Nord Stream 2 and Sputnik V vaccine: Merkel extends her hand to Putin in his most difficult moment
In the most difficult moment of Putinian's twenty-year period, amid internal turmoil, economic difficulties and growing international isolation, Russia finds a side in its traditional historical nemesis, Germany. A not entirely unexpected side, to tell the truth, if we consider that it rests on a common goal, even if motivated by different premises, namely that of opposing American hegemony in the European continent.
I recognize that the statement may seem a bit paradoxical, given that Russia is a strategic rival of the United States while Germany is a cornerstone of their sphere of influence, but that it will sound less incongruent when considering the concrete policies of Berlin, increasingly projected to the East in its aspiration to carve out a role as an independent geopolitical subject. The signing of the trade agreement with the Chinese (the CAI, EU-China Comprehensive Agreement , of which some details were disclosed last Friday), strongly supported by Angela Merkel, the age-old question of the finalization of the Nord Stream 2 project and the recent opening to the use of the Sputnik V vaccine are the three guidelines on which the new German Ostpolitik is currently being developed, destined to remain unchanged even after the end of the Chancellor's mandate.
We will talk about CAI on another occasion, given the wide-ranging implications of its implementation. Instead, I would like to focus on the Russian-German relationship, but starting from the American perspective.
We can tell all the stories we want about the return to multilateralism and a new era of cooperation and harmony between Europe and the United States under Biden management. We would run the risk, however, of missing the point. Germany's attempt to establish itself as a leader of the continent and as an autonomous reference pole towards the Near and Far East comes into direct conflict with the vital interests of Washington, which do not depend on the color of the current administration, being essential factors of its superpower policy. That the Berlin initiatives go in the direction of a hypothetical axis with Moscow adds fuel to the fire, representing the geopolitical nightmare par excellence of any American strategy in Europe. One of the fundamental reasons for the non-normalization of relations with Russia in an anti-Chinese function (which would seem an almost obvious prima facie maneuver) lies precisely in the US concern that, in this way, Russia feels authorized to open up a European corridor, entering as a major player in continental dynamics. Stability in Europe, in essence, represents for the Americans the essential condition to be able to concentrate on another front at this decisive moment, that of the Indo-Pacific, where the fundamental objective is precisely to counter Chinese expansion. It must be said that the establishment of a hypothetical Russian-German axis is a rather remote prospect at the moment and from a geopolitical point of view almost unthinkable: first of all because Germany is perfectly aware that its defense depends totally on the United States; secondly, because Merkel has been able to build a balance of convenience capable of satisfying the needs of a German industry interested in Eastern markets without annoying the ally-protector too much. However, this opportunist realism, which the possible successor Laschet will only confirm, has objectively entered a collision course with American interests. And the Americans reacted.
The case of the Nord Stream 2 is emblematic. The Gazprom gas pipeline that crosses the Baltic Sea is the graphic representation of what Washington is trying at all costs to avoid: a Russia planted in the center of Europe without passing through and a Germany as an energy hub dependent on Russian supplies. The second connection line (the first has already been in operation for some years) would double the supply capacity to 110 billion cubic meters per year, considerably increasing Moscow's market share currently at 40 percent. The geopolitical consequences are intuitive. Not only does Nord Stream 2 deprive Ukraine of an essential part of its current profits and centrality as a transit territory, but it completely cuts out Poland and Romania, the buffer states that separate the US from the Russian area of influence. Poland's ambitions as a future major player in the continental energy market (the Warsaw contract with Gazprom expires in 2022) are well known, as is Berlin's opposition to a diversification of energy sources promoted and managed by Eastern countries. gravitating in the US orbit. A strictly economic consideration is added to the geopolitical interest: the United States must protect not only its strategic position but also its national production of natural gas, which is constantly growing and largely aimed at the European market.
