I’ll explain Putin’s aims and risks in Ukraine
Why Putin invaded Ukraine. The aims of Russia. The state of the art. The reaction of Ukraine and the scenarios
The causes of the war have ancient origins. They are budding from chronic Russian insecurity and the US willingness to maintain its grip on the European continent. Translated into the Muscovite tendency to ignore the ambitions of the neighbors in order to preventively shield themselves from possible attacks, in the American willingness to protect those countries that carry out the containment of the enemy. In a context made incandescent by the eminently imperial nature of the two contenders.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington began to approach many of the former Overseas satellites through NATO, guaranteeing protection from Kremlin revanchism. Up to touching the borders of Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine, in the utmost intimacy of Russian strategy, calling for the removal of the first line of defense from oneself.
Yet until 2014 Ukraine, the most important of the bearings claimed by Moscow, had remained distinct from the US sphere of influence, continuing to look eastward. The Maidan revolution, animated by the growing Ukrainian nationalism and the intervention of the Baltics and Americans, has upset this order.
Then Kiev reshaped its posture towards Europe, while the Kremlin annexed Crimea and took hold of the territories of Luhansk and Donetsk, in an attempt to run for cover. There remained in Russia the awareness of having suffered a dramatic reversal, personal humiliation for Vladimir Putin, terrified at the idea of ending up in the books of homeland history as the one who lost the cradle of Russia.
So on 21 February the Kremlin signed the recognition of the self-styled rebel republics of Donbass, sending its own peacekeepers there . Disappointed by the lesser cabotage of the American proposal, Putin has chosen to attack militarily, to impose his terms by force. Sudden decision, as demonstrated by the length of the negotiations with the West, about three months, which stripped the military campaign of the crucial surprise effect. Even against the will of some of his closest collaborators.
These include the intelligence chief, Sergei Naryshkin, humiliated during a crucial meeting of the national security council, and the highly skilled foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, who came to be pissed off at the protocol reluctance of minister Luigi Di Maio to meet him, almost to ask the West to help him diplomatically.
The Russian Armed Forces began an attack on the entire Ukrainian territory, from the air and from the ground. With the false justification of having to denazify the country, or bend it to one's will. Also entering from Belarus, as well as from Donbass. Paralyzing military installations, nerve centers, blocking access to the sea.
Now the point will be for the Kremlin to win the strategic war. Without getting bogged down in the local plains, without compacting the western front against itself.
It would be impossible to remain indefinitely on the territory. For the absence of military personnel, for the complexity of the context, for the inevitable collapse of the Russian narrative, after Putin had managed to transform Russia into the victim of the eye-catching maneuvers of the enemies.
If the operations were to last for months, with a low intensity or more serious war, it would also be difficult for Moscow to maintain the internal front, inevitably fractured by events.
(Short excerpt from an article published on Domani; here the full version )
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/vi-spiego-fini-e-rischi-di-putin-in-ucraina/ on Sun, 27 Feb 2022 18:10:44 +0000.