Coup Borghese: what the US knew about the military coup

The elusive "Borghese coup", the one that was to change Italy in the night between 7 and 8 December 1970 by handing it over to a military government, was known to the USA. The coup d'état of the well-known Prince and former commander, whose post-war events you can find out about at this link , is one of the most mysterious chapters in Italian history, and perhaps, at least until Covid, one of the most disturbing.

For years people wondered what the US knew about this affair. Now, thanks to the declassification of the telegrams , we know that the American embassy was aware of the fact that something was being organized in Italy, that there was an active function of the Military Services, and gave an excellent description of the Prince.

Now you can know what was said at the time, almost completely. Almost…

So read it, and inform yourself. Do not let history teach you, evil, Republic…

196. Telegram From the Embassy in Italy to the State Department

Rome, 7 August 1970, 1205Z.

4247. Sub: Planning for possible coup attempt week of August 10th. Broadcast to the White House.

1. Talk of the need for a coup to alleviate the apparent inability to form and maintain a stable government has been endemic in Italy since the war, waxing and waning as government crises waxed and then subsided.

2. The protracted series of crises over the past year, coupled with the growing level of labor unrest, has predictably brought the issue back to the fore. I'd be inclined to dismiss it again as this Mission has ended successfully many times in the past were it not for additional factors which seem to me to make such a threat more believable now than before. The PCI seems to share this estimate since on May 25, when another such rumor was afloat, not a single top Italian communist slept in his bed that night.

3. Traditionally this planning has not involved either the "political class" or the Italian military. We have growing evidence that this is no longer true. On Wednesday, while he was still Prime Minister2, Rumor, in communicating to me his current disenchantment with Piccoli, said that Piccoli started playing with the generals (which we confirmed independently). Rumors added that now that Piccoli was Minister of State Participation, superintendent of IRI, ENI, etc., he had access to unlimited money.

4. General Miceli, Chief of Intelligence for the Italian Army, recently made an unusual effort to cultivate Colonel Clavio, ARMA, and forwarded to Clavio three letters sent to various military commands in Rome purporting to warn these commands of a coup attempt in the second week of August.

5. General Miceli provided Colonel Clavio with a tape recording3 of a monologue by an unidentified Italian (probably a politician) making remarks to one or more unknown persons. The tape is difficult to understand and ended with vague talk of something that needed to be done in Italy before or during August 15th. The context of the remarks was such as to leave the impression that a military coup was contemplated. Clavio's efforts to have Miceli identify the speaker were unsuccessful as Miceli claims he received the tape from [less than 1 line not declassified] a close supporter of Antonio Cariglia from the PSU and that he, Miceli, does not know who was talking.

6. On 4 August Miceli told Clavio that in an attempt to investigate what was hidden behind the letters referred to in par. 4 above, he had come across another group, unrelated to the alleged author of the letters, who were known in the past to be coup plotters; [less than 1 line not declassified]

7. General Miceli repeatedly stressed both to ARMA [less than 1 line not declassified] that both he and General Marchesi, Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Defense, have close and intimate relations and full support with the main commanders of army corps. Miceli is General Marchesi's candidate to succeed Admiral Henke as head of the SID. General Marchesi has just returned from a visit to the north. This is not unusual, but the coincidence cannot be ignored.

8. All of the above is circumstantial and nebulous, yet conveys a mood that is pervasive and consistent. A prominent American businessman told me this week that he had been approached by an Italian acquaintance who informed him of a coup d'état planned for the first half of August that would be supported by all elements of the military, Confindustria and Carabinieri. The police were not involved because they were too "infiltrated" by the communists. The American businessman was asked to ascertain whether the United States would recognize such a regime if he came to power and whether he would see another member of the group for more details. I asked him to [3 1/2 undeclassified lines] He was told that:

9. The past and activity of Valerio Junio ​​Borghese are, of course, well known to us. Prince Borghese visited the Embassy on 26 January this year (memcon in Dept.).4 One is inclined not to take this wave of rumours too seriously. Yet it would be a grave mistake not to recognize that a judgment concerning the mood of exasperation mixed with a fear of the future could now cause a coalescence of military support around his movement which could tempt them to attempt such a coup. And the normal disorder of the "Ferragosto" holidays would be an opportune moment.

10. I don't think there is the slightest immediate danger of a communist takeover in Italy. While I think the Colombo government is probably the last chance for the centre-left experiment, I think there is a much better than even chance that a movement back towards the center could be worked out within the democratic process. I find it highly unlikely that a coup attempt like the one apparently contemplated could succeed. If attempted unsuccessfully, [Page 670] would likely cause a massive movement to the left across the political spectrum. If attempted, and successful, such a government could not be maintained without violent opposition and the consequent need for massive oppression. Both outcomes would seriously weaken the structure of the Alliance, would probably have unpredictable repercussions on the balance of the Mediterranean and on our initiatives in the Middle East and would probably jeopardize the outcome of the SALT talks. The current internal difficulties on the issue of the Spanish and Greek regimes would also be magnified.

11. I therefore convey to Prince Borghese the message that we do not consider it appropriate to resort to such measures in the present circumstances and that our estimation is that, if attempted, they will be unsuccessful. Therefore, it might be wise to emulate his collateral relative, Napoleon, and choose the phrase "not tonight, Josephine" as his current code word.

Note
(1) The organization involved is called the National Front.

(2) The head of the organization is Valerio Junio ​​Borghese.

(3) It is mainly made up of retired soldiers presumably with widespread contacts throughout Italian society (industrialists, trade unions and active soldiers), is not linked to any political party, is not monarchical in orientation and has a paramilitary substructure.

(4) Its motivation is nationalist, anti-communist and pro-American.

(5) It has gathered and organized throughout Italy with the intent of having a coup d'état which will be assisted by the military but once established the military would be subordinate to civilian authority. Its state of readiness is such that it can be activated in six hours. It was estimated between ten and fifteen days to carry out the coup.

(6) [2 lines not declassified]

(7) They want the US government to know about and recognize the group once it takes power. They don't ask for any specific help and only ask that their plans be kept secret and not discovered.

(8) The Italian claimed that the report and action plan were passed on to the general accompanying President Nixon to Rome (presumably General Walters) but there was no reaction.

(9) It was specifically said that the operations would be staged with or without US support.

Martin
Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 695, Country Files—Europe, Italy, vol. II. Secret; Nodis.
Rumor resigned on July 6 after the socialist and communist parties agreed to help form a majority for Tuscany's regional government. On July 11, President Saragat asked Giulio Andreotti to form a government. When Andreotti failed to create a majority coalition, the president, on July 25, asked Emilio Colombo to form a government. Colombo announced an agreement on a quadripartite ministry on 4 August. Saragat was sworn into the Colombo cabinet on August 6; it lasted 527 days until 15 January 1972. Saragat had asked Rumor to remain in office until a new government was formed; Wednesday was

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The article Golpe Borghese: what the USA knew about the military coup comes from Scenari Economici .

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This is a machine translation of a post published on Scenari Economici at the URL https://scenarieconomici.it/golpe-borghese-cosa-sapevano-gli-usa-del-colpo-di-stato-militare/ on Mon, 31 Jul 2023 20:47:56 +0000.