This is how Russia’s spies stole EU technology. Report Ft
Despite the sanctions, Russia has still managed to gain access to several Western technologies thanks to its network of spies. The Financial Times investigation
A Financial Times investigation has revealed that Russia's spy ring – set up to procure goods ranging from microchips to ammunition – managed to obtain machine tools from Germany and Finland despite sanctions imposed by the United States in March 2022.
The supply cell's ability to continue operating in Europe illustrates the challenges Western governments face as they try to block the supply of critical technology to Russia's military-industrial complex.
THE SERNIYA NETWORK OF RUSSIA
The “Serniya network” has been accused by the US Department of Justice of working on “highly sensitive and classified procurement activities” on behalf of the Russian spy agency FSB, including for its Science and Technology Intelligence Directorate, commonly known as “Direction T”.
Other clients include the Kremlin's Foreign Intelligence Service, known as SVR, the state defense conglomerate Rostec, the Russian Defense Ministry and Rosatom, the state atomic energy company responsible for the country's nuclear arsenal.
The FT has found that a Russian company, controlled by the same person who controls an entity of the Serniya network, described by the United States as "engaged in proliferation activities under the direction of the Russian secret services", continued to purchase items from companies of the 'EU.
THE ROLE OF TREYDTULS
Company records, import declarations and interviews reveal that Trading House Treydtuls, registered to an address in an industrial area north of Moscow, has purchased $900,000 worth of materials since the start of the Ukrainian war, including microchips and for industrial production, mostly from the EU.
Treydtuls is registered under the same address as Robin Trade, part of the Serniya network, and belongs to the same person, a Russian citizen named Alexey Zibyrov. A Western official who was presented with the FT's findings confirmed that Zibyrov, who has not been named or charged by US authorities, is considered a person "of interest" in relation to his ties to the FSB.
Commercially available customs records, corroborated by import data shared with the FT by Maxim Mironov, a professor of finance at the IE business school in Madrid, show that Robin Trade moved $12.2 million of goods into Russia up to April 2022, before its revenue plummeted by 90% after the imposition of sanctions.
While other parts of the network have ceased their purchasing activity following the sanctions, Treydtuls has started importing machine tools from a company in Germany. Customs records show that Treydtuls brought 22 tons of equipment from Germany, with a declared value of $554,000, to Russia by the end of 2022.
Customs records also show that Treydtuls simultaneously purchased $253,000 worth of integrated circuit boards from a small Singaporean firm. The items were manufactured by US semiconductor groups Analog Devices, Texas Instruments and Altera and the German company IC-Haus.
All of these companies have ceased exports to Russia, increasing the need for Russian state and military entities to source advanced electronics from third countries.
Treydtuls also purchased $3,700 worth of hardened cutting and grinding wheels from a Finnish company. These items are subject to UK Government restrictions on export to Russia, North Korea and Iran, but are not banned by the EU.
There is no evidence to indicate that the European companies were aware they were dealing with a company connected to Russian intelligence. Zibyrov did not respond to an e-mailed request for comment from the FT .
WESTERN ELECTRONICS ARE KEY TO RUSSIA
It is vital for Russia to secure advanced electronics and machine tools to maintain its military-industrial complex.
According to a report by the Center for a New American Security last October, Russia is turning to "grey imports through the black market or a chain of companies designed to hide the end user." These are programs similar to the smuggling programs run by North Korea and Iran, which are also subject to heavy US sanctions.
Emails intercepted by US authorities, and included in the DoJ's indictment, showed how in August 2020 a supply network company had received a license renewal from the FSB, which allowed it to "carry out work related the use of information constituting a state secret up to the top-secret level”.
In December, the DofJ accused five Russian citizens linked to Serniya of conspiring to procure military-grade and dual-use technology for Russian defense companies.
Among them was Vadim Konoshchenok, suspected of being an FSB colonel and detained by Estonian border guards after he attempted to enter Russia with US-made electronics, microchips and munitions, according to US indictment.
Some of the network's smuggling activities involved technologies that the United States claimed could be used to develop hypersonic weapons.
While Treydtuls has thus far avoided Western sanctions, his multiple ties to the offending FSB network were visible through commercial ties prior to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, raising further questions about how Treydtuls was allowed to to continue buying products from the EU.
Records show that in 2019 Treydtuls imported items from two UK incorporated companies, Majory LLP and Photon Pro LLP, based in the Shoreditch area of London. Both were hit with US sanctions last year for operating as front companies in the FSB network.
One of Photon Pro's two directors, according to UK company filings, is a Russian national named Yevgeniy Alexandrovich Grinin, who was indicted by the United States last December but remains at large and wanted by the FBI.
Majory LLP, until its breakup in February, was controlled by Andrey Georgiyevich Zakharov, who the US has accused of running front companies to import sensitive technology in defiance of Western sanctions.
According to Russian company records, Treydtuls is registered at the same Moscow address as a technology company Zakharov co-owns, NTS Wellink. Wellink has participated in Russian government tenders for highly sensitive state-controlled entities, including the Federal Protection Service responsible for Putin's personal security.
Erki Kodar, the Estonian minister in charge of sanctions, told the FT: “Even before the Russian aggression in Ukraine, their modus operandi was to smuggle goods and try to find people willing to move these goods across the border. Our security services have been tracking this phenomenon for the past 10-15 years. The phenomenon has intensified.
Brian Nelson, a senior US Treasury official, earlier this month visited Switzerland, Austria, Italy and Germany to warn how Moscow is continuing to evade export controls and buy advanced equipment .
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Start Magazine at the URL https://www.startmag.it/mondo/russia-tecnologie-europee-spionaggio/ on Sat, 06 May 2023 05:17:44 +0000.