have seen before, European defense is a pipe dream. From a political point of view, if anything, it serves to separate Europe from its allies overseas (and now also across the Channel) rather than to correct the errors of NATO.
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This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Atlantico Quotidiano at the URL http://www.atlanticoquotidiano.it/quotidiano/esercito-ue-tormentone-preferito-di-chi-vuole-allontanare-leuropa-dagli-usa/ on Fri, 03 Sep 2021 03:55:00 +0000.