The dangerous game in the Eastern Mediterranean / 3 – Erdogan’s only shore is in Berlin
Turkey is a revisionist power. By renouncing the alleged role of defender of international law, Berlin has also shown itself to be a revisionist power. By taking an objectively pro-Turkish position, Berlin has shown itself to be a revisionist power of the NATO Treaty and the common defense clauses of the EU Treaty as well. With the aim of becoming a “Greater Switzerland”, neutralized and demilitarized .
In a first article we introduced the dispute between Greece and Turkey, from the point of view of international law. Concluding that when Turkey speaks of its "rights", it means those deriving from a law of its own: which assigns itself a very generous interpretation of the unsigned convention, while denying Athens its rights certainly deriving from the convention. This law which is unique to Ankara also has a name: "Mavi Vatan" , the Blue Homeland. Which Ankara claims to be based "on international law, on the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice", exactly when this international law is refused to sign, that court refuses to sue.
This means that Turkey is a "revisionist power", that is a state that presents an attitude of strong criticism or total rejection of the political-territorial structure established by the treaties and the aspiration to change it. A widespread expression after the First World War, first of all in Italy which wanted to review the 'mutilated victory', then in the defeated states, which wanted to recover the territorial cuts suffered. Hitler was certainly a revisionist, and it is no coincidence that the treaty that allowed the reunification of the two Germanys, in 1990, imposed on Germany the definitive recognition of the German-Polish border. Turkey did not participate in the Second World War, but has suffered large curtailments between the Italian-Turkish war and the First World War and aims to review those in the Aegean Sea.
To the extent that its rulers sometimes claim they desire islands or parts of the Greek mainland, Turkey is a revisionist power of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. For example, on Saturday, Turkish First Vice President Fuat Oktay said that "the state turkish and the nation ”cannot accept to continue crying seeing Aignoussa, Chios, Casterosso in the hands of the Greeks. But, for now, Ankara formally claims only parts of the Greek sea: we can therefore define it as a revisionist power of the Montego Bay convention. Until further notice.
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In a second article we outlined the position of some of the enemies that Turkey has made, in the West and in the Eastern Mediterranean, precisely because of its own revisionism. Concluding how it appears isolated, with one notable exception: Germany.
First of all, the German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has been conducting an attempt at 'mediation' for months. As we have seen, he was answered: from the Greek Dendias that Athens would defend its rights (ie the Montego Bay convention); from the Turkish Cavusoglu that Ankara claimed there were no pre-conditions (ie no Montego Bay convention) and indeed defined the reference to the convention as a "maximalist approach". This describes the world in reverse, typical of any revisionist power: in which sticking to the treaties becomes a maximalist position, violating the treaties a reasonable position.
Maas reacted by inviting the parties to accept "direct talks with honest intentions", and then specify "in which both points of view are put on the table". With the small problem that the Turkish point of view is revisionist: for Ankara, no dialogue is possible unless Athens first deprives itself of the protection of international law. With two consequences: the first, Berlin has objectively renounced its claimed role as defender of international law; the second, by inviting Athens to commit a similar mistake, Berlin took an objectively pro-Turkish position.
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The first, Berlin has objectively given up its claimed role as defender of international law.
There are countless times that Merkel has performed as a great defender of international law, merely by way of example: after the Russian annexation of Crimea ("we sanction Russia for the defense of international law"), accepting the Fulbright Prize ("the international law is called into question, it is our duty to oppose "), criticizing the Israeli settlements in the West Bank (" they are a violation of international law "), contesting the American sanctions on Nord Stream 2 (" they are in violation of international law ") and countless other times. But it is especially in her constant attacks on Trump that the Chancellor has exposed herself, once she lectured him on the Refugee Convention and her speakers read "Merkel represents everything Trump hates: globalism, multilateralism, international law." Particularly enthusiastic Marta Dassù:
"Germany is a new trade-based and multilateralist power, for which international law and international institutions are of paramount importance."
But no. For Germany, international law is not of fundamental importance, indeed: so much so that Maas is ready to throw it away at the first opportunity. Is a surprise? Not so much, for those with a minimum of memory and memories that reunified Germany was the first country in the world (with the Vatican) to recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. So is the role of defender of international law that Berlin claims for itself propaganda? Yes. So, is reunified Germany a revisionist power? Yup.
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The second, by inviting Athens to make the mistake of depriving itself of the protection of international law, Berlin has taken an objectively pro-Turkish position.
On the other hand, Maas has hinted that he wants to take the position of the “honest matchmaker”, ie the third party indifferent to the outcome of the negotiation. But this role may be that of Switzerland (which, in fact, has offered itself), not that of a state twice committed to defending Greece and once committed to defending Cyprus from military aggression. On the contrary, Germany is not a third party, as a military aggression is underway and in light of Germany's military commitments of solidarity, in NATO and the EU, towards the attacked ally. Commitments that Berlin obviously considers it does not want to respect.