The pipeline works have practically stopped since December 2019, the date of the Trump administration's first battery of sanctions. On the very last day of his mandate, January 20, the outgoing president signed new measures against the Russian ship Fortuna which was working on a section of the facility in German waters. According to Gazprom , there are only 150 kilometers to complete the project, a 6 percent of the total, even if the recent withdrawal of insurance coverage by the Swiss Zürich and the Norwegian DNV GL (certification) requires a further slowdown. Dmitri Peskov, a spokesman for the Kremlin, predictably confirmed that construction plans are continuing despite the sanctions, aware that Berlin's will goes in the same direction. The Navalny case has raised further grievances from European partners (on Thursday the Community Parliament voted by a large majority a resolution against the project) and within the CDU itself, where the government line clashes with markedly Atlanticist positions (Röttgen): however, practical interests are, as always, destined to prevail in a country that does politics through (and thanks to) the economy.
It is true that Merkel, after the hearing in the Senate of the new US Secretary of State Antony Blinken who confirmed the hard line against Nord Stream 2 , said she was willing to discuss the terms of a possible agreement with the new administration. At the same time, however, the German government's lawyers have been working for some time on a series of legal mechanisms capable of circumventing sanctions, which in Berlin they consider contrary to international law and vitiated by extra-territoriality. And the accompanying statements leave no doubt about the real intentions of the Chancellor by now at the end of his mandate: “ Europe will have to take on greater responsibilities, not only military but also diplomatic. We, in Germany, are ready and the European Union is too ”.
More than towards the United States, the latest German thrust on the anti- Covid vaccine seems to be directed at the European Union. Last Tuesday, during a telephone conversation, Merkel confirmed to Putin her willingness to evaluate the production of Sputnik V within the EU, once approved by the European Medecines Agency (EMA). The chancellor allegedly offered the counterpart the services of the prestigious Paul Erlich Institute , the federal authority in biomedical research, with the aim of implementing the use of the Russian vaccine in Europe as soon as possible. Again, this is a decision dictated by pragmatism with clear political implications. On the one hand, the cooperation responds to a mutual need: to increase the range of possible vaccine suppliers while Pfizer and Astrazeneca announce production delays and, at the same time, make up for the production shortages of Russia, currently unable to guarantee mass diffusion in domestic environment. On the other hand, it confirms Germany's aspiration to move autonomously, even in the context of the European Union, and offers the Russians a precious assist to improve their image and a channel for penetration in the continental market: the Sputnik V works, signed by Angela Merkel .
It is no coincidence that the CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), Kirill Dmitriev, immediately announced at a press conference that " Sputnik V will soon be one of the most widespread and accepted vaccines in the world: next week a prestigious European 'peer-reviewed' journal will publish the results of phase 3 and the goodness of the work carried out will be clear to all ”. The approval times of the EMA are far from agile but the path is mapped out and at this point Germany will hardly give up its umpteenth instrument of "diversification". It is no mystery that Berlin is intolerant of the times of the centralized supply system and is trying to put pressure on the EMA and the EU institutions themselves to avoid being exposed. Only in this case we are talking about his backyard, the great German-led European project, not any Hungary or any Serbia.
The pro-Russian approach sends a contradictory message and represents a clear signal of distrust towards the Union and authorized suppliers. The definitive rupture would occur in the event of activation of the urgency procedure that allows Member States to grant a provisional user license pending the final ruling of the EMA, on the Hungarian model. But, as for Nord Stream 2 , Germany will hardly go to the extreme consequences, continuing to move like a tightrope walker suspended between opposite shores. In the European case, she can afford it, as a good hostess. With Washington the game gets complicated and Berlin will have to try to avoid falls without a net at all costs.
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This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Atlantico Quotidiano at the URL http://www.atlanticoquotidiano.it/quotidiano/nord-stream-2-e-vaccino-sputnik-v-merkel-tende-la-mano-a-putin-nel-suo-momento-piu-difficile/ on Mon, 25 Jan 2021 05:00:00 +0000.