A choice underlined by the words of the German defense minister, who defined the French-led military exercise as "not of help", as well as Merkel herself: "We can support our European partners and send ships there, but we are also committed to resume dialogue between Greece and Turkey ”… it is a pity that the ships are French.
This choice was further underlined by what happened at the table of the EU Council of Foreign Ministers, under the German presidency, which, despite strong resistance, obtained sanctions on Belarus while postponing the decision on sanctions to Turkey to a subsequent meeting on 24 September and who knows when. Any sanctions that would still be very light, despite the fact that trade with the EU is really important for the Turkish economy, so much so that the Turks, who had already released the fleet at the first announcement in mid-August, in the face of the new postponement they made her do fire maneuvers. In Berlin many seem convinced that the problem of stability in the Mediterranean is France, Macron wants to convince them both Turkey, it seems to us rather it is Germany.
In short, the reunified Germany is also a revisionist power of the NATO Treaty and of the common defense clauses of the EU Treaty.
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The fact that the reunified Germany is a revisionist power promises interesting consequences when, as Lucio Caracciolo informs us , "it is thinking the unthinkable: establishing itself as a needle in the Euro-Mediterranean balance".
He sees German revisionism towards the NATO treaty, recalling a famous speech by Merkel in a Munich brewery (!), When she pronounced: “we Europeans must take our destiny in hand”; whereas 'Europeans' must be understood as 'Germans', as the present Greek-Turkish crisis makes clear even to the blind. He added: "We must fight alone for our future", which immediately seemed strange, considering the miserable state of the German armed forces; but it is by no means certain that, by 'fighting', the chancellor meant to refer to the military challenge.
Caracciolo also sees three obstacles to German emancipation: Hitler's stigma, German anti-militarism, military impotence. But these would not be obstacles, if what Merkel wants were a neutralized and demilitarized Germany, a 'Greater Switzerland' that does not threaten anyone militarily and everything can recall the Hitlerian stigma less. It was the dream of non-West Germany, which the former secretary of the Agitprop Section of the Communist Youth of the GDR at the Academy of Sciences in East Berlin can finally fulfill.
As for the risk of direct military threats, it does not exist, as Germany is surrounded by a large buffer of non-hostile states. As for EastMed gas, Berlin has already chosen to become dependent on Russian gas. As for the risk of a new invasion of migrants, as in 2015, this time the events of February 2020 have shown that Greece is determined to keep them out; and even if Greece collapsed, Hungary and other buffer states along the way would take care of it. Therefore, Berlin sees no advantage in endangering its rich commercial relations with Turkey: for the Greeks, it does not want to spend a plane, a ship, a penalty.
In short, Germany is not an ally of Greece.
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It remains to comment on the manifest inanity of international organizations.
The EU, blocked by Berlin's pro-Turkish position, in addition to not sanctioning Turkey, tolerates its occupying part of the territory of its own member state, the Republic of Cyprus, and expects to keep Western troops out of it on the basis of agreements that it violated itself with the invasion.
As for NATO, Secretary General Stoltenberg was unable to give any signs of life even when Turkish ships aimed at a French ship engaged in an EU mission outside Libya in June; he was only able to “explore” the possibility of observing the situation more closely; and even went so far as to explicitly support the German position. Which seems to be only the logical consequence of Germany not being an ally of Greece. Why, indeed: what are two non-allied states doing in the same alliance?
But not only. We could also ask ourselves: what are two non-allied states doing in the same currency? Well, nothing. The Greeks sacrificed themselves so much for the euro, in the belief that the Europeans would defend a euro country from the Turkish, but Berlin proves that it was a foolish belief. On the contrary, the rules of the euro prevented the Greeks from building stronger armed forces. We might as well take note.
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The time has come to sum up our articles. A Turkish government with its feet on the ground would immediately sign the UN convention and try to enforce it as far as it is of interest. Erdogan, who has no feet on the ground, claims to impose a right of his own to become an independent energy power. In doing so, it is isolated in the eastern Mediterranean and does not appear to have other banks in the West, not even in Italy. Except in Germany, which, by renouncing the alleged role of defender of international law, has shown itself to be a revisionist power and, taking an objectively pro-Turkish position, has shown itself to be a revisionist power also of the NATO Treaty and the common defense of the EU Treaty; with the aim of becoming a “Greater Switzerland”, neutralized and demilitarized.
PART ONE: What the law says and what Ankara says
SECOND PART: Erdogan barks at Athens, but is isolated
The post The dangerous game in the Eastern Mediterranean / 3 – Erdogan's only shore is in Berlin appeared first on Atlantico Quotidiano .
This is a machine translation from Italian language of a post published on Atlantico Quotidiano at the URL http://www.atlanticoquotidiano.it/quotidiano/il-pericoloso-gioco-nel-mediterraneo-orientale-3-lunica-sponda-di-erdogan-e-a-berlino/ on Wed, 02 Sep 2020 04:11:00 +0000.